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61. INTRODUCTION
This report is a background report of the futures process by the Finnish Energy Industries (Energiateol-
lisuus ry). The aim of the futures process is to formulate energy scenarios for Finland up to the year
2050. The scenarios, including possible images of the future and pathways to these futures, are a result
of a series of futures workshops and questionnaires implemented by Turku School of economics, Finland
Futures Research Centre. The first futures workshop was arranged in Helsinki 4 of November 2008, fol-
lowed by a questionnaire sent to all workshop participants and additional energy experts in December
2008, followed by a questionnaire sent to all workshop participants and additional energy experts in De-
cember 2008. The futures process continues in 2009 and will be reported separately later on, but it is
the general context of this background report, which gathers together information of future prospects in
the energy sector and provides seeds for inputs of the participants at different stages at the futures process.
The content of this background report includes an overview of existing international energy-related sce-
narios and international development in general, a review of different energy resources, potentials and
energy technologies. The purpose of this report is firstly to offer input for the participants of the above
described futures process, and secondly to provide up-to-date information of available international en-
ergy scenarios and available energy solutions to a wider public.
The structure of this background report is as follows: After the Introduction, a set of existing interna-
tional energy scenarios are described in Chapter 2 titled “Global Megatrends”. This chapter deals also
with overviews to development in some major economies in the World; China, India, the United States,
European Union and Russia. International climate change negotiations are also presented from the per-
spective of possible burden sharing approaches because as we all know, the future of the UNFCCC Cli-
mate negotiations is open after the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol ends in 2012.
Chapter 3 outlines requirements of the Finnish society for the future energy production and consump-
tion. The main focus in this chapter is on domestic energy and climate strategies and related policies, but
it is necessary to keep in mind that the Finnish society consists of different types of actors who may have
their own energy-related visions and strategies which are not represented at national level which is more
or less a political compromise. Moreover, national strategies and policies do not reach as far as 2050.
Chapter 4 presents energy resources, potentials and technologies starting from fossil fuels and ending
with energy storage and carbon capture and storage technologies. In between, nuclear energy technolo-
gies, several different renewable energy and energy storage technologies are described as possible op-
tions for future.
Chapter 5 deals with energy markets – traditionally energy producers have utilised world markets of oil
and refined oil products, coal, and other fuels, but the actual energy carriers have been generated,
7transmitted and distributed by regional monopolies. Electricity and gas markets have been liberalised
and opened for competition, and they still face many problems in spite of the experience obtained from two
decades. New energy markets may also emerge at different levels from national to global energy systems.
The last chapter focuses on energy transmission and distribution, which is in a central role in the direc-
tion where future energy markets will develop. All the themes of the chapters in this background report
are related to each other, which sets a real challenge to formulate possible energy futures and pathways
to them but also makes the topic an extremely interesting in Finland, a small open economy with limited
domestic energy resources.
82.  GLOBAL MEGETRENDS
2.1. Review of selected Global Energy Scenarios
In the following, major elements of energy scenarios published by World Energy Council, WEC (2.1.1),
International Energy Agency, IEA (2.1.2), Greenpeace (2.1.3), American Council of the United Nations
University (2.1.4), United Nations, UN (2.1.5), Shell (2.1.6), Total (2.1.7), and European Renewable En-
ergy Council EREC (2.1.8) will be presented.
2.1.1. World Energy Council: Deciding the Future: Energy Policy Scenarios to 2050
Since 1993 World Energy Council has built energy scenarios to provide insight on the rapidly changing
environment in which the energy sector operates. In Energy Policy Scenarios to 2050, the council de-
cided to take a new approach to scenarios, moving away from strictly statistical modelling to an ap-
proach that would take account bottom-up regional views of energy future focusing on policies to ensure
energy sustainability. Series of 20 workshops were conducted from July 2005 to April 2007 in various
regions of the world. Over 400 principals from industry, government, academia, NGOs and trade groups
gave their views of how to meet the need for energy that is accessible, available, and acceptable by 2020,
2035 and 2050. These qualitative views of how policies can address future challenges to the delivery of
clean energy services in all regions of the World were checked for consistency against a mathematical
model of the energy sector. In addition, seven specialist groups provided current data on everything
from climate change to power generation, energy price drivers and electricity consumption patterns,
transport and finance. (WEC 2007)
According to WEC’s Energy Policy Scenarios to 2050 energy supplies must double by 2050 to meet the
energy demand of all households worldwide. The main driver to address this challenge is higher energy
prices. Higher prices will also propel the developed world towards greater energy efficiency and attract
much higher levels of public and private capital investment in infrastructure, research, development and
deployment of clean and more efficient technologies. Different levels of government engagement in these
and other areas can have different outcomes in the future. Using the metaphors of four well-known ani-
mals, the work of the WEC Scenarios group delineates four possible approaches by decision makers to
the challenges of delivering future energy in a sustainable and secure way. These four approaches are
represented by the lion, the giraffe, the elephant and the leopard. (WEC 2007)
The lion is a highly skilled and social animal that launches its forays after careful planning and in a
highly cooperative effort. It represents strong government engagement, together with close cooperation
and deep integration of the public and private sectors, domestically and internationally. The giraffe is a
9highly adaptable and independent creature that thrives in an unstructured environment and sees oppor-
tunity at great distances. It describes market-driven actions made with minimal government involve-
ment but a high degree of cooperation and integration of the public and private domains, domestically
and cross borders. (WEC 2007)
The elephant is a social animal with good memory that relies mostly on its own well-structured family
unit with little cooperation between families. It characterizes government deeply engaged in policymak-
ing, but with little cooperation between nations or integration of the public and private spheres. The
leopard is a solitary creature swift to act in isolation. It represents energy responses with little govern-
ment involvement and little cooperation and integration of the public and private sectors. (WEC 2007)
Below are the graphics of some of the main variants of the scenarios. The first graphic presents the
global energy intensity for the four scenarios. The second graphic presents the percent change in pri-
mary energy production. The third graphic presents the rise of the greenhouse gas emissions for the four
scenarios. (WEC 2007)
Figure 1. Percent Change in Global Energy Intensity (E/GDP) for the Four Scenarios from the
Mathematical Model Projections (WEC 2007).
Figure 2.  Percent Change in Primary Energy Production for the Four Scenarios from the
Mathematical Model Projections (WEC 2007).
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Figure 3.  Percent Change in Greenhouse Gas Emissions (as Carbon Dioxide equivalent) for the
Four Scenarios from the Mathematical Model Projections (WEC 2007).
2.1.2. IEA: World Energy Outlook 2008
World Energy Outlook (WEO) is an annual publication by International Energy Agency (OECD/IEA)
containing medium- to long-term energy projections and analysis. It has been long recognized as the
leading source of forward-looking global energy market analysis and has received a number of awards
from prestigious organisations around the world.
Key assumptions of the IEA energy scenarios include population growth and growth rate of World GDP,
primary drivers of energy demand. According to the report, global population is assumed to grow 1 % per
year on average, from an estimated 6.4 billion in 2004 to 8.1 billion 2030. The rate of growth in World
GDP is assumed to be 3.4 % per year over the period. (IEA 2006b)
In a Reference Scenario, which provides a baseline vision of how energy markets are likely to evolve
without new government measures to alter underlying energy trends, global primary energy demand
increases by 53 % between now and 2030. Over 70 % of this increase comes from developing countries,
led by China and India. Oil remains its position as a number one primary energy source as the World’s
oil demand reaches 116 million b/d in 2030 (84 million b/d in 2005). Consequently global carbon-
dioxide (CO2) emissions reach 40 Gt in 2030, a 55 % increase over today’s level and China overtakes the
United States as the world’s biggest emitter of CO2. These trends would amplify the magnitude of global
climate change. (IEA 2006b)
An Alternative Policy Scenario demonstrates that the energy future can be substantially improved if gov-
ernments around the world implement the policies and measures they are currently considering. In this
scenario, global energy demand is reduced by 10 % in 2030 – equivalent to China’s entire energy con-
sumption today. Global carbon-dioxide emissions are reduced by 16 % – equivalent to current emissions
in the United States and Canada combined – in the same time-frame. In the OECD countries, oil imports
and CO2 emissions peak by 2015 and then begin to fall. Improved efficiency of energy use contributes
most to the energy savings. Increased use of nuclear power and renewables also help reduce fossil-fuel
11
demand and emissions. Just a dozen specific policies in key countries account for 40 % of the reduction
in global CO2 emissions. These shifts in energy trends would serve all three of the principal goals of en-
ergy policy: greater security, more environmental protection and improved economic efficiency. (IEA
2006b)
Figure 4. Total Primary Energy Supply by Fuel (IEA 2006a).
The new World Energy Outlook 2008 is based on following assumptions in its reference scenario:
The price of crude oil is estimated to increase slowly up to 2030 stabilizing at the price level of about 120
$/barrel (real 2007 dollars) (IEA 2008).
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Figure 5.  Average IEA Crude Oil Import Price (annual data) (IEA 2008).
The world primary energy demand is expected to continue its growth in the reference scenario although
the growth is slower than in previous scenarios due to increased price and lower economic growth (IEA
2008).
Figure 6. World Primary Energy Demand by Fuel in the Reference Scenario (IEA 2008).
Most of the primary energy demand growth comes from non-OECD countries, especially China and In-
dia (IEA 2008).
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Figure 7. World Primary Energy Demand by Region in the Reference Scenario (IEA 2008).
Table  1. World Primary Energy Demand by Region in the Reference Scenario (Mtoe) (IEA
2008).
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Figure 8. Incremental Primary Energy Demand by Fuel in the Reference Scenario, 2006–2030
(IEA 2008).
The growth in energy demand is estimated to be quite evenly distributed between industrial, transport
and residential demand. IEA does not believe that in the transport sector there will be any major shift to
electric vehicles. (IEA 2008.)
Table 1.  World Final Energy Consumption by Sector in the Reference Scenario (Mtoe) (IEA
2008).
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The increase in future fossil fuel production mainly takes place in non-OECD countries (IEA 2008).
Figure 9. Incremental World Fossil Fuel Production in the Reference Scenario (IEA 2008).
The cumulative investments in energy supply infrastructure will be mainly carried out in developing
countries and the largest investments will be in power sector (production, transmission and distribution)
(IEA 2008).
Table 2.  Cumulative Investment in Energy-supply Infrastructure in the Reference Scenario,
2007–2030 ($ billion in year-2007 dollars) (IEA 2008).
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Figure 10. Cumulative Investment in Energy-supply Infrastructure in the Reference Scenario,
2007–2030 (IEA 2008).
Oil
The oil demand is estimated to decrease in OECD countries mainly due to decrease in non-transport sec-
tors. The main increase is estimated to take place in China. (IEA 2008.)
Figure 11.  Change in Primary Oil Demand by Region in the Reference Scenario, 2007–2030 (IEA
2008).
The oil demand is estimated to increase mainly in transport sector and especially in non-OECD coun-
tries (IEA 2008).
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Figure 12.  Incremental Oil Demand by Sector in the Reference Scenario, 2006 - 2030 (IEA 2008).
The increase in vehicle fleet is also estimated to be highest in China (IEA 2008).
Figure 13. Light-duty Vehicle Stock by Region in the Reference Scenario (IEA 2008).
Middle East is assumed to increase its share in oil production from the present 29 % to 36 % in 2030 due
to its large reserves (IEA 2008).
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Figure 14. World Oil Production by Source in the Reference Scenario (IEA 2008).
Figure 15.  Proven Remaining Oil Reserves by Region, 1980– 2007 (end-year) (IEA 2008).
The production costs of oil depend on the source and technology utilised. The production costs of non-
conventional sources are considerably higher than in conventional sources (especially in Middle East)
(IEA 2008).
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Figure 16.  Long-term Oil-supply Cost Curve (IEA 2008).
The main increase in future growth of oil supply is thought to come from sources yet to be developed and
those yet to be found. The increase of supply by Enhanced Oil recovery (EOR) technology (e.g. by CO2
injection) and non-conventional sources is estimated to be minor. (IEA 2008.)
Figure 17.  World Oil Production by Source in the Reference Scenario (IEA 2008).
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Figure 18. Change in Oil Production by Country / Region, 2007–2030 (IEA 2008).
Gas
Natural gas demand is estimated to increase especially in Middle East and Asia and the main sector
where gas consumption is increasing is power production. (IEA 2008).
Figure 19.  Increase in Primary Demand for Natural Gas by Region in the Reference Scenario
(IEA 2008).
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Figure 20. World Primary Natural Gas Demand by Sector in the Reference Scenario (IEA 2008).
Natural gas production is estimated to increase most in Middle East although East Europe/Eurasia is
supposed to remain the main production area also in the future (IEA 2008).
Figure 21.  Natural Gas Production by Region in the Reference Scenario (IEA 2008).
Figure 22. Proven Reserves of Natural Gas (IEA 2008).
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Figure 23. Change in Natural Gas Production by Country / Region, 2007–2030 (IEA 2008).
Coal
The coal demand is estimated to increase mainly in non-OECD countries, especially in China. The Euro-
pean coal demand is estimated to decrease after 2015 (IEA 2008).
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Figure 24. World Primary Coal* Demand in the Reference Scenario (million tons of coal equiva-
lent) (IEA 2008).
Figure 25. Proven Coal Reserves in Leading Producing Countries, 2005 (IEA 2008).
Electricity
Electricity demand is estimated to grow in all world regions. The growth is estimated to be highest in
Asia (especially in India and Indonesia) where the per capita consumption figures are still very low. (IEA
2008).
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Figure 26. Electricity Demand Growth Rates by Region in the Reference Scenario (IEA 2008).
Figure 27. Per-capita Electricity Demand by Selected Region in the Reference Scenario (IEA
2008).
Coal is estimated to be the main source in the increased power production. Considerable increase is also
estimated to take place in gas, hydro and wind production. (IEA 2008).
Figure 28. World Electricity Generation by Fuel in the Reference Scenario (IEA 2008).
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The investment needs in the power sector are huge. In the OECD the investments are estimated to take
place mainly in power production, while in the non-OECD countries, especially in Asia, huge needs exist
especially in the distribution sector. (IEA 2008).
Figure 29. Projected Capacity Additions and Investment Needs in Power Infrastructure in the
Reference Scenario (IEA 2008).
The increase in renewables based power generation is mainly estimated to take place in hydro and wind
production although later on the biomass and solar based production is also estimated to increase. IEA
does not estimate huge increase in solar power production because they do not believe in any major
technological breakthrough in solar panel production, but estimate just slow decrease in production
costs due to increased automation in production and slight increase in efficiency. (IEA 2008).
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Figure 30. Increase in World Electricity Generation from Renewables in the Reference Scenario
(IEA 2008).
It is estimated that in OECD the main relative increase in power production after 2015 takes place in nu-
clear production, but in absolute terms the fossil production and wind production will be most impor-
tant. Most of the power production investments worldwide are assumed to take place in renewable en-
ergy based production. (IEA 2008)
Figure 31.  Increase in OECD Electricity Generation by Source in the Reference Scenario (IEA
2008).
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Figure 32. World Investment in New Power-generation Plants by Fuel in the Reference Scenario
(IEA 2008).
CO2 emissions
The CO2 emissions are estimated to grow in the reference scenario. The main increase will come from
coal combustion in non-OECD countries. (IEA 2008).
Figure 33.  Energy-related CO2 Emissions in the Reference Scenario by Fuel and Region (IEA
2008).
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Figure 34. Incremental Energy-related CO2 Emissions by Country and Region, 2006–2030 (IEA
2008).
The increase in the CO2 emissions in China is closely related to the structural change in world economy.
China will be producing more goods to be consumed in other parts of the world. Figure 35 shows the in-
ter-regional flows of energy related CO2 emissions embedded in exports of goods and services in 2006. It
can be estimated that the “export” of CO2 emissions embedded in Chinese products will continue to in-
crease in the future. This phenomenon can also be seen in the Finnish case of exporting embedded CO2
emissions especially in the pulp and paper and metal products. (IEA 2008).
Figure 35. Ten Largest Inter-regional Flows of Energy-related CO2 Emissions embedded in Ex-
ports of Goods and Services, 2006 (Million tonnes) (IEA 2008).
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2.1.3. Greenpeace: The Energy [R]evolution
In 2007 Greenpeace published an energy scenario for the year 2050. It was written in collaboration with
the European Renewable Energy Council (EREC), specialists from the German Space Agency and scien-
tists and engineers from universities, institutes and the renewable energy industry.
The Energy [R]evolution provides a practical blueprint for how to half global CO2 emissions, while allow-
ing for an increase in energy consumption by 2050. It demonstrates how a ‘business as usual’ scenario,
based on IEA’s World Energy Outlook projections, is not an option for environmental, economic and
security of supply reasons. In energy revolution scenario energy demand will be reduced by almost 50 %
in 2050 and half of the remaining demand will be covered by renewable energy sources. (Greenpeace &
EREC 2007)
Figure 36.  Projection of Global Population Development (Greenpeace & EREC 2007).
Figure 37. Projection of Global GDP Development (Greenpeace & EREC 2007).
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Figure 38. Development of Primary Energy Consumption under the Energy [R]evolution Scenario
("efficiency" reduction from Reference Scenario) (Greenpeace & EREC 2007).
Whilst worldwide emissions of CO2 will almost double under IEA’s Reference Scenario, under the energy
[R]evolution scenario they will decrease from 23,000 million tonnes in 2003 to 11,500 million tonnes in
2050 (Greenpeace & EREC 2007).
Figure 39. Development of Global CO2 Emissions under the Energy [R]evolution Scenario
(Greenpeace & EREC 2007).
2.1.4. State of the Future 2007, Global Energy Scenarios 2020
State of the Future is a yearly report published by the American Council of the United Nations Univer-
sity. State of the Future 2007 includes a chapter that represents four energy scenarios for the 2020. They
are Business as usual, Environmental backlash, High tech economy and Political turmoil.
Business as usual scenario assumes that the global dynamics of change continue without great surprises
or much change in energy sources and consumption patterns, other than those that might be expected as
a result of the change dynamics and trends already in place. Economic growth is predicted to be moder-
ate or high until oil prices go so high they might cause recessions and depressions. Environmental back-
lash scenario assumes that the international environmental movement becomes much more organized;
some lobbying for legal actions and new regulations and suing in courts, while others become violent
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and attack fossil energy industries. Economic growth is predicted to be moderate or high. Oil price fluc-
tuates with environmental actions. (State of the Future 2007)
High tech economy scenario assumes that technological innovations accelerate beyond current expecta-
tions, and have impacts in the energy supply mix and consumption patterns, to a similar magnitude as
the Internet initiated in the 1990s. Economic growth is high and great efficiencies prevent oil peak prior
to 2050. Political turmoil scenario assumes increasing conflicts, wars, and several countries collapsing
into failed states, leading to increasing migrations and political instabilities around the world. Economic
growth is predicted to be low and depressions are probable. (State of the Future 2007)
Figure 40. Total Energy Demand (billion barrels OE) (State of the Future 2007).
Figure 41.  Annual CO2 Emissions from Fossil Fuels (billion tons) (State of the Future 2007).
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2.1.5. UN: Global Environmental Outlook
Global Environmental Outlooks are the most comprehensive UN reports on the environment. The
United Nations Environment Programme’s fourth report was prepared by about 390 experts and re-
viewed by more than 1 000 others across the world. Four scenarios are constructed in the report. Mar-
kets First, Policy First, Security First and Sustainability First explore society’s common future up to the
year 2050 in terms of the environment and the impact of lifestyle choices and policy responses to ad-
dress various challenges. They explore how current social, economic and environmental trends may un-
fold along divergent development paths in the future, and potential impacts for the environment, human
well-being and development. (UN 2008)
World population is predicted to be increasing in every scenario. In Security First scenario the popula-
tion is estimated to be almost 10 billion in 2050 (UN 2008).
Figure 42.  Population Trends (UN 2008).
World GDP is expected to increase in all scenarios. The lowest rate is in Security First scenario (UN
2008).
Figure 43. Gross Domestic Product (UN 2008).
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World energy use is expected to increase in all scenarios, driven mostly by intensive energy use in low-
income countries. However, per capita energy use in high-income countries remains at a much higher
level than in low income countries. Primary energy use in Policy First and Security First increases from
about 400 EJ in 2000 to 600–700 EJ in 2030 and around 800–900 EJ in 2050. In Market First sce-
nario primary energy use will be over 1000 EJ in 2050. That would almost double the energy use in Sus-
tainability First scenario. (UN 2008.)
Figure 44. Total Primary Energy Use (UN 2008).
In terms of the energy mix, fossil fuels continue to dominate energy supply in all four scenarios. Bio fuels
will be the most important alternative for oil in Sustainability First scenario. (UN 2008)
Figure 45. Global Primary Energy Use by Fuel (UN 2008).
Decrease in emissions is highest in Policy First and Sustainability First scenarios (UN 2008).
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Figure 46.  Per Capita Equivalent Carbon Emissions from Energy and Industry by Region (UN
2008).
2.1.6. Shell Energy Scenarios to 2050
Shell’s scenario group has developed global scenarios since 1970’s. Shell’s energy scenarios to 2050 high-
light the stresses that population growth and economic development are placing on energy supply, en-
ergy demand and the environment. According to Shell’s scenario group the world is entering to an era of
revolutionary transitions where the three hard truths about energy supply and demand can no longer be
avoided. (Shell International B.V. 2008.)
Firstly the World is about to face a step-change in energy use. World population is set to increase up to 9
billions by the 2050. At the same time population giants China and India, are entering their most en-
ergy-intensive phase of economic growth as they industrialize, build infrastructure, and increase their
use of transportation. Demand pressures will stimulate alternative supply and more efficiency in energy
use — but these alone may not be enough to offset growing demand tensions completely. Disappointing
the aspirations of millions by adopting policies that may slow economic growth is not an answer either —
or not one that is politically feasible. (Shell International B.V. 2008.)
Secondly supply will struggle to keep pace. By 2050, growth in the production of easily accessible oil and
gas will not match the projected rate of demand growth. While abundant coal exists in many parts of the
world, transportation difficulties and environmental degradation ultimately pose limits to its growth.
Meanwhile, alternative energy sources such as bio fuels may become a much more significant part of the
energy mix — but there is no “silver bullet” that will completely resolve supply-demand tensions. (Shell
International B.V. 2008.)
Thirdly environmental stresses are increasing. Even if it were possible for fossil fuels to maintain their
current share of the energy mix and respond to increased demand, CO2 emissions would then be on a
pathway that could severely threaten human well-being. Even with the moderation of fossil fuel use and
effective CO2 management, the path forward is still highly challenging. Remaining within desirable lev-
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els of CO2 concentration in the atmosphere will become increasingly difficult. (Shell International B.V.
2008.)
To help think about the future of energy, Shell’s scenario group have developed two scenarios that de-
scribe alternative ways it may develop. The first scenario called Scramble reflects a focus on national en-
ergy security. Immediate pressures drive decision-makers, especially the need to secure energy supply in
the near future for themselves and their allies. Despite increasing rhetoric, action to address climate
change and encourage energy efficiency is pushed into the future. In Scramble scenario primary energy
demand raises over 900 EJ per year. Main responses to the increasing energy demand are coal and re-
newable energy, mainly bio fuels. (Shell International B.V. 2008)
Figure 47. Scramble: Primary Energy by Source (Shell International B.V. 2008).
In the second scenario – Blueprints – growing local actions begin to address the challenges of economic
development, energy security and environmental pollution. A price is applied to a critical mass of emis-
sions giving a huge stimulus to the development of clean energy technologies, such as carbon dioxide
capture and storage, and energy efficiency measures. As a result the carbon dioxide emissions are much
lower compared to Scramble scenario. Also the global primary energy demand stays under 800 EJ per
year. Primary sources of energy are coal and renewables. (Shell International B.V. 2008)
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Figure 48.  Blueprints: Primary Energy by Source (Shell International B.V. 2008).
Figure 49.  Blueprints: CO2 Emissions from Energy (Shell International B.V. 2008).
2.1.7. World Energy Prospects According to Total
Total’s report highlights the importance of promoting energy efficient solutions to save natural resources
and limit CO2 emissions. The critical challenge is reconciling two up to now conflicting targets: meeting
energy demand and protecting the climate. Therefore development in technical solutions such as CCS to
limit related emissions is needed. Also it is necessary to develop alternative and renewable energy op-
tions such as nuclear power, biomass, photovoltaic and other renewables to secure the future. (Total
2008)
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Figure 50. Projections of Global Population, GDP and Energy Demand Developments (Total
2008).
According to Total oil and gas remain their positions as leading primary energy sources. In 2030, they
are likely to account for more than 50 % of world primary energy consumption (Total 2008).
Figure 51.  World Energy Demand (million boe/day) (Total 2008).
As Total oil and gas remain their positions as leading primary energy sources, the CO2 emissions are
likely to increase (Total 2008).
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Figure 52. CO2 Emissions by Sector (Total 2008).
2.1.8. EREC: Renewable Energy Scenario to 2040
European Renewable Energy Council, EREC, published it energy scenarios to 2040 in 2004. Assump-
tions made by EREC and its member associations (EPIA, ESHA, ESTIF, EUBIA, EUREC Agency, EWEA,
AEBIOM and EGEC) are based on experiences and cumulative knowledge lead to assumptions on ex-
pected annual installations growth rates for different technologies and show that by 2040, a share of re-
newable energy up to 50 % worldwide is possible. (EREC 2004)
Two scenarios have been considered. The First scenario is called advanced international policies sce-
nario (AIP). The assumptions in this scenario are based on ambitious growth rates for renewable energy
sources that need additional support measures in order to be reached. It is assumed that regions already
active in the promotion of renewables will increase their efforts and that other regions will follow these
examples. Higher prices for conventional energy supply are anticipated as well as growing support for
electrification of the less and least developed regions by renewables. Implementation of the Kyoto proto-
col as well as additional measures on the international level for climate protection and for the promotion
of renewables is also needed to reach the assumed growth rates. (EREC 2004)
The assumptions for total energy consumption in the scenario are based on a scenario from the IIASA
(International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis). It is optimistic about technology and geopolitics
and assumes unprecedented progressive international cooperation focused explicitly on environmental
protection and international equity. It also includes substantial resource transfers from industrialized to
developing countries and spurring growth in the South. (EREC 2004)
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Figure 53. The Contribution of Renewable Energy Sources to the World Energy Supply in 2040 -
Projections in Mtoe – Advanced International Policy Scenario (EREC 2004).
The second scenario is called Dynamic current policies scenario (DCP). Dynamic current policies do not
mean “business as usual”. Assuming that a “business as usual” is seen as impossible for a sustainable
future by a lot of decision-makers, the model is based on less international cooperation as the AIP-
scenario in the field of RES, but expects ambitious policy measures on national level at least in the in-
dustrialised part of the world. (EREC 2004)
Dynamic current policies scenario is a “middle-course” scenario for the total consumption. It incorpo-
rates more modest estimates of economic growth and technological development and the demise of
trade barriers and expansion of new arrangements facilitating international exchange. (EREC 2004)
Figure 54. The Contribution of Renewable Energy Sources to the World Energy Supply in 2040 –
Projections in Mtoe – Dynamic Current Policy Scenario (EREC 2004).
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2.2. Development in China and India
It is common knowledge that China’s and India’s energy demand affects both the price and fuel accessi-
bility worldwide. It encourages climate change and other environmental problems as well.
Figure 55. China's and India's Share in World Trade* in Goods and Services Compared with
Other Countries (IEA 2007).
Figure 56.  Sectoral Share of GDP, 2004 (IEA 2007).
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Figure 57. Shares of China and India in the Increase in World Primary Energy Demand by Fuel
in the Reference Scenario, 2005–2030 (IEA 2007).
Figure 58. Net Oil Imports in China and India in the Reference Scenario (IEA 2007).
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Figure 59.  Primary Energy Demand in Selected Countries in the Reference Scenario (IEA 2007).
The increase of energy consumption in both of the countries is connected to the rapid growth in their
economies. China’s economy has grown at an average annual rate of 9.5 per cent and India is not far be-
hind China. Worldwatch Institute believes in the possibility of India taking place as the world’s fastest
growing economy in the next 15 years. This kind of growth requires much from the energy sources – and
not just in India or China. At the moment China is the second largest energy consumer and India the
sixth. Both of the countries are pursuing oil from as far as Sudan or Venezuela. Also development in the
number of owned cars is rapidly growing in both of them perhaps leading into world’s biggest car indus-
try. By 2025 China is expected to burn over 14.2 million bbl oil per day, which would double last years
level. Oil import in India is expected to triple to 5 mb/d by 2025. (Makover et al. 2006)
In the BAU scenario of World Energy Outlook 2007 oil maintain its position as world’s most important
energy source. Energy demand is expected to grow 37 %. Considering the increasing number of cars per
capita the projection seems realistic. By 2030 car intensity in China is projected to rise to a car per every
sixth Chinese from the today’s level of a car per 35 Chinese citizens. In the Reference scenario the quan-
tity of vehicles is projected to be about 270 million, in the High growth scenario near 410 million vehi-
cles, by 2030. (IEA 2007)
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Figure 60. Road Transport Fuel Consumption in China and India in the Reference Scenario (IEA
2007).
Coal demand is expected to grow intensively by 2030, mainly due to the increase in electricity produc-
tion in China and India. Coal share of the energy supply is projected to grow globally from 25 per cent to
28 per cent. (IEA 2007.)
Figure 61.  China's Primary Energy Demand in the Reference Scenario (IEA 2007).
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Figure 62. Total Final Consumption by Sector (Mtoe) (IEA 2007).
Figure 63.  Primary Oil Demand in China and India by Sector in the Reference Scenario (IEA 2007).
IEA energy outlook contains BAU model and High Growth scenario for India as well. In the Reference
scenario the need for primary energy is expected to reach 1,299 Mtoe by 2030 (537 Mtoe in 2005). Ref-
erence scenario is based on the assumption of average annual economic growth rate of 6.3 %, as the
High Growth scenario represents an alternative future with 7.8 % annual growth rate. Higher growth
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rate would lead to increased demand of primary energy (4.2 % annual rate) compared to 3.6 % growth
rate in the Reference scenario. Accelerated economic growth would speed up the increase in growth rate
of owned cars in India, which would lead to rapid increase in oil demand: 8.3 million b/d by 2030 (in the
Reference scenario 1.8 million b/d less). India could become world’s third biggest importer of oil soon
after 2030. (IEA 2007)
Figure 64. China's Oil in the Reference Scenario (IEA 2007).
Figure 65. India's Oil Balance in the Reference Scenario (IEA 2007).
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Figure 66. China's Gas Balance in the Reference Scenario (bcm) (IEA 2007).
Figure 67.  India's Natural Gas Balance in the Reference Scenario (IEA 2007).
Faster economic growth would enable electricity for all Indian households by 2030, as Reference sce-
nario projects 96 % of households having access to electricity in the same period. Energy demand is ex-
pected to grow 2005–2030 about 180 %, at an annual rate of 4.2 % (3.6 % in the Reference scenario).
Economic growth allows quicker transition towards more efficient energy production, which means di-
minishing use of biomass. India strives for ascending number of nuclear production, which by 2030
would be 21 % higher in the High Growth scenario than in the Reference scenario. Nevertheless the
amount of CO2 emissions is expected to rise to 3.9 Gt by 2030, which is 2.8 Gt more than nowadays.
(IEA 2007.)
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Figure 68.  Energy-related CO2 Emissions by Fuel in the Reference Scenario in China (billion ton-
nes) (IEA 2007).
Both China and India have enormous demand for emission reduction. Both countries are highly depend-
ent on coal. Relatively most efficient measures to decrease emissions concentrate on intensifying the
end-use, replacing coal with renewables, natural gas or nuclear power and especially in India moderniz-
ing power plants. In China there is significant potential to reduce emissions by decreasing the energy
loss in electricity transfer and distribution. (IEA 2007)
Figure 69. Electricity Generation in China, 2005–2030 (IEA 2007).
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Figure 70.  Primary Energy Demand in China and India in the Reference and High Growth Sce-
narios (IEA 2007).
In the High Growth scenario of IEA the average economic growth rate is projected to be 7.5 per cent per
year. In the analyzed period world’s energy demand would ascent over 50 % of its current level. India
and China are together responsible for 45 % of the increase in demand. In year 2010 China will probably
take USA’s place as the world’s largest energy consumer. (IEA 2007)
These two giants, whose population is 40 % of global population, might speed up the usage of cleaner
energy. China is accessing its huge energy flows – bio fuels, solar and wind power. For instance on the
Chinese territory and coast the potential of wind power alone is approximately 2,000 GWs, which is one
of the biggest in the world. China is the leading country in thermal power usage to water heating, since
60 % of the installed systems are in China. National People’s Congress approved a bill favoring renew-
able energy sources, which bind China to produce 15 % of the state’s energy with renewables by 2020.
China’s official goal is to boost its energy usage by 20 % per every addition in GDP by 2010. (IEA 2007)
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Figure 71.  Incremental Primary Fossil Fuel Demand in China and India in the Alternative Policy
Scenario, 2005–2030 (IEA 2007).
Chinese government and strong authority concentrated in the provinces make it hard to execute energy
programs led by central administration, because of the lack of commitment in provinces. Chinese envi-
ronmental government is not centralized and coherent, nor is there any remarkable supervisor or coor-
dinator. Part of the Chinese environmental problem is that cheap labor and energy are needed to sustain
rapid economic development. Energy price is kept low for alluring investors, and it is a mean to promote
low income households. On one hand low prices restrain inflation, but on the other hand they allow the
extravagant usage of energy. (IEA 2007)
India has set a goal to produce enough clean energy to be able to electrify all villages by 2010. According
to the plan 4,000 MW of renewable energy should be added by 2007 for the goal to be accomplished, so
that the share of renewables would rise to 10 per cent. This kind of ambitious goal require huge invest-
ments, some estimates claim even 1.5 trillion juans (2006). It is likely that these goals will encourage
further innovative actions among Chinese people and business, and will open business opportunities
also for their American, European and Asian partners. Both countries have affordable labor, emerging
crowd of engineers and know-how. China already is world’s largest mobile phone market. Perhaps solar
panels, wind mills or hybrid cars are next. (IEA 2007)
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2.3. Development in the United States
Energy Information Administrations Annual Energy Outlook 2008 presents diverse scenarios concern-
ing the results of different energy policy paths. It contains a reference scenario which serves as a clear
basis against which other alternatives can be compared. The AEO reference case reflects reduced expec-
tations for economic growth: GDP grows at an average annual rate of 2.4 % from 2006–2030. (U.S. En-
ergy Information Administration 2008)
In the AEO reference case the total primary energy consumption grows by 19 percent 2006–2030, from
99.5 quadrillion Btu to 118.0 quadrillion Btu in 2030. Lower estimate compared to previous calculations
is influenced by lower economic growth, greater use of more efficient appliances and vehicles, higher
energy prices, and slower growth in energy-intensive industries. Residential delivered energy consump-
tion grows in the RS from 10.8 quadrillion Btu in 2006 to 12.9 quadrillion Btu in 2030 (0.7 percent per
year). High delivered energy prices and slower growth in commercial square footage lead to slower
growth in energy consumption: delivered commercial energy consumption grows from 8.3 quadrillion
Btu in 2006 to 11.3 quadrillion Btu in 2030. (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2008.)
Figure 72.  Delivered Energy Consumption by Sector (quadrillion Btu) in USA. Reference scenario
(U.S. Energy Information Administration 2008).
Since 1997, delivered energy consumption in the USA industrial sector has trended downward, falling
from 27 quadrillion Btu to 25 quadrillion Btu in 2006, in spite of rising output. Industrial delivered en-
ergy consumption is expected to increase to 27.7 quadrillion Btu in 2030. Growth in the energy-intensive
manufacturing industries averages 0.7 percent a year from 2006 to 2030. Delivered energy consumption
in the transportation sector grows to 33.0 quadrillion Btu in 2030. (U.S. Energy Information Admini-
stration 2008)
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Total consumption of liquid fuels, including both fossil liquids and bio fuels, is expected to grow from
20.7 million barrels per day in 2006 to 22.8 million barrels per day in 2030 which is lower estimate than
before due to the new LDV CAFÉ standard specified in EISA-2007. Much of the difference appears in the
transportation sector. Natural gas consumption increases from 21.7 trillion cubic feet in 2006 to 23.8
trillion cubic feet in 2016, then declines to 22.7 trillion cubic in 2030. Electricity generation accounts for
5.0 trillion cubic feet of natural gas use in 2030. (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2008)
Total coal consumption increases from 22.5 quadrillion Btu in 2006 to 29.9 quadrillion Btu in 2030.
Coal consumption is projected to grow at a faster rate toward the end of the period, particularly after
2020, as coal use for new coal-fired generating capacity grows rapidly. Coal consumption in the electric
power sector increases from 22.7 quadrillion Btu in 2020 to 27.5 quadrillion Btu in 2030, and coal use at
CTL plants increases from 0.6 quadrillion Btu in 2020 to 1.0 quadrillion Btu in 2030. (U.S. Energy In-
formation Administration 2008)
The AEO2008 reference case projects substantially greater use of renewable energy as a result of
EISA2007. Total consumption of marketed renewable fuels grows by 3.0 percent per year, from 6.8
quadrillion Btu in 2006 to 13.7 quadrillion Btu in 2030. About 45 percent of the demand for renewables
in 2030 is for grid-related electricity generation. (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2008)
Figure 73. Energy Consumption by Fuel (quadrillion Btu) in USA (U.S. Energy information Ad-
ministration 2008).
The rapid growth in the use of renewable fuels for transportation reflects the EISA2007 RFS, which sets
a requirement for 21 billion gallons of advanced bio fuels and 36 billion gallons of total renewable fuels
by 2022 (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2008).
Ethanol use grows from 5.6 billion gallons in 2006 to 23.9 billion gallons in 2030. Ethanol use for gaso-
line blending grows to 13.4 billion gallons and E85 consumption to 10.5 billion gallons in 2030. The
ethanol supply is expected to be produced from both corn and cellulose feed stocks, with corn accounting
for 15.0 billion gallons and cellulose 6.9 billion gallons of ethanol production in 2030. Excluding hydroe-
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lectricity, renewable energy consumption for electric power generation grows from 0.9 quadrillion Btu in
2006 to 3.2 quadrillion Btu in 2030. (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2008)
Energy intensity, measured as primary use per dollar of GDP, declines by about one-third from 2006 to
2030 in the RS.
Figure 74. Energy Use per Capita and per Dollar of GDP (index 1980=1) in USA (U.S. Energy In-
formation Administration 2008).
Net imports of energy share are expected to continue meeting a major share of total U.S. energy demand.
EISA2007 and the new CAFÉ standards however serve to moderate growth in energy imports. U.S.
crude oil production is increases from 5.1 million barrels per day in 2006 to a peak of 6.3 mb/d in 2018,
then subsequently declines to 5.6 mb/d in 2030. (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2008)
Total electricity consumption grows from 3,814 TWh in 2006 to 4,972 TWh in 2030, increasing at an
average annual rate of 1.1 percent (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2008).
Figure 75.  Total Energy Production and Consumption (quadrillion Btu) in USA (U.S. Energy In-
formation Administration 2008).
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In the AEO 2008 reference scenario, the coal share of total energy use increases from 23 percent in 2006 to
25 percent in 2030, while the share of natural gas falls from 22 percent to 20 percent, and the liquids share
falls from 40 percent to 37 percent. The combined share of carbon-neutral renewable and nuclear energy
grows from 15 percent in 2006 to 17 percent in 2030. (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2008)
Taken together, projected growth in the absolute level of primary energy consumption and a shift toward a
fuel mix with slightly lower average carbon content cause projected energy-related emissions of CO2 to
grow by 16 percent from 2006 to 2030. Projected energy-related CO2 emissions grow from 5,890 million
metric tons in 2006 to 6,851 million metric tons in 2030. (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2008)
Figure 76.  Energy Production by Fuel (quadrillion Btu) in USA (U.S. Energy Information Ad-
ministration 2008).
Figure 77.  Electricity Generation by Fuel (TWh) in USA (U.S. Energy Information Administra-
tion 2008).
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Figure 78. Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Sector and Fuel (million metric tons) in USA (U.S. En-
ergy Information Administration 2008).
AEO 2008 presents three views of economic growth for the projection period. Economic growth depends
on growth in labour force and productivity. The high and the low growth cases show the effects of alter-
native economic assumptions on the energy market projections. In the high growth scenario, GDP
growth averages 3.0 percent a year and in the low growth case the percentage is 1.8 per year. Emission
projections change with economic growth assumptions. Emissions in 2030 are 9 percent lower in the
low growth case and 9 percent higher in the high growth case than in the RS. The relationship is strong-
est for the industrial sector and to lesser extent in the transportation sector, where economic activity
strongly affects energy use and emissions and where fuel choices are limited. In the low growth scenario
industrial delivered energy consumption falls to 24.2 quadrillion Btu in 2030, as industrial value of
shipments grows only by 0.5 percent per year. In the high growth scenario, industrial value of shipments
grows by 2.0 percent per year and energy consumption rises to 31.7 quadrillion Btu in 2030, which is 14
percent higher than in the RS. In 2030, transportation sector energy consumption is about 8 percent
higher in the high growth scenario and 8 percent lower in the low growth scenario than in the reference
case. The modes with the largest increases are heavy trucks and aircraft. (U.S. Energy Information Ad-
ministration 2008)
2.4. Development in the European Union
The biggest challenge for the European energy sector in the next decades will be to balance sustainable
development, competitiveness and security of supply. The investment needed in this sense is estimated
to be huge: about one trillion euros over the next 20 years.
In order to meet the objectives above, the following six priority areas and the related actions have been
identified by the Commission of the European Communities (2006):
55
1. Complete the EU internal gas and electricity markets. This could be done mainly through the
development of a European Grid, improved interconnections and coordination between regula-
tors, competition authorities and the Commission.
2. Ensure the EU internal energy market guarantees security of supply and solidarity between
Member States. This would be achieved primarily through a European energy supply observa-
tory, which would enhance transparency on security of energy supply issues and energy stocks
within the EU.
3. Promote a Community-wide debate on the different energy sources, in order to monitor that the
overall EU energy mix pursues the objectives of security of supply, competitiveness and sustain-
able development.
4. Deal with the challenges of climate change in a manner compatible with its Lisbon objectives. In
particular, clear goals should be set to prioritize energy efficiency (with a goal of saving 20 % of
the energy that the EU would otherwise use by 2020) and a long-term road-map for renewable
energy sources should be implemented.
5. Present a strategic energy technology plan to the European Council and Parliament, so to make
best use of Europe’s resources
6. Define a common external energy policy, which should include also a pan-European Energy
Community Treaty, a new energy partnership with Russia, as well as a new Community mecha-
nism to enable rapid and coordinated reaction to emergency external energy supply situations
impacting EU supplies.
In relation to these priorities, scenarios have been developed to forecast the development of energy de-
mand in the next years. One example is the study carried out by National Technical University of Athens
for the Directorate-General for Energy and Transport of the European Commission. The main findings
of the baseline scenario are reported below (3):
80 % of incremental energy consumption to 2030 will be met by natural gas, which in 2030 will be the
second largest fuel, with 32 % of total EU15 primary energy demand. Oil will remain the largest fuel and
will meet 35 % of total demand. (Mantzos et al. 2003)
Renewables are forecasted to be the fastest growing energy source, but their share rises from only 6 % in
2000, to 7.4 % in 2010 and 8.6 % in 2030, according to Baseline assumptions. (Mantzos et al. 2003)
Nuclear will increase only marginally (+3 %) in 2010, but its output in 2030 will be some 22 % lower
than in 2000, a result due to the nuclear phase-out of some Member States. The consumption of solid
fuels will decrease steeply in the medium term, but will regain its 2000 value in 2030, as a replacement
to nuclear energy. (Mantzos et al. 2003)
The tertiary sector and transport will be the fastest growing final energy markets, both growing more
than overall final energy demand. The rail share of both passenger and freight transport will fall because
of large substitution away from rail transport in the countries acceding to EU. The increasing GDP per
capita of these areas will also lead to a growing demand for air travel and km travelled per capita in the
EU25 (about 50 % increase in the reference period) (Mantzos et al. 2003).
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Electricity is forecasted to be the fastest growing fuel in final use (about 1.6 % p.a. by 2030), followed by
heat from CHP and district heating plants. Gas also grows above average (1.1 % p.a.), meanwhile oil will
increase more slowly: despite growing demand in the transport sector, this result reflects the fuel switch-
ing away from oil in other final demand sectors. (Mantzos et al. 2003)
In the Baseline scenario the increase of renewables in final energy demand will be rather slow, by only
0.2 % p.a. (Mantzos et al. 2003)
For electricity generation, over the projection period natural gas becomes the most important source,
meanwhile solid fuels, oil and nuclear all lose market shares. Renewables become much more important,
almost matching nuclear in 2030, but, under baseline conditions, fail to reach the 22 % target in 2010
the CHP share increases only moderately, despite its key role in the efficient use of fossil fuels. (Mantzos
et al. 2003)
Investment requirements in electricity generation are considerable because capacity increases to about
950 GW in 2030. Electricity prices are also forecasted to decrease, thus reflecting efficiency gains de-
rived from technological progress, fuel switching and completion of the internal market. (Capros &
Mantzos 2006)
2.5. Development in Russia
In 2005 The Committee for the Future formed a group focused on Russia-issues, which were supposed
to collect material about the present state and future development in Russia. The group involved several
experts, who expressed their views on the subject. The results of the Russia group were published in year
2007 about the Russia in 2017. (Kuusi et al. 2007)
Russian economic is expected to grow strongly in the near future; possibly some decelerating is seen
near 2017. Growth rate is estimated to be 3–6 % in the near future. The exceptionally huge disagree-
ments among estimates reflect the magnitude of uncertainties involving Russian prospects. Russian ru-
ble will strengthen for several years, but it won’t keep the same pace (10 % last few years). Due to grow-
ing GDP and strengthening ruble Russian imports increase fast. On the other hand the real strengthen-
ing hinders the competitiveness of exports. (Kuusi et al. 2007)
In the beginning of the 21st century Russian oil production grew almost 10 % per year. However, accord-
ing to the official estimates both oil and gas production will increase only 2 % per year in the near future.
If the current trend is to be continued Russian energy production is decreasing already in year 2017. Be-
cause of this the surplus of current accounts would be gone in a few years. Then the continuing rising of
energy prices in the world markets is likely to compensate the reducing of the exports. (Kuusi et al.
2007)
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Besides energy production Russian government has strongly emphasized ICT-related branches as a
strategy in the future. The Electronic Russia 2002–2010 program has had 2.6 billion dollars for enabling
internet usage and new e-services among citizens and companies. (Kuusi et al. 2007)
Population continues to decrease. It reached its peak at 1992, when it was over 148 million. Now the
amount is over 143 million, and according to the Russian Statistics in year 2017 population would be
approximately 135 millions. However it must be kept in mind that predictions are sensitive especially to
grand population movements. Russia’s multicultural tradition ensures that Russia will continue to be the
destination for immigrants from the former Soviet Union countries. It is also possible that Russia strives
for persuade the approximately 25 million Russians living outside Russia to return. Russia has relatively
large age group of those born in the 80s. Still the population achieving the working-age will go halves by
2017. The pressure to adjust in work markets, education and in military is enormous. Because of the
weakening relation between working population and people outside work markets current Russian pen-
sion system will be inadequate. (Kuusi et al. 2007)
Inequality will strengthen in Russian society. The differences in income and wealth between people and
regions remain among the biggest in the world. Development towards urbanization keeps on strong.
This will decrease the need to maintain the inherited infrastructure. On the other hand it will set more
challenges to the cities ability to take in the new residents. (Kuusi et al. 2007)
Russian experts and the administration are more aware of the problematic scenarios in the future. How-
ever, international experience has shown that many of them are hard to change. It is obvious that even
with strong will it is hard to get rid of inefficiency, corruption and discretion. Usually it has succeeded
only with development towards democracy and civil society. The expansion of the middle class, ICT-
development and internationalization could make possible to have openness, equality and democracy at
some extent. (Kuusi et al. 2007)
The state of the nature keeps on weakening, though Russia is one of the beneficiaries of the climate
change. So Russia holds strong position concerning negotiations about global actions against climate
change. Warming climate benefits agriculture and sea traffic can be expanded in the north. The southern
parts of the country are likely to suffer and melting permafrost can cause unexpected problems to the
energy production and transportation in the northern parts. Even though the average temperature will
rise in the north people will continue to centralize into the more dense southern areas. (Kuusi et al.
2007)
The first scenario “Global power player in Energy issues” includes a vision of optimistic development
with strengthening principles of law and justice and more diverse economic life. The leading export
companies in energy field variegate their business to labor intensive areas. Policy shift is towards less
controlled democracy. The scenario can be compared with the situations in Japan and South Korea,
which have proceeded to efficient democracy in relatively short time.  Of course it must be taken into
account that Japan and South Korea were both occupied by USA in the beginning of the process. (Kuusi
et al. 2007)
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The second scenario “Diverse mosaic – Russia” initiates from the creativity and needs of the new middle
class in Russia. The structure of the production continues strongly in the Russian market, especially in
the service sector. Large segment of the service sector is focused on consumables distribution and pro-
ducing consumer services in the home market. The energy export no longer covers the increasing import
cost, the balance is provided by the export of services, especially by ICT and international turism. Sce-
nario can not actualize without significant increase in openness towards EU. (Kuusi et al. 2007)
The name “Diverse mosaic – Russia” refers to increasing acceptance of versatility. Traditional Russian
traits – resourcefulness and creativity – become national strengths. Even though laws are held binding
in big questions and in international relations the authorities’ tolerance towards law bending is high in a
local scale. Diverse mosaic -scenario presumes that by year 2017 Russia has evolved to a state which re-
spects and protects individual freedoms. This is accompanied with the prospect of starting the member-
ship negotiations with EU in 2017. Anyhow it is considered too bold to think Russia as a member in
2017. (Kuusi et al. 2007)
Third scenario “The Oligarchy” assumes that strong elite holds the power in Russia with a support of
military, police force and energy companies. The elite succeed to maintain considerably high quality of
living dependent on export income, even though the basis of the economy remains the same. Living con-
ditions and the standard of living in the middle class are highly dependent on the support to the elite.
Major part of the population have low standard of living and are reliant to exchange economy. Civil legal
protection and equality do not actualize. National values and security are emphasized. Foreign inter-
venes are considered as hostile actions and problems are explained to arise from foreign actions. The
elite support intolerance towards minorities to distract the dissatisfactions among citizens.  The media is
run by the elite and activists are silenced. (Kuusi et al. 2007)
First two scenarios are founded on the assumption of Development towards more versatile economic
and Russian innovativeness, but the means differ. First scenario takes into account the special traits of
Russia and its national traditions. The other scenario resembles the suggestions western communities
have presented. Last scenario represents the progress towards more isolated Russia. It hardly can be
considered as a positive development. (Kuusi et al. 2007)
Along with the economic growth Russian energy consumption is estimated to keep on growing between
2005 and 2020.
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Figure 79. Consumption of Primary Energy in Russia (TWh) (Ministry of the Russian Federation
2003a).
Russia’s long term goals in energy policy are developing government’s transfer payments, advancing en-
ergy security, improving energy efficiency and diminishing environmental harms. Russia as a state is
dependent on the energy sector and vice versa. On one hand the energy sector is the most important in-
come source, on the other hand it is the biggest receiver of subventions. For the energy sector to main-
tain its competitiveness the subvention policy must be directed effectively. (Ministry of Energy of the
Russian Federation 2003b)
The problems of the energy security in Russia are the weak infrastructure, the pressure on environment
by energy production, inefficiencies in the markets, lack of regulations and the dependency on oil and
gas. To answer these problems Russia has to modernize its production. The energy consumption struc-
ture has to be converted into less oil and gas intensive. This means adding alternative energy production.
At the moment Russia’s energy intensity is over double compared to rest of the world and triple com-
pared to EU countries. Advancing the energy efficiency is crucial to secure the economic growth. Produc-
tion need to be directed at less energy consuming industries. Different kinds of energy saving technolo-
gies must be deployed. With these actions Russia’s energy intensity could decrease even 50 % by 2020.
(Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation 2003a)
 Increasing Russia’s energy production has also increased environmental harms and threats. Environ-
mental policy has aimed at developing environmental standards to match those of European.  Economic
guiding and promoting environmental monitoring has been used as means. (Ministry of Energy of the
Russian Federation 2003a)
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2.6. The Future of International Climate Policy – Burden Sharing Ap-
proaches
With the prospect of climate negotiations, experts, stakeholders, and governments have assessed a range
of options for advancing the international climate change effort beyond 2012. For instance PEW Center
has carried out a broad survey of alternative approaches proposed. The survey encompassed more than
40 proposals either published or publicly presented by 2004. (Claussen & McNeilly, 1998)
Any proposal for advancing the international climate effort comes against the backdrop of the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol. The 1992 Framework
Convention, ratified by 189 nations, establishes the basic structure of the existing climate change regime.
This includes: the ultimate objective of stabilizing greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations at safe levels;
general principles such as precaution, cost-effectiveness, and common but differentiated responsibili-
ties; obligations to report on GHG emissions and national measures to combat climate change; and
commitments for assistance and technology transfer to developing countries. The Kyoto Protocol sets
forth quantitative commitments by developed countries to reduce their GHG emissions. These commit-
ments take the form of absolute emissions targets, applicable to a basket of six greenhouse gases for a
five-year commitment period. The Protocol employs market mechanisms such as emissions trading and
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and allows parties to achieve their target in part through
sinks activities such as reforestation and forest management. (UNFCCC 1992)
Some of the proposals build on the basic architecture of Kyoto—for example, by extending the CDM or
by articulating a pathway towards broader participation. Others depart by varying degrees from the ex-
isting architecture—for example, by articulating a different type of commitment (policies and measures
rather than quantitative emissions targets); a different negotiating process (national pledges rather than
internationally-negotiated commitments); or a different forum (a smaller group of countries rather than
a global process). (UNFCCC 1992)
The proposals differ widely in their scope. Some are comprehensive in nature, setting forth a complete
picture of a possible future regime. Others address a particular issue in the negotiations—for example,
the type of emissions target that should be used or the criteria for differentiating commitments. It is im-
portant to recognize that, to the extent, different proposals address different issues, they could be com-
plementary rather than mutually exclusive. (UNFCCC 1992)
One of the most contentious issues of differentiation of (future) commitments is ‘who should contribute
when and how much to mitigate global climate change and to the costs resulting from adaptation meas-
ures’. The concerns of equity and efficiency are important in the evaluation of the possible burden shar-
ing models, which determine emission commitments for different countries. All in all, it is not an easy
task to find a model, which will satisfy all parties. In the next paragraphs some interesting methods and
models used to the differentiation of commitments are briefly described. It can be discussed whether
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these targets should be set for different countries, which are the partners of the Climate Convention, or
to the companies, which are the main emitters of the GHGs, or to the final consumers of products and
services in other words on ‘per capita’ basis. (UNFCCC 1992)
The Brazilian Proposal distributes emission reductions to Annex I Parties based on regional contribu-
tion to temperature increase due to their historical emissions (since 1890). The burden is shared be-
tween industrialised countries on the basis of the cumulative temperature change they have caused, i.e.
effective emissions. According to this proposal, countries with a longer history in industrialisation and
hence a bigger responsibility would be required to make larger reductions, while those that have indus-
trialised relatively late would have to reduce less. The reduction target for United Kingdom would be
63.3 % whereas for Greece it would only be 7.5 % (UNFCCC, 1997).
The American Pew Center has presented criteria (responsibility, standard of living, opportunity) to
group countries into three tiers (high, middle, low) with different levels of action required (‘must act
now’, ‘should act now, but differently’, could act now’). The tiers are meant to act as indicative groupings
for further negotiations. (Claussen & McNeilly, 1998)
In the Multi-stage approach a gradual increase in the number of Parties involved and their level of
commitment (no commitments; de-carbonisation; stabilisation of emissions; burden sharing) takes
place according to participation and differentiation rules (Den Elzen et al, 2002).
One method used in burden sharing proposals is the triptych approach, which is a sector and technol-
ogy-oriented approach that accounts for differences in national circumstances such as population size
and growth, standard of living, economic structure and fuel mix in power generation. The Triptych ap-
proach is a sector approach distinguishing three categories of emissions, corresponding to three groups
of economic sectors: the energy intensive industry, the power producing sector and the domestic sectors.
Accounting for varying national circumstances, different criteria are used for each of the three categories
to calculate sectoral allowances. (Phylipsen et al, 1998; Groenenberg et al, 2001)
Furthermore, the multi-sector convergence approach has many similarities with the region-oriented
triptych approach, but has a global coverage. Also, the multi-sector convergence approach contains more
sectors than triptych, which makes it more flexible and allows more country-specific circumstances to be
taken into account. (Ringius et al, 2000)
A fair amount of attention is also given to different models revolving around the concept of the environ-
mental space and per capita entitlements, including contraction and convergence, which is perhaps one
of the most comprehensive models devised so far. The contraction and convergence approach tries to use
objectively defined criteria for differentiation of commitments and allocates emission allowances on
equal per capita base. (IEA 2003)
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Figure 80. Change in the CO2 Intensity of the Economies of Japan, USA and EU15 from 1960 -
2001 and the Required Development up to 2050 in order to Reach the Contraction and
Convergence Target of 1.8 tons of CO2 Per Capita (IEA 2003).
The National Institute of Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) in the Netherlands has developed
an interactive analytical computational framework for linking the evaluation of different approaches for
the differentiation of future commitments to global climate protection targets. The FAIR (Framework to
Asses International Regimes for differentiation of commitments) model can be used to quantitatively
explore a wide range of climate policy options for international burden sharing and to evaluate the con-
sequences of different approaches to the differentiation of future commitments. The model includes ap-
proaches that have gained policy attention, e.g. the Brazilian proposal, Contraction & Convergence
(GCI), Global Compromise (Benito Müller), Triptych approach (UU), Emission Intensity Targets ap-
proach. (Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 2008)
The FAIR model includes three modes for evaluating international commitment regimes. The first is ‘in-
creasing participation’ so that the number of parties involved and their level of commitment gradually
increase according to participation and differentiation rules (such as per capita income, or per capita
emissions). The second is ‘convergence’, all parties participate in the burden-sharing regime with emis-
sion rights converging to equal per capita levels over time and the third is ‘triptych’: different burden
sharing rules are applied for different sectors (convergence of per capita emissions in domestic sector,
efficiency and de-carbonization targets for industry and power generation sector). The three modes in
FAIR, i.e. increasing participation, convergence and triptych combine both different principles of equity
as well as most of the other dimensions of regimes. (Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency
2008)
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3.  REQUIREMENTS SET BY THE FINNISH SOCIETY
This section presents energy policy goals in Finland (4.1), scenario elements related to regional struc-
ture, transport and the way of living (4.2) plus results from a study dealing with energy attitudes of Fin-
nish companies (4.3). It is important to note that any energy scenarios of Finland are not presented here.
This is due to the “tabula rasa” starting point of the scenario process to be carried out in parallel with
this background report together with Finnish Energy Industries.
3.1. Energy policy goals
Energy is a very significant issue in the Finnish society. It is an important factor of production for
industry, and it has a central role in the life and well-being of human beings. Especially electricity has
increased its significance, while a larger part of different services are provided electronically via Internet
and mobile technologies. Energy consumption in Finland is one of the highest among industrial
countries. This is due to the large share of energy-intensive branches in Finnish industrial structure,
need for heating in the cold climate, and sparsely populated country with a fragmented regional
structure. Energy use has also several different impacts, which have become more and more important
in energy-related decision-making.
Targets and requirements related to energy use have been set up for a long time by the Finnish society.
These have been included at political level in policy programmes and starategies dealing with energy,
and in climate strategies during the 2000s (National Climate Strategy 2001, Outline of the Energy and
Climate Policy for the Near Future - National Strategy to Implement the Kyoto Protocol 2005; and Long-
Term Energy and Climate Strategy 2008). These strategy documents cannot cover the whole spectre of
different actors’ views. Several societal actors have their own strategies, related among other things to
energy issues. These strategies cannot be dealt with here in detail, but in the context of requiremets set
up by the society it is important to bring out that the society consists of different types of actors with
different kinds of energy use. (Ministry of Trade and Industry in Finland 2001; Ministry of Trade and
Industry in Finland 2005; Ministry of Trade and Industry in Finland 2008)
Global climate change, and especially carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion have in
recent years been in the focus of targets related to energy use. Finland as a member of the European
Union has to fulfil the commitments based on the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol. The most significant of them
is to limit annual greenhouse gas emissions to their 1990 level during the first commitment period
2008–2012. The Kyoto Protocol identifies six major greenhouse gases; carbon dioxide (CO2), methane
(CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur
hexafluoride (SF6). (UNFCCC 2008)
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Post-2012 targets to limit greenhouse gas emissions under the UNFCCC negotiations have not been
decided yet. However, it can be expected that further targets and related commitments are on the agenda
of forthcoming UNFCCC negotiations. European Union has already agreed on a target of 20 % reduction
in greenhouse gas emissions from their 1990 level. European Council accepted in January 2008 a “20 20
20 energy package”. (EC 2008) It also includes targets related to policy issues such as renewable energy
and energy efficiency (see below).
In Finland, a Long Term Energy and Climate Strategy is under preparation. The work is coordinated by
the Ministry of Employment and the Economy. When writing this text (September 2008) the strategy is
not yet available, so the following text on energy policy goals is mainly based on the previous strategy
Outline of the Energy and Climate Policy for the Near Future – National Strategy to Implement the
Kyoto Protocol 2005. (Ministry of Trade and Industry in Finland 2005)
The central energy-related policy goals are described in the Outline of the Energy and Climate Policy for
the Near Future - National Strategy to Implement the Kyoto Protocol (2005). Securing energy supply is
the most traditional energy policy goal in Finland and in other countries as well. The target is to preserve
a manifold decentralised energy system and secure the availability and sufficiency of fuels, electricity
and heat. Security of energy supply in the case of a national crisis such a war is focused on the
maintenace of critical energy infrastructures and central national activities. Currently the obligations
related to security of supply include fuel reserves taken care by the state and by energy companies and
financed by a supply security fee included in energy taxes (CO2 tax and electricity tax). The national se-
curity of energy supply is improved by international agreements and arrangements related to security
reserves of fossil fuels which are not presented in detail here. (Ministry of Trade and Industry in Finland
2005)
Developing the energy market is a relatively new energy policy goal. The first legislation aimed to
liberalisation of the electricity market was introduced in the early 1990s in Finland, among the first
countries in the World. At the EU level, the directive of internal electricity market was given in 1997 and
the directive on gas market in 1998. Like in Finland, also in other Nordic counties the electricity and gas
markets were liberalised earlier, even foreseeing the timetables defined in the directives. However, the
adopted practices in the Norcic countries have been quite different. (Ministry of Trade and Industry in
Finland 2005)
After the liberalisation of energy markets new investment decisions have been made by energy
companies based on the market situation. This is why the quantitative targets related to energy
production and consumption are made for other political reasons than those of traditional energy policy.
The most significant of the new reasons is climate policy and related quantitative targets for greenhouse
gas emissions, which mainly come from fossil fuel combustion in the energy sector. Commitments to the
UNFCCC Kyoro Protocol is the main argument behind binding targets for e.g. the use of renewable
energy sources in the EU (see below). From the point of view of energy infrastructure, the energy policy
goal in the libaralised energy market is to secure the possibilities for easy flexible feed of fules and
electricity from different sources into the electricity grid, gas pipelines and othere energy networks, and
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make the connection to these networks as easy as possible. After the libaralisation of the energy markets
and joining the EU, some ideologically conflicting policy goals such as protecting energy self-sufficiency
and promotion of domestic energy sources have vanished from the written policy agenda although their
significance has practically remained unchanged. (Ministry of Trade and Industry in Finland 2005)
Promoting energy efficiency is a central energy policy goal. It can be divided into end-use efficiency and
supply efficiency including the whole energy transforming system from production,
transfer/transmission and distibution. Energy end-use efficiency is not a topic of this background report,
but the policy instruments of energy efficiency promotion set up at both the EU and national level (such
as energy efficiency contracts, energy audits, energy recommendations for public purchases and energy
efficviency requirement of electric appliances as well as energy lebels) have been focused mainly on
energy end-use. The official EU target is to improve energy efficiency 20 % from the current level until
the year 2020 as a part of the “20 20 20 energy package”. (Ministry of Trade and Industry in Finland
2005)
Promoting the yuse of renewable energy sources has rapidly emerged as the most discussed energy
policy goal at the EU level. This is due to the fact that the EU has an intent to implement the UNFCCC
Kyoro Protocol commitments via quantitative targets for the use of renewable energy. (Ministry of Trade
and Industry in Finland 2005)
Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the promotion of electricity
produced from renewable energy sources in the internal market sets a 21 % indicative share of electricity
produced from renewable energy sources in total Community electricity consumption by 2010. It defines
national indicative targets for each Member State, encourages the use of national support schemes, the
elimination of administrative barriers and grid system integration, and lays down the obligation to issue
renewable energy producers with guarantees of origin if they request them. With current policies and
efforts in place, it can be expected that a share of 19 % by 2010 – rather than the 21% aimed at – will be
reached. (COM 2001/77/EC; Ministry of Trade and Industry in Finland 2005)
Directive 2003/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the promotion of the use of
biofuels or other renewable fuels for transport sets a 5.75 % target for the share of biofuels in all petrol
and diesel for transport placed on the market by 2010. Member States were required to set indicative
targets for 2005, taking a reference value of 2 % into account. This target has not been achieved. Biofuels
counted to only 1 % of transport fuels in 2005. The target for 2010 is not likely to be achieved. The
Commission expectations are for a share of about 4.2 %. (COM 2003/30/EC; Ministry of Trade and In-
dustry in Finland 2005)
The EU ”20 20 20 energy package” accepted in January 2008 by the European Council includes a
directive proposal which aims to establish an overall binding target of a 20 % share of renewable energy
sources in energy consumption and a 10 % binding minimum target for biofuels in transport to be
achieved by each Member State. This directive proposal also includes binding national targets by 2020
in line with the overall EU target of 20 %. (COM(2008) 30 FINAL)
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3.2. Changes in Regional and Community Structures
The regional structure in Finland is a dispersed mixture of central business district in the triangle Hel-
sinki–Turku–Tampere, relatively small cities with and industrial background and a large sparsely popu-
lated countryside. A general trend in regional development is growth of the cities, especially the capital
region (Helsinki and the surrounding cities and municipalities) in the central business district. The den-
sity of population in Finland is very low also in the central areas which increases transport and decreases
energy efficiency. Energy consumption of apartments and dwellings increases mainly due to the increase
in room area available per person and increasing number of electric appliances. Income level has a clear
correlation with the use of private cars. (Lehtilä 2004)
The policy goal relating to the community structure includes decreasing the fragmentation but not in-
creasing the population density. This refers to enhancing the availability of services especially in relation
to public and light transport and regional competitiveness. However, public transport services in the
countryside and small cities will have a declining trend. The total volume of transport has been esti-
mated to increase 20 % from the 2000 level until the year 2020. (Lehtilä 2004)
Development of the information society; i.e. availability of electronic services and increase of related
changes in everyday activities, has been very fast in Finland. One indicator of this is increasing work at
home or away from the traditional workplace. This kind of development may decrease the volume of
person transport, especially traffic jams. It may also decrease energy consumption of transport and of-
fice buildings. In 2000, over 10 % of total workforce was regular or temporary working outside of their
workplace in Finland. (Lehtilä 2004)
The role of households and individuals is more significant in energy consumption when energy embed-
ded in commons, (things and services) is taken into account. The number of small households (one or
two persons) will increase in the future. The most significant factors affecting change in community
structure and way of living include increasing number and decreasing size of households, ageing popula-
tion, increasing room of apartments/dwellings per person, and increasing purchasing power. (Lehtilä
2004)
Finnish housing stock changes slowly due to the expensive building and housing. Houses are made long-
lasting and new production is only 1.3 % of the housing stock. The development of the average housing
area is slow: during over 100 years additional space of one room more per house, in average, has been
added. In the 1980’s an average area was over 69 m2, a decade later 74 m2 and in the year 2004 it was 78
m2. Distribution of the different types of houses in Finland has been stable, most common are blocks of
flats with the share of 44 %, one-family houses with the share of 40 % and terraced houses with the share
of 14 % of the housing stock. (Lainevuo & Siimes 2001)
The current situation doesn’t correspond with the housing wishes of the Finnish people. At the moment
about 50 % of the population lives in a block of flats, 30 % in a detached house and 20 % in a semi-
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detached or a terraced house. However, 57 % of the population would want to live in a detached house,
22 % in a block of flats and 20 % in a semi-detached or terraced house. Living at the countryside is
dreamt most commonly by the 30–44 year old people. (Lainevuo & Siimes 2001)
The attraction of the big cities is likely to increase in the future. Especially metropolitan area is the target
of the increasing immigration of the foreigners. Finland’s internal migration is concentrating increas-
ingly on the big regional centers and the metropolitan area. Population is expected to grow fastest in
Pirkanmaa and Uusimaa, about 20 % by the year 2040 and decrease in Kainuu, where the population
will diminish 13 % by the year 2040. (Kokkarinen 2007a)
Population movement has a significant influence on the traffic development regionally. Possession and
usage of passenger cars is biggest in the framework conventions. The population of the framework con-
ventions is active aged and in addition to work traffic, a lot of business and recreational traffic emerge,
for which public transport doesn’t suit well. In big cities, there are good opportunities to develop public
transport and light traffic routes. The biggest age group in 2040 is expected to be 20–39 year old people,
with few people under the age 20, but with plenty old age groups. In the depopulation areas driving with
private cars is necessary and public transport requires special arrangements. However, due to the dimin-
ishing population, the amount of cars is no longer growing either. Ageing population diminishes the us-
age of cars, so the amount of traffic doesn’t grow that much. In the north, where the size of the families is
in average larger, the usage of the passenger car is emphasized due to long distances. (Kokkarinen
2007a)
Figure 81. Traffic Growth 2006 - 2040. (Kokarinen 2007b)
The experts have had conflicting views concerning the population age structures influence on traffic de-
velopment. Most likely in the future aged people demand more from the service level of the society. Mo-
torization of the aged people is expected to grow as well. The idealization of individualism increases also
car intensity in spite of the development of environmental values. (Lainevuo & Siimes 2001)
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Frequency and length of the recreational trips is expected to grow. Rising of the income is almost directly
comparable to the demand for traffic. Development of the electronic business decreases the trips to the
stores, but increases the distribution traffic. Net impact is however diminishing of the traffic. Cycling
and other light traffic is believed to grow due to increasing health and environmental awareness. (Laine-
vuo & Siimes 2001)
As the globalization progresses the growth of the air traffic is inevitable. The development of networking
increases both passenger and goods traffic. The conveyance of goods will multiply especially in the air
and road traffic. Centralization of the population and jobs increases the traffic between the centers.
Especially traffic on the major roads, air and rail traffic will probably grow. The development of the
remote work doesn’t necessarily diminish the net traffic, even though work traffic will decrease.
However, remote work possibilities will be beneficial for the evening out the amount of traffic and the
traffic jams. Both going to work outside one’s own residential area and working across regional borders
are believed to continue. Especially if the traffic arrangements develop in the ways that promote private
cars, commuting will more and more likely geared out of the region, even if jobs were available near the
apartment. (Lainevuo & Siimes 2001)
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Change factor Traffic form
    Road traffic                  Railway traffic           Waterborne traffic             Air traffic
Passenger       Goods      Passenger  Goods  Passenger    Goods  Passenger   Goods
1. Economic growth +2 +2 +1 +1 +1 +1 +2 +2
2. Economic structure changes +1 +1 0 0 0 0 +1 +2
3. Population changes +1 +1 0 0 0 0 +1 0
4. Changes in the regional
structure
+2  -- 1 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0
5. Community development +1 +1 0 0 0 0 0 0
6. Technology development 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7. Internationalization +1 +1 0 +1 +1 +1 +1 +2
8. Traffic policy of the EU -1 -1 +2 +1 0 0 -1 0(-1)
9. Values
· Environment
· Traffic safety
· Individualization
-21, +22
-1
+1
-1
0
+1
+1
+1
0
0
0
0
+1
0
0
+1
0
0
-1
0
+1
-1
0
+1
10. Development of the logistics +1 0 0 +2
Figure 82. Summary of the Influence, which the Change Factors Have on Passenger Traffic and
Goods Traffic Demand in the Years 2000–2020 (+2=Increases Significantly,
+1=Increases, 0=No Real Influence, -1=Diminishes, -2=Diminishes Significantly)
(Lainevuo & Siimes 2001).
Community structure may decentralize, if housing density becomes more and more sparse, population
increasingly centralizes on the attractive urban areas and the ideal of a detached house remains. More
compact community structure is considered less probable as it is desirable. Particularly the growth of the
income level is expected to increase the sparseness of the housing density and possession of a car and
diminishing the significance of the cost of travelling. (Lainevuo & Siimes 2001)
Housing and building trade is expected to become more and more globalized. As the actual building re-
mains local, the building parts will probably become international export products. Building trade prod-
ucts and services are custom made from preliminary prepared modular parts. Housing planning will be
more and more based upon consumers preferences. For the evaluation of the overall quality of the
houses branded houses are developed instead of the current mass production houses. Customer service
will transform with higher degree into understanding and enabling ways of lives, than traditional hous-
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ing planning. Instead of regional monopolies and construction zones, culture of building sites regionally,
that will allow building competitions for the big areas, consisting of several sites. (Heinonen et al. 2005)
Possibilities and skills for the independent building will decrease. On the other hand, in Finland culture
of “building yourself” will continue and detached house builders have a possibility to do so, but on the
other hand, a strong trend is the technologization of house industry and independent possibilities will
diminish. In addition to current actors, new overall service offerers, operating in the interface of citi-
zen/customer, will aspire to gather housing entities for different residential profiles. In the local level the
amount of services will in all likeness to increase. (Heinonen et al. 2005)
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4.  DEVELOPMENT OF ENERGY RESOURCES / PO-
TENTIALS AND TECHNOLOGIES
According to the Baseline scenario developed by IEA in 2008, total primary energy supply is expected to
grow at 1.6 % per year (which means an increase of 104 % un primary energy demand between 2005 and
2050), with coal becoming the predominant fuel in 2050, accounting for 37 % of primary energy use.
Oil’s share declines from 35 % in 2005 to 27 % in 2050, meanwhile natural gas decreases of only 1 %,
reaching 20 % at the end of the review period. In the total demand of the Baseline scenario, the fossil
fuels’ share increases from 80 % in 2005 to 84 % in 2050: in this case concerns about security would
remain, and significant climate change would be the consequence. (IEA 2008)
4.1. Oil
4.1.1. Oil Resources and Reserves
There are several different categories of oil, each having different costs, characteristics and, above all,
depletion profiles. Some are easy, cheap and fast to produce, whereas others are the precise opposite.
The terms “conventional” and “non-conventional” (or “unconventional”) oil are in wide usage, but lack a
standard definition, adding greatly to the confusion. In the World Energy Council’s (WEC) most recent
Survey on Energy Resources (2007), “conventional” oil is identified and defined to exclude the following
categories: oil from coal, shale, bitumen and extra-heavy oil. “Reserves” are currently recoverable, both
technologically and economically. “Resources” include detected quantities that cannot be profitably re-
covered with current technology but might be recoverable in the future, and quantities that are geologi-
cally possible but yet to be found. (WEC 2007)
According to WEC, the “estimated ultimate recovery” (EUR) of conventional crude oil was about
387,000 million tonnes at the end of 2005. This amount is higher than the amount of 381,000 million
tonnes given in the 2005 energy study by the German BRG (Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und
Rohstoffe). The regional distribution of “estimated ultimate recovery” of conventional crude oil, com-
prising cumulative production, reserves and resources, is very uneven. The Middle East has the highest
EUR. About 65 % of North America’s EUR has been recovered so far. In the CIS countries, this applies to
about 37 % and in the Middle East to about 24 % of the EUR. The OPEC countries’ EUR is 206,000 mil-
lion tonnes, accounting over 50 % of the global EUR, of which only about 28 % has been recovered so
far. The OECD countries have EUR of only 74,000 million tonnes, of which nearly 62 % has already been
recovered. (WEC 2007)
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Figure 83.  Distribution of the Estimated Ultimate Recovery (EUR) of the Conventional Crude Oil
in 2005 (WEC 2007).
About 62 % of the global reserves are located in the Middle East, about 13 % in North and South America
and about 10 % in the CIS countries. The OPEC countries have about 76 % of global reserves (of which 61
% is to be found in the Persian Gulf region), the OECD about 7 %, leaving about 18 % for the rest of the
world. (WEC 2007)
Figure 84.  Distribution of Proved Oil Reserves in the World 1987, 1997 and 2007 (BP 2008).
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Global crude oil production increased only moderately till 2003. In 2004 and 2005, there was a signifi-
cant increase up to 3,900 million tonnes – anew absolute production maximum. The regions with the
highest production in 2005 were the Middle East, North America and the CIS countries. (IEA 2008)
Cumulative crude oil production until the end of 2005 reached 143,000 million tonnes – half of it was
produced within the last 23 years. This means that 47 % of the total reserves of conventional oil discov-
ered so far, has been consumed. Taking into consideration also the expected resources of 82,000 million
tonnes, more than 37 % of the EUR has been consumed. The depletion mid-point – when half of the
EUR will have been recovered – will be reached within the next 10 to 20 years. Afterwards, the decline of
conventional oil production is inevitable. (IEA 2008)
About two-thirds of the crude oil produced in 2005 was transported between different countries and re-
gions, sometimes covering large distances by tanker or pipeline. For crude oil, there is a single global
market with nearly uniform prices. However, there was a significant increase in price differentials be-
tween oils of different quality due to a general increase in oil prices. (IEA 2008)
4.1.2. Future of Oil
Oil prices have increased sharply in the last years and reached their short-term maximum in July 2008
at US$ 145/bbl for Brent crude. In real terms, this price is the highest recorded in the oil era. In terms of
the Euro, this development is slightly more moderate. The reasons for the currently very high oil price
are interpreted differently. Some experts regard an imminent shortage of oil reserves (peak oil discus-
sion) as the driving force. Others consider that a combination of different factors is most likely to be the
reason for this development. (WEC 2007)
These factors include (WEC 2007):
· increasing demand for oil, after some years of stagnation, caused by prospering economies and
strong demand for oil in the USA, China and India;
· supply disruptions caused by strikes in leading supplier countries (Venezuela, Nigeria, Norway)
and terrorist attacks in Iraq, as well as natural disasters (e.g. hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico);
· political instability in the Middle East and the Yukos affair in Russia, as well as a fear of terrorist
attacks;
· lack of additional production capacity in most of the producing countries;
· the weak US Dollar;
· speculation in the oil business due to low interest rates on the capital markets.
To summarise, the following developments can be expected for crude oil in the future (WEC 2007):
· From a geological point of view, the remaining potential for conventional oil can provide for a
moderate increase in oil consumption over the next 10 to 15 years. After that, an insufficient
supply may be expected, owing to decreasing production when the depletion mid-point has been
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passed. Demand will then have to be met by other fuels. The percentage of oil production by the
OPEC countries (especially in the Persian Gulf region) will increase for several decades to come.
· The percentage of non-conventional oil will rise to 5–10 % of total oil production by 2020, as oil
prices will stay at relatively high levels. In its International Energy Outlook 2006, the US Energy
Information Administration predicted the share of non-conventional oil in world oil consump-
tion as 9.7 % in 2030, including synthetic fuels from natural gas (GTL), coal (CTL) and biomass
(BTL), whereas the IEA predicts a share of 8.9 % in 2030 of non-conventional oil in its World
Energy Outlook 2005, with synthetic fuels providing 22.5 % of non-conventional oil.
· Predicting oil price fluctuations is very difficult, owing to a variety of factors. Important factors
influencing their development are likely to be the behaviour of OPEC countries, the availability
of additional production and refining capacities, as well as the development of the global econ-
omy. Daily fluctuations in crude oil prices up to a range of several US$ per barrel are likely in
both directions, owing to speculation in the oil market business.
· There are numerous uncertainties that could possibly affect the availability of crude oil:
· R/P ratio (resources per production ratio) could possibly be shortened by a downward revision
of OPEC reserves. These reserve numbers were sharply boosted in the 1980s, presumably for po-
litical reasons in order to keep OPEC production quotas in balance;
· R/P ratio can be lengthened due to uncertainties in reserve assessment. Proved reserve figures
do not normally include probable and possible reserves. As a rough indicator of the future avail-
ability of geo-energy fuels, the ratio of resources (in the BGR sense of additional reserves) to
(proved) reserves can be used. The larger the indicator, the more ‘resources’ can be converted
into ‘reserves’.
In terms of global consumption, crude oil remains the most important primary fuel, accounting for 36.4
% of the world’s primary energy consumption (without biomass). Some forecasts of future energy con-
sumption imply that no significant change in the importance of oil will happen in the next few decades.
(WEC 2007)
According to the Baseline scenario in IEA publication “Energy Technologies and perspectives 2008”, the
demand for oil increases by 86 % from 2005 to 2050, a growth which is unlikely to be met by conven-
tional oil. This means that a considerable increase in non-conventional oil is needed: according to the
Baseline scenario heavy oil, tar sands, shale oil and arctic oil account for about 30 % in 2050. For exam-
ple, open-cast mining is the main production technology for tar sands in Canada (about 80 % of total
production), meanwhile underground production of tar sands is less common but with a large potential
for expansion. The exploitation of shale-oil is instead limited to some small-scale activities, mainly in
Estonia, Brazil and China. As far as R&D is concerned, the investment towards oil technology appears to
be on the rise, with about 6.5 billion of USD spent in 2006. (IEA 2008)
Also according to OPEC, the next two decades are expected to see oil set to maintain its major role as a
source of energy and oil resource base is expected to be sufficiently abundant to satisfy this demand
growth. Moreover, although non-OPEC production is seen as continuing its recent expansion over the
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medium term, it is generally agreed that OPEC will increasingly be relied upon to supply the incremental
barrel. Nevertheless, uncertainties over future economic growth, government policies and the rate of
development and diffusion of newer technologies raise questions over the future scale of investment that
will be required. These uncertainties, coupled with long lead times, inevitably complicate the task of
maintaining market stability. Moreover, medium-term prospects suggest there is a need to ensure that
the level of spare capacity is consistent with such stability. (OPEC 2004)
According to the scenario developed by OPEC, the key driver of oil demand will be economic growth,
with the major uncertainty being the expansion of productivity in the OECD, and the extent to which this
will be influenced by technological advances and the further growth in trade. For developing countries,
with largely low capital stock bases and considerable technological catch-up potential, GDP growth rates
are expected to be higher. Population expansion will also contribute to economic growth, but there is
uncertainty, as to how fast the capital stock and productivity will grow. Both will be positively affected by
the liberalization of markets and the increasing importance of trade. The prospects for economic growth
in China represent a significant point of uncertainty in the outlook. Over the forecast period, developing
countries are assumed to grow at an average of five per cent p.a., with China and South Asia expanding
at the fastest rates. Economies in transition have considerable scope for productivity catch-up, while
Russia’s economy is also benefiting from the impact of high oil prices. Real GDP growth in the former
Soviet Union (FSU) of four-to-five per cent p.a. is assumed for the medium term, falling towards three
per cent in the longer term. Other growth in Europe is expected to be slightly higher, as, over the forecast
period, countries in the region will be trading increasingly with the European Union. (OPEC 2004)
Figure 85. Annual Growth in Oil Demand until 2025 in Mboe/d (OPEC 2004).
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The assumptions relative to economic growth rates are coupled with the idea that higher income is fol-
lowed by a higher share of vehicle ownership, therefore the transport sector, followed by the industry
sector, is the most important source of oil demand, as oil is expected to account for the majority of fuel
consumption in transportation. (OPEC 2004)
Figure 86. OPEC Production Capacity and Demand for OPEC Crude (Washington Monthly 2005).
Also according to the different scenarios developed by IEA, OPEC production in 2050 will stay at least at
the same level of 2005, therefore significant investments especially in the Middle East will be necessary
in order to meet demand growth and maintain secure supply of transport fuels, with a key role played by
the development of sufficient new oil supply. (IEA 2008)
Figure 87. Annual Growth in Oil Demand by Sector in OECD Countries in Mboe/d (OPEC 2004).
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Figure 88. The Oil Peak According to the Recent Prognosis of the Association for the Study of Peak
Oil. Note that the US, Russian and European Oil Supplies Have "Peaked" Already Years
Ago. (Exitmundo 2004).
Peak oil theory has been widely discussed during the last years. The idea of the theory is that the produc-
tion peak of oil is going to be reached very soon depending on the estimated reserves. Some researches
claim that the peak oil has already been passed.
Figure 89. World Oil Production is Projected to Peak (DOE 2004).
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Figure 90. When the World Oil Peaks (Verosub 2008).
4.2. Coal
4.2.1. Coal Resources
Worldwide, the use of coal as an energy source remains crucial to the economies of many developed and
developing countries, and in particular with the latter, as industrialization and urbanization spread and
national energy requirements soar. Thus, coal looks set to retain its position as a secure, reliable source
of energy, particularly for the generation of electricity. (IEA 2005)
Coal-fired power generation accounts for 39 % of the world’s total electricity production and in some
countries, such as the USA, Germany, Poland, Australia, South Africa, China and India, it is very much
higher due to its cost competitiveness. While use in some European countries remains static or is in de-
cline, significant increases in coal fired generation capacity are taking place in many of the developing
nations, such as China and India, where large capacity increases are planned to make use of abundant
coal reserves, which are far more abundant than oil and gas reserves. Coal remains therefore very impor-
tant for the economies of many countries, but a major challenge is to reduce its environmental impact.
(IEA 2005)
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Amongst the major energy sources, coal is the most rapidly growing fuel on a global basis. While ques-
tions regarding the size and location of reserves of oil and gas abound, coal remains abundant – and
broadly distributed around the world. Economically recoverable reserves of coal are available in more
than 70 countries worldwide, and in each major world region. After centuries of mineral exploration, the
location, size and characteristics of most countries’ coal resources are quite well known. Global coal re-
serves at the end of 2005 were 847.5 billion tonnes. At the current rate of production, global coal re-
serves are estimated to last for almost another 150 years. These resources consist of bituminous coal (in-
cluding anthracite), subbituminous coal, and lignite. Finland has no coal resources. (WEC 2007)
Figure 91.  Distribution of the Total Coal Reserves in the World (WEC 2007).
 “Proved amount in place” is the resource remaining in known deposits that has been carefully measured
and assessed as exploitable under present and expected local economic conditions with existing available
technology. “Proved recoverable reserves” are the tonnage within the proved amount in place that can be
recovered in the future under present and expected local economic conditions with existing available
technology. “Estimated additional amount in place” is the indicated and inferred tonnage additional to
the proved amount in place that is of foreseeable economic interest. It includes estimates of amounts
which could exist in unexplored extensions of known deposits or in undiscovered deposits in known
coal-bearing areas, as well as amounts inferred through knowledge of favourable geological conditions.
Speculative amounts are not included. “Estimated additional reserves recoverable” is the tonnage within
the estimated additional amount in place that geological and engineering information indicates with rea-
sonable certainty might be recovered in the future. (WEC 2007)
Compared with data appearing in the 2004 Survey of Energy Resources, North American reserves are
4,000 million tonnes smaller due to the gradual attrition of US reserves. South America shows a 3,500
million tonnes reduction. In Asia a significant change down 41,000 million tonnes was largely due to
improved data for India. European reserves declined by 12,000 million tonnes, over half of which in Po-
land. (WEC 2007)
Growth in energy consumption is forecasted to continue – at an annual average rate of 1.6 % between
2004 and 2030. Over 70 % of this growth will come from developing countries, where populations and
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economies are growing considerably faster than in the OECD nations. China alone will account for some
30 % of increased energy consumption. Fossil fuels will continue to provide more than 80 % of the total
energy consumption in the future, and – according to the International Energy Agency – coal consump-
tion will see the largest increase in absolute terms, from 2,772 Mtoe in 2004 to 4,441 Mtoe in 2030. The
greatest increase in coal consumption will be in the developing countries, with 86 % in Asia, where re-
serves are large and low-cost. India’s coal use is expected to grow by 3.3 % per annum to 2030, more
than doubling in absolute terms. OECD coal consumption is likely to grow modestly. (WEC 2007)
4.2.2. Future Trends in Coal
In order to reduce its environmental impact, development and application of Clean Coal Technologies
(CCTs), designed to minimize the emissions of various undesirable species from coal-fired power plants,
should continue. Further development of CCTs will lead to a number of technology options (Zero or
Near-zero Emissions Technologies – ZETs) that emit very low levels of all emissions. (WEC 2007)
Having established that ZETs may have an important role in the coming years, it should be kept in mind
that no single system will be capable of meeting all future requirements, hence a portfolio of technolo-
gies will be necessary. By not concentrating on a single candidate technology, the associated technologi-
cal risks can be minimized, and possible routes forward can be tailored to meet the different situations
prevailing in different parts of the world. Since the structure of electricity generation sectors and future
national power demands are likely to vary significantly between countries and regions, there are likely to
be several possible routes forward towards the adoption of ZETs, with some variants being more appli-
cable to the industrialized nations and others focused more on developing countries. Thus, there are
many possible routes forward, some based on PCC (Pulverised Coal Combustion) and others on IGCC
(Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle), with the latter creating opportunities for combining the tech-
nology with fuel cells. In Japan, the EAGLE integrated gasification combined cycle fuel cell (IGFC) pro-
ject is testing this concept. (WEC 2007)
When comparing PCC and IGCC based systems, the latter presents various advantages, among which
(WEC 2007):
· a lower energy penalty than for capture from PCC plant, since the CO2 content of the pre-
combustion, syngas stream is greater and hence more easily captured than from a flue gas
· CO2 can be captured at a pressure suitable for pipeline transport, thus reducing CO2 compres-
sion costs
· chemical processing of the syngas, coupled with CO2 capture, yields hydrogen suitable for com-
bustion in gas turbines, direct conversion to electricity in fuel cells or other uses
· low levels of SO2 emissions can already be achieved and NOx levels are comparable to those of
natural gas fired combined cycles
· solid wastes produced are usually in an inert form, thus their disposal is easier
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Moving from existing technologies to ZETs equivalents that incorporate a CO2 capture stage, will clearly
have major cost implications for systems developed from either PCC or IGCC. It has been estimated that
for the former, plant capital costs would be 56–82 % greater than current systems, and for the latter,
some 27–50 % higher. A large proportion of the increased capital costs are associated with the capture of
CO2 (IEA 2005).
From what was presented above it is clear that only with effective R&D programs in the clean coal tech-
nology field, it will be possible for these strategic options to be developed and refined to the point where
they can be adopted commercially as part of the solution to global warming and climate change. (WEC
2007)
According to the Baseline scenario developed in 2008 by IEA, the demand for coal is expected to triple
between 2005 and 2050, with coal eclipsing oil between 2030 and 2050 and reaching 37 % of total de-
mand in 2050. The three factors driving this growth are the following (IEA 2008):
· high oil prices make coal-to-liquids (CTL) technologies more economical and the production of
synfuels from coal also increases
· high gas prices result in more new coal-fired electricity plants being built
· energyintensive industrial production grows rapidly in developing countries (especially China
and India), which have large coal reserves and only limited amounts of other resources.
4.3. Natural Gas
4.3.1. Natural Gas Resources
Natural gas is a mixture of hydrocarbon and small quantities of non-hydrocarbons that exists either in
the gaseous phase or is in solution in crude oil in natural underground reservoirs, and which is gaseous
at atmospheric conditions of pressure and temperature. Natural gas liquids (hydrocarbons exist in the
reservoir as constituents of natural gas but are recovered as liquids in separators, field facilities or gas-
processing plants. (WEC 2007)
Proved amount in place is the resource remaining in known natural reservoirs that has been carefully
measured and assessed as exploitable under present and expected local economic conditions with exist-
ing available technology. Proved recoverable reserves are the volume within the proved amount in place
that can be recovered in the future under present and expected local economic conditions with existing
available technology. Estimated additional amount in place is the volume additional to the proved
amount in place that is of foreseeable economic interest. Speculative amounts are not included. Esti-
mated additional reserves recoverable is the volume within the estimated additional amount in place
that geological and engineering information indicates with reasonable certainty might be recovered in
the future. (WEC 2007)
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Gas reserves are geographically concentrated. While about 73 % of gas reserves are concentrated in two
areas – the Middle East and the CIS – the geopolitical distribution of gas reserves is rather similar to
that of oil. With nearly 90 Tm3, the OPEC countries have about half of total reserves, compared with 75
% for oil. The CIS enjoys a more advantageous situation for gas, with 33 % of reserves against only 10 %
of oil reserves. In the OECD countries, the situation is barely different for either energy resource, with
less than 10 % of gas reserves and 7 % of oil reserves. By 2020, non-OECD countries could account for
about 88 % of world gas trade, including 58 % for OPEC countries. Approximately 44 % of total proven
reserves are concentrated in some twenty mega and supergiant fields. Out of these, the world's largest
non-associated gas field – North Field/South Pars – straddling Qatari and Iranian waters, accounts for
some 49 %. This concentration of gas wealth naturally raises questions of security of supply, of transit, of
the potential implementation of an organisation of gas-exporting countries (OGEC) and of assets nation-
alisation strategies. To address these issues, consuming countries will increasingly respond by diversify-
ing supplies. (WEC 2007)
Figure 92. Proved Natural Gas Reserves as at the End of 2005, Tm3 and % of World Total (WEC
2007).
Natural gas is used around the world but the major areas of trade correspond to the OECD regions:
North America, Europe and Asia-Pacific. Gas in these markets is used for residential and commercial
needs, industrial heat and, increasingly, power production. Natural gas accounts for 21 % of global en-
ergy supply, with slightly higher proportions in the relatively mature markets of North America and
Europe. Rapid growth since 2000 is expected to moderate in the second half of the decade, but global
demand is still expected to increase from 2.8 Tm3 in 2005 to 3.2 Tm3 in 2010. The main driver of this
growth in OECD countries is power generation, whereas the growth of gas demand in other regions such
as the Middle East, China and India is driven by other sectors as well (IEA 2006b).
There are two principal ways of transporting gas from the well-head to the burner tip: through pipelines
or in the form of LNG. Both are expensive and require long construction times; therefore, a considerable
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period is needed to pay back the initial investment. Pipelines are more cost-effective over short dis-
tances. Liquefied natural gas is natural gas that has been cooled down to -161°C to make it liquid. This is
done in a liquefaction train, a series of process operations from gas to LNG. Often a liquefaction plant
starts with one or two trains. Once these trains have proven successful, both technically and commer-
cially, more trains can be added at a lower marginal cost if the resources are sufficient. After liquefac-
tion, the gas is transported in specially-designed ships. At the point of arrival, the gas is returned to its
normal gaseous state in a re-gasification terminal. (IEA 2006b)
In power generation, the share of natural gas is greatest in the Middle East, and it is quite high also in
the countries of the former Soviet Union (about 43 %), together with Mexico and some Asian countries
(IEA 2006a).
4.3.2. Future Trends in Natural Gas
Power generation from natural gas is competitive with today’s prices in many areas of the world, but to-
tal generation costs are more sensitive to increases in fuel prices in the case of natural gas combined-
cycle (NGCC), than in plants using other generation technologies, because fuel costs account for 60–75
% of total generation costs. This means that, comparable increases in different fuel prices for electricity
generation would have a greater impact on the economics of NGCC than on other technologies. Devel-
opments in the United States and Europe in recent years have confirmed this, since rising prices in natu-
ral gas have resulted in a switch to coal-fired generation. The rapid development of natural gas-fired
power generation could thus strain gas production and transmission systems and lead to further natural
gas price increases. (IEA 2006a)
Within the natural gas market non-OECD countries certainly present the largest potential for growth.
Driven by steady population growth and strong economic activity, total energy needs should climb at
quite a smart pace, providing natural gas with new opportunities for market development. The fast-
growing economies in Asia (including China and India), the Middle East, Africa and even Latin America,
promise gas demand growth rates of 3–4 % p.a. by 2020. In some Asian countries, the share of natural
gas is boosted to reduce dependence on imported furnace oil, as in Pakistan, moreover in countries like
India and Indonesia, fertiliser production (urea, ammonia) will also require growing volumes of natural
gas, both as fuel and as raw material. In the Middle East, gas will be increasingly used in seawater de-
salination plants and in industry in general. In Africa, besides a growing requirement from the power
sector, gas network extensions open up broader country-wide developments, such as in Algeria and
Egypt. In Latin America, with the exception of Argentina, recent gas market developments indicate that
gas still has significant potential for growth. (WEC 2007)
From a sectoral standpoint, the power sector should absorb about 37 % of marketed gas each year by
2020. While industry should maintain its current 25 % share, the residential and tertiary sectors are
likely to decline in importance. The abundance of gas reserves already discovered, and the prospects for
a large yet-to-find potential, give natural gas a lifetime probably in excess of 130 years, at the current
84
rate of consumption (2.93 Tm3 in 2006). Additionally, improvements in transportation economics are
gradually providing access to a potential of 'stranded' gas, remote from consuming zones, onshore and
offshore, currently estimated at 30–35 Tm3, making it marketable at a competitive price. New frontier
areas for exploration are also opening up, in deeper and more complex horizons, technology permitting.
(WEC 2007)
4.4. Uranium Resources and Nuclear Technology
4.4.1. Uranium Resources
International organisations in the field of nuclear power collect more or less regularly national estimates
of identified and undiscovered uranium resources including expected mining costs. A “Red Book”
including the available national estimates have been published since 1965 by International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA/OECD). The content of the Red Book depends
on the information submitted ny national authorities. The most recent edition of the Red Book
(Uranium 2007 – Resources, Production and Demand) was published in 2008. The following text is
mainly based on that edition.
Identified resources (previously Known Conventional Resources) are divided into two classes, Reason-
able Assured Resources (RAR) and Inferred Resources. Both classes include three cost categories, <40
USD/kgU, <80 USD/kgU and <130 USD/kgU. (NEA/IAEA 2008)
The following table includes the amounts of Identified Resources (RAR and Inferred Resources) in all
cost categories as reported in the Red Book. In comparison to the previous edition (2005) of the Red
Book, the resources have slightly decreased in the most attractive category (RAR <40 USD/kgU). On the
other hand, Inferred Resources have increased in all cost categories. The distribution of RAR and In-
ferred Resources in the most important countries are presented in the figures below. (NEA/IAEA 2008.)
Table 3. Identified Uranium Resources (NEA / IAEA 2008).
Identified Resources 1.1.2007
Cost category
RAR Inferred resources Total
<130 USD/kg U >3,338 >2,130 5,469
<80 USD/kg U 2,598 >1,858 >4,456
<40 USD/kg U* >1,766 1,204 2,970
*Resources in the cost categories of <USD 40/kgU are likely higher than reported, because several
countries have indicated that either detailed estimates are not available, or the data are confidential.
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Figure 93.  Distribution of Reasonable Assured Resources (RAR) in 2007 (NEA/IAEA 2008).
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Figure 94.  Distribution of Inferred Resources in 2007 (NEA/IAEA 2008).
In addition to this, the Red Book includes estimates of Undiscovered Resources. Undiscovered
Resources include Prognosticated Resources and Speculative Resources (SR). Prognosticated Resources
refers to uranium resources that are expected to occur in well-defined geological trends of known
deposits, or mineralised areas with known deposits. SR refers to uranium resources that are thought to
exist in geologically favourable, yet unexplored areas. Therefore, Prognosticated Resources are assigned
a higher degree of confidence than Speculative Resources. Both classes include the same three cost
categories than Identified Resources. (NEA/IAEA 2008)
According to the Red Book, Finnish authorities have reported Identified Resources in the RAR class
1,100 tonnes in the cost category >130 USD/kg U. According to the Centre of Geological Excellence
(GTK), Finland does not have any uranium resources which would be economically feasible for nuclear
fuel production. However, some mining companies are interested in searching new uranium resources in
many countries, possibly also in Finland. This has created some political discussion on e.g. the existing
legislation considering mining activities. (NEA/IAEA 2008)
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According to Internartional Atomic Energy Agency, thorium is widely distributed with an average
concentration of 10 ppm in earth’s crust in many phosphates, silicates, carbonates and oxide minerals
and is 3 to 4 times more abundant in nature than uranium and has not been exploited commercially so
far. Thorium occurs in association with uranium and rare earth elements in diverse rock types: as veins
of thorite, thorianite, uranothorite and as monazite in granites, syenites, pegmatites and other acidic
intrusions. Monazite is also present in quartz-pebble conglomerates sand stones and in fluviatile and
beach placers. Monazite, a mixed thorium rare earth uranium phosphate, is the most popular source of
thorium and is available in many countries in beach or river sands along with heavy minerals–ilmenite,
rutile, monazite, zircon, sillimenite and garnet. The present production of thorium is almost entirely as a
by–product of rare earth element extraction from monazite sand. (IAEA 2005)
Thorium reserves and resources have not been comprehensively estimated so far and different
approximations may exist. According to e.g. the German BGR, reserves of more than 2 million tonnes of
Th can be considered as a possible base for future fuel supply for nuclear power plants. According to the
Departnent of Atomic Energy in India, the total known world reserves of Th in RAR category are esti-
mated at about 1.16 million tonnes. About 31 % of this is available in the beach and inland placers of In-
dia. Other countries having sizeable thorium reserves include Brazil, Canada, China, Norway, Russia,
USA, Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Turkey and Sri Lanka. (IAEA 2005)
Thorium has been considered as a source of nuclear fuel for several different nuclear fission technologies
(see below). It cannot be used for nuclear fuel as such. First it needs to be transformed into a fissile form.
For utilization of thorium in nuclear power programme, an additional step of first converting fertile
232Th into fissile 233U is needed. 233U is by far the best fissile isotope for thermal neutron spectrum and
can be used for breeding in both thermal and fast nuclear reactors. (IAEA 2005)
4.4.2. Nuclear Power in Electricity Production
According to World Energy Council (WEC), in 2007 there were 435 nuclear reactors with a net capacity
of 367 GWe in operation all over the world. 346 of these (net capacity 310 GWe) are located in OECD
countries. In 2005 the share of nuclear power in global electricity production was 16 % and in OECD
countries the share was in 2007 as high as 21.6 %. The nuclear share in electricity production has slightly
decreased in recent years due to lack of new installations, reactor shutdowns and increased electricity
production of other energy sources. However, the average load factor has increased and in 2006 it was
83 % at the global level while the total amount of nuclear-based electricity production was 2,658 TWh.
The four nuclear reactors in Finland have traditionally had very high load factors (well over 90 %) be-
cause of the large share of base load power in Finnish electricity consumption and the very reliable op-
eration of the nuclear power plants. (WEC 2007)
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Figure 95.  Nuclear Power Share of Total Electricity Production in OECD Countries (WEC 2007).
 Progress in international climate negotiations has increased expectations towards more challenging tar-
gets for greenhouse gas emission reductions. This has strengthened the role of nuclear power in many
countries. It has even been expected that a nuclear renaissance will occur in the next 20 years. World
Energy Council has listed examples of emerging policy initiatives dealing with construction of new nu-
clear power plants: World’s most populated and rapidly developing countries China and India are very
interested in all options for additional electricity generation, including nuclear power. Russia has pre-
sented a plan of doubling the nuclear capacity until the year 2020. South Korea has planned to increase
the share of nuclear power from current 40 % up to 60 % in medium term time perspective. Also in the
United States different plans for increasing nuclear capacity have been introduced. Furthermore, energy
policy in countries such as Belarus, Turkey and Poland has changed to more positive towards nuclear
power than earlier. A review provided by European Commission titled ”The World Energy Technology
Outlook – 2050” provides an estimate of rapid increase in the use of nuclear power in electricity produc-
tion until the year 2050. Also World Energy Council has presented similar visions supported by e.g. in-
formation about surveys dealing with government positions and citizens’ attitudes to the use of nuclear
power in different countries. (WEC 2007)
4.4.3. Development of Nuclear Technology
Nuclear reactors can be classified by using several different criteria. Major criteria in the literature in-
clude the following (GIF 2008):
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Classification by use
· research reactors
· production reactors
· power reactors
· propulsion reactors
Classification by moderator material
· graphite moderated reactors
· water moderated reactors
· light water moderated reactors (LWRs)
· heavy water moderated reactors
Classification by coolant
· gas cooled reactors
· liquid metal cooled reactors
· water cooled reactors
· pressure water reactors (PWRs)
· boiling water reactors (BWRs)
Classification by type of nuclear reaction
· fast reactors
· thermal reactors
· fusion reactors
Classification by role in the fuel cycle
· breeder reactors
· burner reactors
Classification by Generation
· generation I reactors
· generation II reactors
· generation III reactors
· generation III+ reactors
· generation IV reactors
Classification by phase of fuel
· solid fueled reactors
· fluid fueled reactors
· gas fueled reactors.
Here only nuclear reactors used in power plants are dealt with. The majority of nuclear reactors used in
power plants are BWRs moderated by light water. Planning process of generation III+ nuclear reactors
takes advantage of the accumulated experience from the use of generation I–III reactors. The European
Pressurized Reactor (EPR) ordered by Teollisuuden Voima (TVO), currently under construction in
Finland by Areva, is classified as a generation III+ reactor. (Gif 2008)
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Figure 96. Generations of Nuclear Energy (GIF 2008).
Some countries such as France, Japan, United Kingdom, Russia, United States and India have developed
fast breeder reactors (FBR), which are not moderated and produce during operation new nuclear mate-
rial which can be further used as nuclear fuel. Some FBRs have been in use for electricity production, but
often their use has been given up by political decisions. (Gif 2008)
Since then the development of nuclear technology has been more or less focused on so-called generation
IV nuclear reactors. In comparison to existing reactors, generation IV reactors will
· be safer
· use less nuclear fuel and be more effective
· produce less radioactive wastes
· be more economical, and
· have smaller investment and operation costs.
If this kind of advantages will be achieved, the reasonable size of nuclear units can be smaller than in
current nuclear power plants. This makes generation IV reactors more flexible and thus more suitable to
the circumstances in the opened electricity markets. Moreover, the development of nuclear technology
towards generation IV reactors may have such an impact on citizen’s attitudes towards nuclear power
that the current opposition and change the government position is those countries where increasing the
use of nuclear power is not at the energy policy agenda (Gif 2008).
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A Generation IV International Forum (GIF) has been established for research and planning of genera-
tion IV nuclear reactors. This forum has selected the most promising technologies, and published in
2002 a technology road map for more focused research and planning work. Many reactor types were
considered initially; however, the list was downsized to focus on the most promising technologies and
those that could most likely meet the goals of the generation IV initiative. Three systems are nominally
thermal reactors and three fast reactors. The VHTR is also being researched for potentially providing
high quality process heat for hydrogen production. The fast reactors offer the possibility of burning acti-
nides to further reduce waste and of being able to breed more fuel than they consume. These systems
offer significant advances in sustainability, safety and reliability, economics, proliferation resistance and
physical protection. The first generation IV nuclear reactors are expected to be in commercial use by the year
2030. The development of different generation IV nuclear technologies will naturally be different. (Gif 2008)
Figure 97.  System Partners (GIF 2008).
Very-High-Temperature Reactor (VHTR)
The Very High Temperature Reactor concept utilizes a graphite-moderated core with a once-through
uranium fuel cycle. This reactor design envisions an outlet temperature of 1,000°C. The reactor core can
be either a prismatic-block or a pebble bed reactor design. The high temperatures enable applications
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such as process heat or hydrogen production via the thermochemical iodine-sulfur process. It would also
be passively safe. (Gif 2008)
Figure 98. Very-High-Temperature Reactor (VHTR) (GIF 2008).
Supercritical-Water-Cooled Reactor (SCWR)
The Supercritical water reactor (SCWR) is a concept that uses supercritical water as the working fluid.
SCWRs are basically light water reactors (LWR) operating at higher pressure and temperatures with a
direct, once-through cycle. As most commonly envisioned, it would operate on a direct cycle, much like a
Boiling Water Reactor (BWR), but since it uses supercritical water (not to be confused with critical mass)
as the working fluid, would have only one phase present, like the Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). It
could operate at much higher temperatures than both current PWRs and BWRs. (Gif 2008.)
Supercritical water-cooled reactors (SCWRs) are promising advanced nuclear systems because of their
high thermal efficiency (i.e., about 45 % vs. about 33 % efficiency for current LWRs) and considerable
plant simplification (Gif 2008).
The main mission of the SCWR is generation of low-cost electricity. It is built upon two proven technolo-
gies, LWRs, which are the most commonly deployed power generating reactors in the world, and super-
critical fossil fuel fired boilers, a large number of which are also in use around the world. The SCWR
concept is being investigated by 32 organizations in 13 countries. (Gif 2008)
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Figure 99.  Supercritical-Water-Cooled Reactor (SCWR) (GIF 2008).
Molten Salt Reactor (MSR)
A molten salt reactor is a type of nuclear reactor where the coolant is a molten salt. There have been
many designs put forward for this type of reactor and a few prototypes built. The early concepts and
many current ones had the nuclear fuel dissolved in the molten fluoride salt as uranium tetrafluoride
(UF4), the fluid would reach criticality by flowing into a graphite core which also served as the modera-
tor. Many current concepts rely on fuel that is dispersed in a graphite matrix with the molten salt provid-
ing low pressure, high temperature cooling. (GIF 2008)
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Figure 100.  Molten Salt Reactor (MSR) (GIF 2008).
Gas-Cooled Fast Reactor (GFR)
The Gas-Cooled Fast Reactor (GFR) system features a fast-neutron spectrum and closed fuel cycle for
efficient conversion of fertile uranium and management of actinides. The reactor is helium-cooled, with
an outlet temperature of 850 °C and using a direct Brayton cycle gas turbine for high thermal efficiency.
Several fuel forms are being considered for their potential to operate at very high temperatures and to
ensure an excellent retention of fission products: composite ceramic fuel, advanced fuel particles, or ce-
ramic clad elements of actinide compounds. Core configurations are being considered based on pin- or
plate-based fuel assemblies or prismatic blocks. (GIF 2008)
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Figure 101. Gas-Cooled Fast Reactor (GFR) (GIF 2008).
Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor (SFR)
The SFR is a project that builds on two closely related existing projects, the LMFBR and the Integral Fast
Reactor (GIF 2008).
The goals are to increase the efficiency of uranium usage by breeding plutonium and eliminating the
need for transuranic isotopes ever to leave the site. The reactor design uses an unmoderated core run-
ning on fast neutrons, designed to allow any transuranic isotope to be consumed (and in some cases
used as fuel). In addition to the benefits of removing the long half-life transuranics from the waste cycle,
the SFR fuel expands when the reactor overheats, and the chain reaction automatically slows down. In
this manner, it is passively safe. (Gif 2008)
The Integral Fast Reactor or IFR is a design for a nuclear reactor with a specialized nuclear fuel cycle. A
prototype of the reactor was built, but the project was cancelled before it could be copied elsewhere. (Gif
2008)
The SFR reactor concept is cooled by liquid sodium and fueled by a metallic alloy of uranium and pluto-
nium. The fuel is contained in steel cladding with liquid sodium filling in the space between the fuel and
the cladding. One of the design challenges of an SFR are the risks of handling Sodium. (Gif 2008)
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Figure 102.  Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor (SFR) (GIF 2008).
Lead-Cooled Fast Reactor (LFR)
The Lead-cooled Fast Reactor [1] features a fast-neutron-spectrum lead or lead/bismuth eutectic (LBE)
liquid-metal-cooled reactor with a closed fuel cycle. Options include a range of plant ratings, including a
"battery" of 50 to 150 MW of electricity that features a very long refueling interval, a modular system
rated at 300 to 400 MW, and a large monolithic plant option at 1,200 MW. (The term battery refers to
the long-life, factory-fabricated core, not to any provision for electrochemical energy conversion.) The
fuel is metal or nitride-based containing fertile uranium and transuranics. The LFR is cooled by natural
convection with a reactor outlet coolant temperature of 550°C, possibly ranging up to 800°C with ad-
vanced materials. The higher temperature enables the production of hydrogen by thermochemical proc-
esses. (Gif 2008)
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Figure 103.  Lead-Cooled Fast Reactor (LFR) (GIF 2008).
A vast majority of nuclear technology development are based on utilization of uranium resources. As
noted earlier, thorium can be considered as a source for nuclear fuel but because it cannot be used as
such, it must be transformed into fissile material by using additional neutrons. International Atomic En-
ergy Agency lists several experimental and power reactors for thorium utilization. Current activities re-
lated to thorium are mostly in India, a country with major thorium reserves and huge increase in esti-
mated energy consumption. Thorium utilization has been earlier under serious consideration in many
industrialized countries, but according to IAEA, experimental and power reactors have not been in op-
eration in the recent years. At the moment, the interests towards thorium utilization as a nuclear fuel
have been emerging again. Thorium has been mentioned as a potential fuel for LWRs and various gen-
eration IV nuclear reactors, especially for gas-cooled fast reactors (GCR) and molten salt reactor (MSR).
(Gif 2008)
4.5. Hydro Power
Hydro power is one of the oldest known energy sources. Currently the energy potential of rivers and
rapids is not any more used mechanically, instead it is used for electricity production via water turbines.
Water turbine is a good example of mature technology, where significant technological developments are
not expected. According to British Petroleum (BP), 709 Mtoe hydropower was produced in 2007, which
corresponds to over 8,200 TWh electricity. Among the Nordic countries, Norway and Iceland produce
almost all electricity by hydro power. The share of hydro is significant in Sweden and Finland as well.
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Globally the most significant countries producing hydropower include China, Brazil, Canada, United
States, Russia, Norway and Japan. (BP 2008)
World Energy Council has estimated that global hydropower resources would enable a production of
15,000 TWh electricity annually. However, in industrial countries the production capacity of hydripower
is close to its maximum value. In other words, almost all available hydropower resources have been
taken into use. Suitable resources for additional hydropower production are available in Southern
America and Asia. Large-scale hydropower production usually consists of state-owned power plants and
traditionally hydropower producxtion haqs been considered as a national issue. (WEC 2007)
The efficiency of hydro power plants is often increased by regulation of the water system; i.e. dams and
water reservoirs. Water is stored in reservoirs and feeded in turbins for subsequent changes in electricity
needs. However, the amount of annual hydropower production varies quite a lot due to differences in
annual precipitation. In addition to large-scale centralised hydropower plants there is also some small-
scale and micro hydro power in use, which is characterised my hydropower plants with low efficiency
(typically less than 10 MW) for local use and minimal or lacking water regulation. In the EU area, the
amount of installed small or micro-scale hydropower in use is about 5,000 MW. (WEC 2007)
In 2007, about 14 TWh electricity was produced by hydropower in Finland. This refers to a 15.5 % share
of total electricity supply. The largest amount of built hydropower capacity is located in Norhern
Finland, in Oulujoki, Kemijoki and Iijoki which were built after World War II. Continuation of the
Northern hydropower building has been discussed a lot during the decades, and the issue is at today’s
energy policy agenda. (Vesirakentaja Oy 2008)
Finnish Energy Industries has recently ordered and published an investigation of unused hydropower
resources in Finland (Power from water 2007). The investigation covers also those resources located on
protected and Natura2000 areas. The investigation covers the need for update of the construction plan,
the additional capacity available with construction, annual electricity production of the additional
capacity and the controllability of production. (Vesirakentaja Oy 2008)
According to this investigation, the technologically and economically significant but unused hydropower
potential in Finland is totally 934 MW which corresponds 2.98 TWh annual electricity production.
However, the largest part of this potential is located in sites protected by legislation ot in Natura2000
areas. These include e.g. Vuotos reservoir and power plant (37 MW and 0.33 TWh), Kollaja reservoir and
power plant (35 MW and 0.20 TWh), Ounasjoki (349 MW and 1.21 TWh) and middle part of Iijoki (113
MW and 0.44 TWh). The building of these hydropower rites would require changes into existing
legislation dealing with hydropower and nature conservation. Outside the protected areas and
Natura2000 areas can be found a 330 MW ja 0.58 TWh hydropower potential, which is mainly located
in existing hydropower sites where some additional output is available via modernisation of existing
hydropower facilities. (Vesirakentaja Oy 2008)
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Figure 104. Unbuilt Hydropower Resources in Finland. Green Slices: Protected Areas and
Natura2000 Areas (Vesirakentaja Oy 2008).
In addition, there is also a potential of 274 MW and 0.89 TWh suitable fot additional hydropower
production but requiring update in old construction plans. This potential is mainly located in the rivers
of Pohjanmaa and upper courses of Oulujoki, Iijoki ja Kemijoki. This potential is mainly in protected and
Natura2000 areas, only 63 MW and 0.22 TWh is available with curtrent legislation. About a half of this
potential could be constructed with investment subsidies for energy plants at their current level.
According to the investigation, there is also an additional potential of 368 MW and 2.86 TWh outside of
centralised construction possibilities and protected areas, which is called as ”natural hydropower
resources”. (Vesirakentaja Oy 2008)
4.6. Solar Energy
4.6.1. Solar Technologies
Nowadays, an extremely large variety of solar technologies are available, and photovoltaics have been
gaining an increasing market share for the last 20 years, but global generation of solar electricity is still
small compared to the potential of this resource. The current cost of solar technologies and their inter-
mittent nature make them hardly competitive on an energy market still dominated by cheap fossil fuels.
From a scientific and technological viewpoint, the great challenge is finding new solutions for solar en-
ergy systems to become less capital intensive and more efficient: for this purpose low-cost and/or high-
efficiency photovoltaic device concepts are being developed. Solar thermal technologies are reaching a
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mature stage of development and have the potential of becoming competitive for large energy supply.
Intermittency is being addressed with extended research efforts in energy storage devices, such as bat-
teries and other electric storage systems, thermal storage, and the direct production of solar fuels (typi-
cally hydrogen). All these are valuable routes for enhancing the competitiveness and performance of so-
lar technologies. (Stanford University 2006)
Figure 105. Comparison of Incoming Solar Energy with Other Energy Flows and the Human
Global Consumption of Energy (Wikipedia 2008).
According to IEA, the total cumulative installed capacity of PV systems in IEA PVPS (Photovoltaic Power
Systems Programme) reached 5.7 GW at the end of 2006, with an increase of 36 % over 2005. This
represents around 87 % of the global capacity (6.6 GW), with Germany, Japan, and USA accounting for
70 % of the total capacity (the same countries are the three largest PV manufactures). In the future the
trends for PV systems are expected to be positive, with global yearly electricity generation between 1,383
and 2,584 TWh in 2050. (IEA 2008)
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Figure 106.  Cumulative U.S. PV Installations by Year (US Solar Industry 2006).
Figure 107. Annual U.S. Grid-tied PV by Application (US Solar Industry 2006).
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Figure 108. Overview of Available Technologies for Solar Energy Conversion (SEIA 2004).
Photovoltaics directly convert photon energy into electricity: they use inorganic or organic semiconduc-
tor materials that absorb photons with energy greater than their bandgap to promote energy carriers
into their conduction band. Electron-hole pairs, or excitons for organic semiconductors, are subse-
quently separated and charges are collected at the electrodes for electricity generation. Thin- film photo-
voltaics or “3rd generation photovoltaics”, are considered as a promising route to increasing the effi-
ciency and lowering the cost of photovoltaics (Various authors, Standford University 2006). According
to IEA forecasts, thin films are expected to increase their market share significantly by 2020, and in par-
ticular Si thin-films modules might reach efficiency as high as 18%, thus representing viable solutions for
power applications. This new generation of PV is expected to emerge and reach high market shares be-
tween 2020 and 2030 (IEA 2008).
Solar thermal technologies convert the energy of direct light into thermal energy using concentrator de-
vices. For electricity generation, the most developed technologies are the parabolic dish, the parabolic
trough, and the power tower. Already commercially available, the parabolic dish can be used in single
dish applications with output power of the order of 25 kWe, or grouped in dish farms to create large
multi-megawatt plants. Parabolic troughs seem most likely to be used for deployment of solar energy in
the near-term. Various large plants are currently in operation (California – 354 MW) or in the planning
process in the USA and in Europe. Power towers, with low cost and efficient thermal storage, promise
dispatchable, high capacity factor power plants in the future. (Standford University 2006.) Investment
costs for trough plants are in the range of USD 4 to 9/W, depending on local conditions. Plants under
construction are expected to generate electricity at a cost between USD 125–225/MWh. (IEA 2008.)
Photosynthetic, photochemical, thermal, and thermochemical processes can be applied to store solar
energy in the form of chemical fuels, particularly hydrogen. Photochemical and photoelectrochemical
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systems use light-sensitive materials for absorbing photon energy and producing electrons with suffi-
cient energy for splitting water. In thermochemical technologies, concentrated solar flux is used to pro-
duce the high-temperatures necessary to drive endothermic reactions such as syngas production from
natural gas and water thermal or chemical decomposition. Some biological systems (algae, bacteria,
yeasts) produce hydrogen in their metabolic activities. (Standford University 2006)
4.6.2. Market Growth Trends in Solar Energy
Solar thermal is booming worldwide, especially in Europe and USA. In the USA, the total number of
shipments of thermal collectors has doubled between 1996 and 2005. The European solar thermal mar-
ket is also thriving. The market volume in the EU-25 has been very close to 2 GWth newly installed ca-
pacity in 2006, compared with 0.6 GWth 10 years before (Levon 2007). The total solar thermal capacity
in operation was 5 GWth in 1997, 10 GWth in 2004 and has reached 15 GWth in 2007 (ESTIF 2007).
Around 2 million European families already directly benefit from solar thermal energy, as do other fre-
quent users such as hotels, sport centres and office buildings. Apart from policy support, the main driv-
ers of these highly positive trends are growing awareness for solar energy, increasing prices of conven-
tional energies, growing concern over security of supply with imported fuels as well as visible signs of
climate change.
The current situation in Austria, where 15 % of detached houses already use solar thermal and in some
villages solar collectors can be seen on most roofs, is showing the way for the rest of Europe. The poten-
tial for growth in Europe is immense, particularly in market sectors such as multi-family houses, indus-
trial and office buildings. (ESTIF 2007)
European Solar Thermal Industry Federation (ESTIF) presents two 2020 targets, minimal and ambi-
tious, for solar thermal energy development. Technically, ESTIF foresees a market phase-in of new ap-
plications, together with considerable advancement in heat storage and solar cooling, to impact the mar-
ket around 2015-2025. Economically, they anticipate further cost reduction of solar thermal, and the
continuing cost increase of fossil fuels. Politically, business as usual is assumed, i.e. fragmented support
for the minimal target; strong support EU-wide for the ambitious target. (ESTIF 2007)
In the minimal target (Austria scenario), the minimum goal for the EU in 2020 should be to reach the
solar thermal usage of 199 kWth per 1.000 capita of Austria in 2005, equivalent to a total capacity in op-
eration of 91 GWth in the EU (ESTIF 2007).
The market growth rate needed to reach this minimal target is 16 % per year, well below the EU average
of 2002-2006. However, to reach this target a better political framework is needed throughout the EU,
to make sure that the growth is shared in all countries. (ESTIF 2007)
The ambitious target, 1m2 per capita for every European in 2020, can be reached with a suitable support
framework. 1 m2 of collector (0.7 kWth) per capita equals a total capacity 1,190 GWth in the EU. In the
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residential sector alone, about two million EU families have already installed this amount of solar capac-
ity. Reaching this target means using solar widely both for cooling and process heat, with majority of this
capacity supplying domestic hot water and space heating. The average yearly growth rate of the EU mar-
ket necessary to reach this target is 31 % – less than the rate achieved in 2006 and only 7 % above the
2002–2006 average. (ESTIF 2007)
A glance at the growing competition for scarce resources on the global energy markets is a persuasive
argument for using solar thermal most everywhere possible during the 21st century. Conservatively esti-
mated, this market will have a value in the order of 10,000 billion €, without replacements and mainte-
nance. Europe is in a good position and has the chance to be the main beneficiary of this new global
business field. In most renewables, Europe is leading both in technology and in the market volumes.
However, in the latter, the Chinese market for solar thermal alone is 7 times bigger than the EU market.
However, given the price levels, European manufacturers cannot easily compete in markets like China,
India and Turkey. A substantial growth in the domestic EU market is needed for the European to main-
tain its technological leadership (ESTIF 2007).
World photovoltaic shipments grew by 32 % in 2003, and the industry generated $4.7 billion in revenue.
Solar electric systems for homes and businesses dominated the market in the United States, Europe, and
Japan as the volume of sales surpassed 740 megawatts (MW), with Europe contributing to around 50 %
of the global cumulative capacity.
Increasingly, policies in Europe and Japan (in particular feed-in tariffs and 70,000 or 100,000 roofs
programs) are driving technology and market development: support mechanisms are defined in national
laws. The introduction, modification or fading out of such support schemes can have profound conse-
quences on PV industries. PV Market forecasts therefore depend on a deep understanding of the political
framework. (SEIA 2004)
The next 10 years are critical for worldwide solar power development. This period will determine which
nations reap the economic, environmental, security, and reliability values that solar power offers. Ac-
tions by government and industry will determine whether solar power is catapulted to a new level,
meanwhile investment decisions for research, new manufacturing, and creating new markets will deter-
mine where solar power will thrive (SEIA 2004).
SEIA (Solar Energy Industries Association) estimates that, if policies for technology and market devel-
opment are introduced, the cumulative capacity of installed solar electric systems in the United States
will grow substantially from less than 0.4 GW in 2003 to 200 GW by 2030.
The solar PV market has been flourishing over the last years and is forecasted to confirm this trend in
the coming years. After an exponential growth in the last 10 years, by the end of 2006 the generating
capacity manufactured reached 2500MW, with the main players being Europe, US and Japan (Daviss
2007).
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This is the result of the feed-in tariffs introduced first in Germany (which has the 55 % of the world’s in-
stalled base of PV panels) and, more recently, in Italy and Spain. (Daviss 2007)
EPIA (European Photovoltaic Industry Association) has developed a “policy driven” scenario (in which
follow up and/or introduction of support mechanisms, namely feed-in tariffs, in a large number of coun-
tries is taken into account) according to which Germany is expected to remain the market leader and
even increase its market size considerably over the next years. The biggest growth is foreseen for the
Rest Europe in particular in countries such as Spain, Italy, France and Greece. The USA will also be able
to use its vast solar potential and will challenge Germany as the Number 1 PV country. PV development
in Japan will, to a large extent, depend on the decision of the Japanese government to reintroduce, or
not, a support program. Also the Rest of Asia, in particular India and South Korea, will face increasing
demand for PV. (EPIA 2008)
Global PV markets have been expanding rapidly over the last decade. EPIA expects a similar market de-
velopment for the years to come. By 2010 a global annual PV market of 7 GWp can be expected in the
privileged Policy Driven Scenario. However, it is evident that such a market growth will require continu-
ous political support in some countries and expanding support in countries which have not been active
supporters of PV so far. PV will reach competitiveness with peak power prices in southern Europe by
2015 and in most of Europe by 2020. This so called grid parity is expected to then trigger an extraordi-
nary demand due to PV generated electricity becoming increasingly competitive as a result of a continu-
ous decrease in PV technology prices (thanks to the investment in new designs) and expected price in-
creases of fossil energy sources (EPIA 2008).
The costs of PV systems are still high, despite their decrease with a learning curve of 15-20 % which re-
sulted in a significant decrease in prices from 1990s to 2004. From 2004 prices have increased again,
because of both increased demand (especially in Germany and Japan) and shortage of silicon. Currently,
crystalline silicon modules are back to 2004 nominal prices and are expected to decrease as new manu-
facturing plants and silicon-purification facilities come on line. At the moment, PV modules account for
about 60 % of total costs, which were around USD 6.25/W at the end of 2006 and are expected to drop
to USD 3.75/W to 4.4/W by 2010. The increasing penetration of thin-film modules will help to further
reduce the costs (IEA 2008).
4.6.3. Solar energy potential in Finland
Photovoltaics
In Finland there are over 150 km² roof or façade surface suitable for photovoltaics. If this surface were
covered with solar electric panel, the production would be 14 TWh / year. Due to the power limitations
set by the energy system, upper limit of the peak power of photovoltaics can be considered 1 500 MWp
(1.5 TWh / year). Larger amounts require reserve capacity arrangements and in the long run effective
energy storage solutions. In table below, there is summarized estimation of the theoretical potential of
photovoltaics in Finland. (SOLPROS 2001, 8–9.)
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Table 4.  Theoretical Potential of Photovoltaics in Finland (SOLPROS 2001).
Summer cottages and holiday
camps
10 MWp 10 GWh
Special applications 10 MWp 10 GWh
Public buildings (20 % of the
municipalities a’50 kWp)
4 MWp 4 GWh
Roofs of the buildings 14 000 MWp 11 TWh
Facades of the buildings 4 000 MWp 3 TWh
Photovoltaics in the network
without additional reserve ca-
pacity
1 500 MWp 1.5 TWh
Solar heating
The goal of the national solar power program of measures is 100.000 m² solar heating in 2010. In the
year 2025 around 1.000.000 m² could represent the upper limit of the usage. There are estimations of
potential for solar heat in Finland illustrated in the following table below and previous numbers fit well
within these estimations. Long-term possibilities are most likely a couple of TWh per year. The upper
limit in the long run (year 2050) will be around 10 TWh, which means the last three rows. According to
this estimate, the practical potential is naturally lower than these numbers. (SOLPROS 2001, 15)
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Table 5.  Technical Potential of Solar Heating in Finland (SOLPROS 2001).
Market segment Collecting area Energy
Special targets (outdoor
swimming pools, sports halls,
camping sites, fast food chains
etc.)
50 000 m2 20 GWh
Public buildings (20 % of the
municipalities a’500 m2)
40 000 m2 20 GWh
Solar heat supplements oil
heating (10 % of the renewable
oil cauldron)
90 000 m2 30 GWh
Warm service water of the
one-family house
1 500 000 m2 0.6 TWh
Replacement of the heavy fuel
oil during summertime
280 000 m2 0.1 TWh
Drying of biomass 5 000 000 m2 2 – 3 TWh
Summertime’s regional and
district heating
5 000 000 m2 2 – 3 TWh
Solar heat’s seasonal storage 10 000 000 m2 4 – 5 TWh
4.7. Wind Energy
4.7.1. Background Information
Installed wind energy has been increasing rapidly worldwide over the last 5 years and now accounts for
up to 3 % of electricity consumption in Europe, which offsets nearly 50 million tons of CO2 (European
Commission 2007).
According to EIA (Energy Information Administration) wind energy is also becoming increasingly im-
portant in the USA: although it has developed rapidly in the United States since 2000, it still did not
provide a substantial amount of electricity until 2006, when wind energy produced 27 billion kWh. This
represents half the amount provided by biomass, but nearly 83 %more than the amount provided by
geothermal. The fact that wind provided 7 % of renewable-based electricity during 2006 (and 28 % of
non-hydro renewable generation) is due to the large amount of new wind capacity which has come on
line since the turn of the century. In particular, total installed wind capacity increased from 4,417 MW in
2002 to 11,329 MW in 2006, with 2,600 MW of the increase coming during 2006 alone. (EIA 2008)
Utilization of wind energy worldwide is increasing rapidly: 20,073 MW of wind power capacity was in-
stalled globally during 2007 to reach a total of 94,122 MW by the end of the year. The global market for
wind turbines increased by 31 % in 2007, following growth of 33 % and 41 % in 2006 and 2007 respec-
tively. (EWEA 2008)
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The fast growth is particularly visible in Europe, where the European Commission’s 1997 White Paper
target of 40,000 MW wind power capacity by 2010 in the EU was reached already in 2005. In the EU,
installed wind power capacity has increased by an average of 25 % annually over the past eleven years,
from 4,753 MW in 1997 to 56,535 MW in 2007. In terms of annual installations, the EU market for wind
turbines has grown by 19 % annually, from 1,277 MW in 1997 to 8,554 MW in 2007. (EWEA 2008)
The very rapid growth in Denmark and Germany, up to around 2003/4, has now slowed, but Spain, In-
dia, China and the United States are forging ahead and there are plans for further capacity in Canada,
the Middle East, the Far East and South America. If the current growth rate continues, there may be
about 150 GW of wind by 2010. (WEC 2007)
4.7.2. Wind Energy Industry and Market Trends
In a recent study by a British scientist, the current wind energy technology trends in Europe are investi-
gated. Since captured energy is proportional to the blade area of the wind turbines, wind technology has
mostly evolved towards higher and bigger wind turbines over the last decade. Nowadays, the design of
wind turbines is undergoing a shift using power electronics to bring additional energy capture and con-
trol to the quality of power delivered to the grid. (EC 2007)
Another trend that affects electricity production is repowering, which means the replacement of older,
smaller turbines with fewer, larger turbines representing the state of the art in power production. Re-
powering is expected to increase in years ahead. In 2006, Denmark reduced the total number of tur-
bines, but capacity was increased by 8 MW. Germany removed 79 turbines and added 135 MW of new
machines in these areas. In Italy, 46 turbines ranging from 200 kW to 450 kW were replaced by 15 larger
machines in the range of 800 kW to 1500 kW. This increased total in-field capacity by 4 MW but had a
larger benefit reported in terms of energy production. The Netherlands decommissioned 40 turbines in
2006 Twenty-one of these with total capacity of 4.3 MW were replaced with 13 turbines with a capacity
of 26.5 MW, for a net “repowering effect” of 22 MW. (IEA 2006) The timely development of ever-bigger
rotor-blades is considered a major bottleneck and a key limiting factor determining the up-scaling pace
in the wind industry, and more R&D actions are needed in terms of exploring new ways of transporta-
tion, installation and operation and maintenance methods of these big components (WEC 2007), in fact
the biggest turbines currently available are 5-6 MW units with a rotor diameter of up to 126meters (IEA
2008). Problems relative to weak grid should also be taken into account: in some cases the local electri-
cal grid may be too weak to handle the electricity output from a large machine (WEC 2007).
Energy payback time is reported to be decreasing considerably, with values around 6–8 months right
now, which is similar to conventional energy, but with no ongoing fuel supply costs or waste production.
The payback time for CO2 is between 13 and 20 months, thus showing that the return on investment is
rapid in terms of environmental and economic costs. (EC 2007)
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At the policy level, the support mechanism which has proven to be the most successful for the promotion
of wind energy is fixed feed-in tariffs, and it is also for this reason that Europe is the current leader
within this sector, with nearly 75 % of installed wind energy capacity worldwide, and an annual growth
rate of the sector which has been close to 30 % over the last 5 years (EC 2007).
New developments are underway in the field of wind energy storage. One example is that proposed by
the EU project “Night wind” which aims at using a refrigerated warehouse as a giant battery for wind
energy, so to store all electricity produced during night time by windmills all over Europe, and to release
this energy again during the peak electricity demand hours in daytime (Night Wind). Other options are
electricity storage in redox flow batteries (a class of devices which employ an electrolyte where energy is
stored and a cell stack where energy conversion occurs), pumping pressurized air in geological forma-
tions and releasing it at night or when the wind does not blow, or mechanical energy storage, precisely in
the form of flywheels like those offered by Beacon POWER (BEACON Power).
Other new R&D developments connected to wind power technology include super conducting generators
(thanks to which 50-60 % reduction in weight and size are expected), smart rotors (which would aid load
reductions), but also new concepts like “flying windmills” (a novel design in which turbines are tethered
to the ground and tap jet stream wind currents) or floating structures for off-shore turbines. Research
for hybrid systems is also underway, as in the case of Poseidon’s Organ, in which a floating off-shore
wave power plant also serves as foundation for wind turbines. (IEA 2008)
As mentioned previously, the cost of wind power has declined steadily over the last decades, therefore
wind prices are expected to fall during the next two-three years. According to the IEA forecasts, this will
lead to a decrease in prices for the installation of wind technologies, which, in 2020, will make electricity
produced from onshore wind competitive with that produced from fossil fuels, as it already is at good
wind sites. (IEA 2008)
Price projections estimate that in 2015 costs will be about US cents 5.3/kWh at a high wind site and
about 6.3/kWh in a medium wind site (IEA 2008).
The same forecasts show that the deployment of onshore wind technologies will continue to be domi-
nated by Western Europe until 2020, when investments in China and USA are expected to pick up. By
2025 onshore wind installations will attain a capacity of 200 GW and after that will remain relatively
constant, meanwhile in China onshore wind power will reach 250 GW by 2040. As far as offshore wind is
concerned, the commercialization will be reached between 2035 and 2040, when it will get to about 250
GW. Because of the higher capital costs requirements (turbines are on average about 20 % more expen-
sive than onshore and tower and foundations can cost more than 2.5 times the price of an onshore pro-
ject of the same size), the deployment of this technology will be limited to Western Europe, OECD Pacific
and OECD North America. (IEA 2008)
Off-shore wind however, presents various advantages, such as alleviating concerns about despoiling the
landscape and reduction of intermittency issues, since the wind regime is more stable. On the other hand
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a solution to intermittency and grid stability may lie in the development of more sophisticated grid man-
agement systems, demand-side management systems and electricity storage systems as those described
above. (IEA 2008)
Six leading wind turbine manufacturers accounted for about 90 % of the global market in 2006: turbine
manufacturing continues to expand in Europe and new plants are opening in China, USA and India. The
growth in this sense is very large: four of the leading companies in this sector, including India’s Suzlon,
have opened plants in the USA in 2006, meanwhile the Chinese Goldwind has reached the top ten in
terms of market share worldwide. (IEA 2008)
According to GWEC (Global Wind Energy Council), 2007 was the best year so far for the global wind
industry, with close to 20000 MW installed. This development was lead by the US, China and Spain, and
it brought the world-wide installed capacity to 94,123 MW. This is an increase of 31 % compared with the
2006 market, and represents an overall increase in global installed capacity of about 27 %. “The growth
rates we are experiencing in wind energy continue to exceed our most optimistic expectations,” said
GWEC Secretary General Steve Sawyer. “Globally, wind energy has become a mainstream energy source
and an important player in the world’s energy markets, and it now contributes to the energy mix in more
than 70 countries across the globe. (GWEC 2008)
The top five countries in terms of installed capacity are Germany (22.3 GW), the US (16.8 GW), Spain
(15.1 GW), India (7.8 GW) and China (5.9 GW). In terms of economic value, the global wind market in
2007 was worth about 25 bn EUR or 37bn US$ in new generating equipment. (GWEC 2008)
China in particular has seen a doubling in its annual market, with 3,304 MW of wind energy capacity
added during 2007, representing market growth of 145 % over 2006, and now ranks fifth in total in-
stalled wind energy capacity with 5,906 MW at the end of 2007. However, experts estimate that this is
just the beginning, and that the real growth in China is yet to come. Based on current growth rates, the
Chinese Renewable Energy Industry Association (CREIA) forecasts a capacity of around 50,000 MW by
2015. The manufacturing industry of wind energy in China is booming, in fact, while in the past im-
ported wind turbines dominated the Chinese market, this is changing rapidly as the growing wind power
market and the clear policy direction have encouraged domestic production. At the end of 2007, they
were 40 Chinese manufacturers involved in wind energy, accounting for about 56 % of the equipment
installed during the year, up from 41 % in 2006. “This percentage is expected to increase substantially in
the future. Total domestic manufacturing capacity is now about 5,000 MW, and is expected to reach 10-
12 GW by 2010” predicts GWEC President Prof. Arthouros Zervos. Established major Chinese manufac-
turers are Goldwind, Sinovel Windtec, Windey and Dongfeng Electrical. While in 2006, only about 400
MW of new capacity was manufactured by Chinese manufacturers, in 2007, the top two Chinese compa-
nies (Gold Wind and Sinovel) alone accounted for 1,460 MW of the new installed capacity, representing
about 42 % of the annual market. This compares to only 37 % provided by the top three foreign manufac-
turers (Gamesa, Vestas and GE). (GWEC 2008)
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As far as the European market is concerned, the big surprise was Spain with 3,522 MW of new capacity
installed in 2007, the highest amount of any European country ever, earning it second place globally af-
ter the US. Total installed wind energy capacity now stands at over 15 GW in Spain, but there was also
sustained growth in France with 888 MW of added capacity to reach 2,454 MW and Italy, with 603 MW
added for a total of 2,726 MW. The new Member States performed well and increased installed capacity
by 60%, with Poland, the most successful, reaching a total of 276 MW. The Czech Republic installed 63
MW, its best year ever, and Bulgaria 34 MW. Nevertheless, a handful of markets pulled in the opposite
direction, including Germany, whose annual market shrank by 25 % compared to 2006. Portugal and the
UK also slumped. As a result, the overall annual market growth in Europe in 2007 was of only 11 %.
(GWEC 2008)
Another remarkable trend is that, while Europe remains the leading market for wind energy, new instal-
lations represented just 43 % of the global total, down from nearly 75 % in 2004. For the first time in
decades, more than 50 % of the annual wind market was outside Europe, and this trend is likely to con-
tinue into the future. While Europe, North America and Asia continue to see the most important addi-
tions to their wind energy capacity, the Middle East/North Africa region increased its wind power instal-
lations by 42 %, reaching 538 MW at the end of 2007. New capacity was added in Egypt, Morocco and
Iran. Growth in the Pacific region was led by New Zealand with 151 MW in new capacity, which nearly
doubled the country’s total installations, reaching 322 MW. While Australia had an exceptionally weak
year with only 7 MW of new installations, the change in government at the end of 2007 spurs hopes for a
brighter future for wind energy. Within hours of being sworn in to office, the new Labour Prime Minister
Kevin Rudd signed the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, and the new government is now making good
on its promise of a target of 20% power production by renewables by 2020. (GWEC 2008)
Still according to GWEC, the global wind market is predicted to grow by over 155 % from its current size
to reach 240 GW of total installed capacity by the year 2012. This would represent an addition of 146 GW
in 5 years, equaling an investment of over 180 bn EUR (277 bn US$, both in 2007 value). The electricity
produced by wind energy will reach over 500 TWh in 2012 (up from 200 TWh in 2007), accounting for
around 3% of global electricity production (up from just over 1 % in 2007). The main areas of growth
during this period will be North America and Asia, and more specifically the US and People's Republic of
China. This forecast exceeds previous estimates by GWEC, and the total installed capacity for 2010 has
been corrected upwards to reach 171.9 GW (from 149.5 GW). The average growth rates during this five
year period in terms of total installed capacity are expected to be 20.7 %, compared with 23.4 % during
2003–2007. In 2012, Europe will continue to host the largest wind energy capacity, with the total reach-
ing 102 GW, followed by Asia with 66 GW and North America with 61.3 GW. The additions in installed
capacity every year are predicted to grow from 19.9 GW in 2007 to 36.1 MW in 2012, with an average
growth rate of 12.7 %. Considering that annual markets have been increasing by an average of 24.7 %
over the last 5 years, growth could be much stronger also in the future, were it not for continuing supply
chain difficulties which considerably limit the growth of annual markets for the next two years. This
problem should be overcome by 2010, and along with the development of the offshore market, growth
rates are expected to recover in the next decade. (GWEC 2008)
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Asia is predicted to overtake Europe as the biggest annual market, with as much as 12.5 GW of new wind
generating capacity installed during the year 2012, up from 5.2 GW in 2007. This growth will be mainly
led by China, which has since 2004 doubled its total capacity every year, thereby consistently exceeding
even the most optimistic predictions. By 2010, China is expected to be the biggest national annual mar-
ket globally. This development is underpinned by a rapidly growing number of domestic manufacturers
operating in the Chinese market, delivering home made turbines to large scale wind energy projects. Al-
ready in 2007, 40 domestic suppliers supplied 56 % of the new installations in the domestic market, up
from 41 % in 2006. While China will emerge as the continental leader in Asia, sustained growth is also
foreseen in India, while other markets such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan will also contribute to the
development of wind energy on the continent. The European market will by 2012 have fallen to third
place in terms of annual installations (10.3 GW), behind North America (10.5 GW). Overall, this means
that over 71 % of new installations will occur outside of Europe in 2012, up from 28 % in 2004 and 57 %
in 2007. While in terms of total installed capacity, Europe will continue to be the biggest regional market
its share will have fallen to 42.4 %. The large scale development of offshore wind energy is further de-
layed and will only start to have a significant impact on European market growth towards the end of the
time period under consideration. However, it is expected that offshore development will lend new mo-
mentum to growth in Europe during the next decade. In Europe, Germany and Spain will remain the
leading markets, but their relative weight will decrease as a larger number of national markets emerge
on the scene. While the spectacular growth of the Spanish market in 2007 with over 3.5 GW of new in-
stallations will not be sustained, a stable pace of 2–2.5 GW per year on average can be expected, ena-
bling Spain to reach the government’s 2010 target of 20 GW. The size of the German annual market will
continue to decrease, but it will remain the second strongest European market for the 2008–2012 period
and the biggest in terms of total installed capacity. By 2010, offshore developments will give new impe-
tus to the German market, resulting in stronger growth. Other important markets in Europe will be
France and the United Kingdom, each increasing by an average of 1 GW per year. The North American
market will grow even stronger than previously thought, led by significant growth in the US, as well as
sustained development of the Canadian market. In total, North America will see an addition of 42.6 GW
in the next five years, reaching 61.3 GW of total capacity in 2012. This represents an average of 8.5 GW
of new capacity added every year, the bulk of which will be in the US. These figures assume that the US
Production Tax Credit (PTC) will continue to be renewed in time for the current strong growth to con-
tinue. Moreover, high level engagement of an increasing number of US states, 26 of which have already
introduced Renewable Portfolio Standards, will also assure sustained growth. A change in US admini-
stration may further underpin this development. Latin America is expected to contribute to the global
total in a more substantial way in the future, mainly driven by Brazil, Mexico and Chile. By 2012, the to-
tal installed capacity in Latin America and the Caribbean will increase 8-fold to reach 4.5 GW, with an
annual market of 1.4 GW. However, despite its tremendous potential, Latin America is likely to remain a
small market until the end of the period under consideration, progressing towards more significant de-
velopment in the next decade. The Pacific region will see around 2.3 GW of new installations in 2008-
2012, bringing the total up to 3.5 GW. While in Australia, wind energy development slowed down con-
siderably in 2006 and 2007, the outlook for the future is more optimistic, mainly thanks to the change in
federal government at the end of 2007, the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and the pledge to imple-
ment a new target for 20 % of electricity to come from renewables by 2020. New Zealand, however, got
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new impetus with 151 MW of new installations, and many more projects are at various stages of devel-
opment. Africa and the Middle East will remain the region with the smallest wind energy development,
with a total installed capacity of 3 GW by 2012, up from 500 MW in 2007. However, it is expected that
market growth will pick up in the coming five years, with annual additions reaching around 800 MW by
2012. This development will be driven by Egypt and Morocco, with some development also predicted in
other North African and Middle Eastern countries. (GWEC 2008)
Figure 109.  Global Cumulative Wind Power Capacity 1990–2007 (in MW) (GWEC 2008).
Figure 110.  Top Annual Markets in the World (MW) (GWEC 2008).
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Figure 111.  Offshore Wind in the EU (MW) (GWEC 2008).
Figure 112. Wind Power's Share of Electricity Demand (EWEA 2008).
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Figure 113. Advanced Scenarios for 2010, 2020 and 2030 (EWEA 2008).
Figure 114. Electricity from Wind up to 2030 (EWEA 2008).
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Figure 115. Wind Power's Share of EU Electricity Demand (EWEA 2008).
Figure 116. Forecasts of Cumulative and Installed Capacity of Wind Energy in the Period 2007–
2012 (GWEC 2008).
4.7.3. Wind Energy potential in Finland
Wind Energy potential in Finland according to WWF Finland (2007) and theoretical provincial disquisi-
tions are 9 000–10 000 MW (30 TWh). Out of this figure off-shore potential is 5 000–8 000 MW. Lauri
Luopajärvi (2008) estimates the economically viable potential to produce wind power in Finland by the
year 2020 to be 2 000 MW (6.1 TWh). (Korpinen et al. 2007, 4; Luopajärvi 2008)
According to the ecological criteria of WWF, the added wind power areas to the landscape plans should
be checked, about two thirds of the potential suggested to the sea areas or in the other words about 2
220 wind farms, measures up to the ecological criteria set by WWF. In the fell areas more careful nature
study should be done. In regard to the inland wind potential, no official or complete records are made.
117
Finding out the potential would require updating of the wind atlas. Current wind atlas was done by
Meteorological Institute in 1991 and a new one is under way and will be finished by the end of the year
2009. (Korpinen et al. 2007, 4; Laatikainen & Jussila 14.5.2008)
4.8. Bioenergy and Peat
The term bio energy denotes the use of vegetable matter as a source of energy; it covers a variety of fuels,
with applications in all the major sectors of consumption – power generation, transportation, industry,
households, etc.
4.8.1. Wood Fuels
There are two very different populations using wood fuels. One, typically an OECD member country,
uses highly-efficient combustion technology under tight regulations on emissions. The other (estimated
at three billion people) uses small-scale appliances, which are both inefficient and highly polluting.
Wood Fuel is usually classified into three main commodities: fuel wood, charcoal and black liquor. Black
liquor is the spent pulping chemicals and the lignin component of wood after chemical pulping, it is fired
in a chemical recovery boiler and process steam and electricity are also produced. Fuel wood and char-
coal are the traditional wood forest products, and even today almost half of all of the forest harvest is for
energy, with the remainder for industrial use (lumber, veneer and paper).  Charcoal is produced by the
thermal conversion of wood (and other biomass). This transformation has losses in the form of combus-
tible gas and condensable materials (wood tar), which are not always recovered for either material appli-
cations or energy purposes. The energy efficiency of charcoal production ranges from 25 % in Africa (us-
ing mainly artisanal methods) to 48 % in Brazil which uses industrial kilns with extensive energy and
materials recovery. (WEC 2007)
4.8.2. Biomass Conversion
The largest secondary transformation of biomass after charcoal production is in the electricity sector.
For many years biomass processing industries such as sugar, wood products and chemical pulping (black
liquor) have installed combined heat and power (CHP, also known in the USA as cogeneration) plants.
Many of these have been relatively low-steam-temperature installations, with only sufficient electricity
to meet the plant processing needs (WEC 2007). One example of this technology is the Alholmens Kraft
CHP plant in Pietarsaari, the largest biomass-fuelled power plant in the world, producing 100 MW proc-
ess steam for the adjacent paper mill, 240 MW for utility generating electricity, and 60 MW heat output
for district heating. (IEA 2008)
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Co-firing is another option for electricity generation: it involves combining biomass material with coal in
existing coal-fired boilers. Coal-fired boilers can handle a pre-mixed combination of coal and biomass in
which the biomass is combined with the coal in the feed lot and fed through an existing coal feed system.
Alternatively, boilers can be retrofitted with a separate feed system for the biomass such that the bio-
mass and coal actually mix inside the boiler. (EIA 2002)
Figure 117.  Biomass Conversion Paths (IEA 2007).
4.8.3. Biofuels
Ethanol
2006 was the year in which biofuels for transportation came into very public prominence, as rising world
crude oil prices stimulated the US President in his January state-of-the-union address to advocate in-
creased support for ethanol, both in its current production from maize and the future option of produc-
ing it from the extensive lignocellulosic resources contained in agricultural straws and wood. (WEC
2007)
As a consequence of the high prices of traded crude oil in the last few years, many countries advanced
their bio fuel goals and, in the case of Brazil and the USA, large production gains occurred. The propor-
tion of the world's gasoline pool provided by the 2006 estimate of ethanol output is about 2.5% (1.1 EJ of
ethanol and 37.5 EJ of gasoline). (WEC 2007)
The expansion of biofuels is not without controversy, as the production of ethanol from corn is only
marginally energy-positive at about 1.4:1, while that from sugarcane in Brazil has a ratio of about 8 units
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of renewable liquid fuel to one of fossil energy input. And whereas Brazil has foregone most agricultural
subsidy to its sugar industry, the agricultural sectors of both the USA and the EU countries are engaged
in vast subsidies on agricultural commodities in general, and on ethanol or other biofuels specifically.
(WEC 2007)
Biodiesel
The other significant biofuel is biodiesel, which is currently produced from vegetable oils, animal fats
and grease by esterification. The vegetable oils with carbon chain lengths of between 16 and 22 carbon
atoms are generally in the form of triacyl glycerides (TAG) which on transesterification with methanol
produce glycerol as a by-product and FAME (fatty acid methyl ester) as the precursor to biodiesel. The
second-generation biodiesel is often called 'renewable diesel' and is produced by treating vegetable oil
with hydrogen over catalysts in oil refineries, to either blend or be co-processed with 'fossil diesel. The
resultant product can be used in the range of B5–B50. In addition to vegetable oils, animal fats such as
tallow and waste grease can also be converted to FAME; they are the lowest-cost resources available,
mainly in urban areas. (WEC 2007)
The commercial resource base for vegetable oils comprises about 20 different species with soybean oil,
palm/palm kernel oil, sunflower, rapeseed (Colza), and coconut oils being the largest sources. World
consumption for all purposes is increasing at about 4 % per year, however the largest growth rates are in
palm oil which together with soy oil comprise 50 % of the annual vegetable oil production. Despite the
current minority position of biodiesel relative to ethanol, the adoption of mandates in several countries
will fuel a large growth in the near future. Brazil, for example, has a nationwide mandate for B2 in 2008
resulting in an estimated 1.1 hm3 demand for biodiesel (935 kt). The EU mandates for 5.75 % biofuels in
the transportation sector by 2010 are driving the rapid growth of biodiesel in the major EU economies
and, like ethanol, production has leapt in the last few years (WEC 2007). The agricultural commodity
base of the current biofuels has ramifications for the sustainability of the food and animal-feed supply
system, and many countries are looking to other biomass resources and second-generation biofuels for
sustained growth. (WEC 2007)
AEBIOM (European Biomass Association) suggests that the concept of sustainability should not only be
applied to biofuels but also to the production of all energy crops as well as all conversion routes, be it for
biofuels, biogas, heat or electricity purposes. The food and feed production should also be sustainable.
Therefore an integrated approach which can take into account the following criteria is necessary (AE-
BIOM 2007):
· administrative and economic consequences should be acceptable and should not decrease the
competitiveness of biofuels
· redundancy with the existing European agricultural cross-compliance scheme should be avoided
· certification system should be set while taking into account the existing certification schemes
which are applied for various biomass sources (FSC for forest, RSPO for palm oil, RTSS for soy-
bean, etc), so to be set only for those missing parts that are not covered by existing reliable certi-
fication scheme
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Third and Fourth Generation Biofuels
Third generation biofuels and products are made from energy and biomass crops that have been de-
signed in such a way that their very structure or properties conform to the requirements of a particular
bioconversion process. They may be produced from waste rather than primary crops, thus not putting
pressure on world food supplies. Commonly they are produced from algae, which present high yields and
can grow in places away from forests and protected areas. (IEA 2008)
Because third-generation biofuels are still under development and production experience is still lacking,
IEA forecasts that these fuels will give little contribute before 2050 (IEA 2008).
Fourth generation biofuels are based on engineering or breeding of energy crops that absorb unusually
high levels of CO2 (for example eucalyptus trees), and when combined with CCS, may result in a two-fold
reduction in carbon emissions, defined as more carbon removed from the atmosphere than released.
Fourth generation biofuels may be produced also through fast pyrolysis, a process which utilizes the
burning or smouldering of biomass at 400–600 ºC in the absence of air. Its by-product, called biochar
may act as an efficient substrate for microbial populations which fix nitrogen, phosphorus and other nu-
trients as well as carbon and water in the soil. Recent studies suggest that biochar-improved soil could
sequester up to 150 tonnes more carbon than unimproved soil and, according to some estimates, amend-
ing only 10% of the biologically active agricultural land on the planet today with biochar could help to
attain a carbon negative status in a relatively short time (Pretorius 2007)
Biogas
Biomass conversion into biogas can be either from fast thermo-chemical processes (e.g. pyrolysis) which
can produce biogas and other fuels, with only 2 %–4 % of ash, or from slow anaerobic fermentation,
which converts only a fraction (50 %–60 %) of feedstock but produces soil conditioners as a byproduct.
In the case of pyrolysis the process is carried out at high temperatures (300–700°C) and material de-
composition products are solid (charcoal), liquid (oil) or gaseous. Slow pyrolysis produces solid prod-
ucts, meanwhile modern fast (flash) pyrolysis at moderate temperature provides up to 80% bio-oil. In
order for biogas to be produced, high temperatures are required. (IEA 2007b)
This biogas can be used in combustion engines (10 kW to 10 MW) with efficiency of some 30%-35%; in
gas turbines at higher efficiencies or in highly-efficient combined cycles. Biomass integrated gasification
gas turbines (BIG/GT) are not yet in commercial use, but their economics is expected to improve. The
first integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) running on 100% biomass (straw) has been success-
fully operated in Sweden. Technical issues appear to have been overcome. IGCC plants are already eco-
nomically competitive in CHP mode using black-liquor from the pulp and paper industry as a feedstock.
Other developments have brought Stirling engines and organic Rankine cycles (ORC) closer to the mar-
ket whereas integrated gasification fuel cell plants (IGFC) still need significantly more R&D. (IEA
2007b)
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Current Status and Future Trends
According to IEA, in the power sector, about 21 % of the biomass is used for co-firing, mostly together
with coal. In industry, 200 Mtoe of liquids produced from biomass, mainly methanol, are projected to be
used for the production of petrochemicals and 45Mtoe for bio-lubricants. A further 150 Mtoe of biomass
derived liquids is projected to be used in the building sector, largely as substitutes for traditional bio-
mass or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), which are currently used for cooking. In needs to be noted that
the conversion of biomass to liquids creates a significant conversion loss. The remaining biomass (about
980 Mtoe) is forecasted to be used to provide direct heat in the industry and building sectors. (IEA
2008)
A wide range of conversion technologies are under continuous development to produce bioenergy carri-
ers for both small and large scale applications.
Advancing technologies include biomass integrated gasification combined cycle (BIGCC) systems, pyro-
lysis and second generation biofuels. Many are close to commercial maturity but are awaiting further
technical breakthroughs to increase the process effciency, followed by large scale demonstrations to help
reduce the risks and further bring down the costs. Second generation biofuels for example may one day
use biochemical technologies to convert the cellulose to sugars that in turn can be converted to bioetha-
nol, biodiesel, di-methyl ester, hydrogen and chemical intermediates in large scale bio-refineries. In ad-
dition biochemical and thermo-chemical synthesis processes could be integrated in a single bio-refinery
such that the biomass carbohydrate fraction is coverted to ethanol and the lignin-rich residue gasified
and used to produce heat, electricity and/or fuels, thus greatly increasing the overall system efficiency to
70–80%. Both concepts however remain some way off reaching the commercial scale, despite decades of
research investment. (IEA 2007a)
Biomass integrated-gasification, combined-cycle (BIGCC) technologies have the potential to contribute
CO2 savings by 2050 of between 0,22Gt/year and 1.46 Gt/year, assuming successful development of this
technology. If BIGCC plants are linked with CCS, and the biomass used is replaced by growing future
crops or replanting forest, such an approach would actively reduce atmospheric concentrations of CO2.
(IEA 2008)
Around 400 GW of modern biomass heat-production equipment, consuming around 300 Mt/year of
biomass, currently produces around 4.5 EJ/year (or 105 Mtoe/year) of direct heat, assuming a conver-
sion factor of 75 %. By 2005, over 40 GW of biomass-fired power generation capacity had been installed
worldwide, generating 230 TWh/year of electricity. If a capacity factor of 60 % and a conversion factor of
25 % are assumed, this would consume approximately 240 Mt/year of biomass. In the case of liquid bio-
fuels, around 120 Mt of biomass were consumed in 2005, to produce 19 Mtoe of biofuels, with an aver-
age conversion efficiency of 50 %. (IEA 2008)
Costs of biomass derived energy are expected to decrease over time, due to both technology learning and
economies of scale in larger commercial plants. Current bio-electricity generation costs of around USD
62 to 185 per MWh could reduce by 2050 to between USD 49 to 123 per MWh. Transport biofuels could
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reduce from the current USD 10 to 31 per GJ to between USD 7 and 12 per GJ. Heat production is ex-
pected to remain at around today’s cost of USD 4 to 19 per GJ during the forecast period. (IEA 2008)
According to IEA’s forecasts, in 2050 more than 100 EJ/year of biomass would be supplied from agricul-
tural residues and wastes (with costs ranging from USD 2 to 3 per GJ, making them the most cost-
competitive source), an additional 125 EJ/year of material could come from high-yielding perennial
crops (at costs of USD 3 to 5 per GJ) and a further 75 EJ/year could come from growing energy crops on
60 Mha of marginal lands, thus giving a total resource of 300 EJ/year. (IEA 2008)
The main barriers to widespread use of biomass for power generation are cost, low conversion efficiency
and feedstock availability. Most important are the lack of internalisation of external costs in power gen-
eration and effective policies to improve energy security and reduce CO2 emissions. In the long term,
bio-power potential will depend on technology advances and on competition for feedstock use, and with
food and fibre production for arable land use. Competition may not be an issue until 2020 if industrial-
scale production and international standards facilitate biomass international trade. While long-distance
transportation reduces economic and environmental attractiveness of biomass, conversion into “bio-oil”
(e.g. by pyrolysis) could facilitate international trade. Risks associated with widespread use of biomass
relate to intensive farming, fertilizers and chemicals use and biodiversity conservation. Certifications
that biomass feedstock is produced in a sustainable way are needed to improve acceptance of public for-
est and lands management. Nutrients should be returned to forests and land through ash from biomass
combustion to alleviate nutrients loss and need for fertilisers. While over-exploitation of biomass re-
sources in developing countries should be avoided, biomass can be important for using marginal land
and bringing socio-economic benefits in these regions. (IEA 2007b)
4.8.4. Peat resources of Finland
In the Finnish energy economy, peat is used to replace imported fuels. Two-thirds of the energy con-
sumed in Finland has been generated with imported fuels. At present, peat is used in around one hun-
dred larger applications. The biggest ones are located in the inland cities co-generating electricity and
Photo: Jari Väätäinen, GT. (Geological Survey
of  Finland 2008).
123
heat mainly with peat. Peat energy cover 6 % of total energy in Finland. (Lahtinen et al. 2005)
In Finland, peat is mainly used in energy generation or in horticulture. Energy peat accounts for 90% of
the total peat production and horticultural peat for around 6–7%. Some peat is used in municipal sludge
and bio waste composting plants and as bio filters; as litter material in animal husbandry; as oil-
absorbent; in textiles; and in balneology. (Lahtinen et al. 2005)
Peat lands, which are technically suitable for the peat industry in Finland, cover a total area of 1.2 mil-
lion ha and contain 29.6 billion m 3 of peat in situ. Calculations of economical and environmental facts
that will limit the use of mires have not been taken into account. Slightly humifed peat suitable for horti-
cultural and environmental use totals 5.9 billion m 3 in situ and energy peat totals 23.7 billion m 3 in situ
with an energy content of 12 800 TWh. The effective energy density of the areas appropriate for energy
production is 0.54 MWh/ m 3 in situ. (Lahtinen et al. 2005)
Sphagnum peat account for 54 % and Carex peat for 45 % of recoverable peat reserves. The remainder, 1
%, is composed of Bryales peat, the bulk of which are encountered in the North-Finland area. The high-
est values of humification degree are located in Finnish Lake area, in Central Finland. The average ash
content is 3.4 % of dry mass, sulphur content 0.20 % of dry mass and dry bulk density 87 kg/m3 in situ.
(Lahtinen et al. 2005)
The mean depth of the geological peat land is 1.41 m. In the area exceeding 1.5 m in depth the peat layer
is 2.50 m thick on an average. Thirty-seven per cent of the mires, covering a total area of 1.9 million ha,
are over 1.5 m deep. Total Finnish national peat reserves are account for 69.3 billion m 3 in situ. Dry sol-
ids total 6.3 billion t. The carbon storage of Finnish mires is 3.2 billion t. (Lahtinen et al. 2005)
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Figure 118. Distribution of Peat Land in Finland (Green). 28 % of Finnish Territory is Peat Land.
(Geological Survey of Finland 2008).
Figure 119.  Technically Suitable Peat Resources in Finland. Energy Peat 23.7 Billion Cubic Meters
and Environment and Horticulture Peat 5.9 Billion Cubic Meters (Geological Survey of
Finland 2008).
The use of peat has established its position in the Finnish energy system. Peat has traditionally been well
available and thus its security of supply has been considered good. It has also been regarded as a high-
quality indigenous fuel. In recent years many investments have been made in power plants using indige-
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nous fuels and in co-use of peat and wood. In fact, the use of the peat and wood fuels is very closely in-
ter-linked and their use supports one another. (Lahtinen et al. 2005)
Regionally speaking, peat consumption is highest in North Ostrobothnia and inland. The negative effects
of peat use are considered to be the high carbon dioxide factor of peat combustion and in some cases the
possible effects of production on the local environment. (Lahtinen et al. 2005)
Emissions trading, which was started at the beginning of 2005, weakens the competitiveness of peat in
relation to other fuels. When the value of an emission allowance rises enough, also the use of coal may
become cheaper than that of peat in installations in which peat has earlier been the main fuel. (Lahtinen
et al. 2005)
If the current role of peat is to be maintained, the sufficiency of the peat production sectors necessary for
peat production should be secured, which should also be taken into account in regional land use plan-
ning. The security of supply of peat should be ensured, e.g. by developing stockpiling, regardless of the
weather conditions and variations in demand. The preservation of the competitiveness of the operating
environment in the long term is a prerequisite for the continuity of production. (Lahtinen et al. 2005)
Peat should remain competitive particularly in relation to the imported fossil fuels in order to allow the
investment potential of the installations using indigenous fuels. Policy outlines for the role of the energy
use of peat, which lay the basis for sustained operational planning, will be required for the Climate and
Energy Strategy. (Lahtinen et al. 2005)
Annually 20–30 milj. M3 of peat is used – from which 18–28 TWh is energy peat (Silpola 2007).
Finland’s energy peat reserves content is 12800 TWh (Virtanen et al. 2003). In 2006 the amount of peat
from Finland’s total energy consumption was about 6 % (Figure 120) (Tilastokeskus 2007a). Less than 1
% from Finland’s peat land area is in peat harvesting from which 90 % is in energy peat harvesting (En-
ergiateollisuus 2007). In year 2006 industrial peat harvesting area was 74 9000 ha including active and
temporarily set-aside peat extraction fields (VAHTI 2008).
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Figure 120. Total Energy Consumption in Finland in 2006 (Tilastokeskus 2007).
The inorganic carbon or carbon dioxide (CO2) of the atmosphere starts to form into organic carbon in
peat lands first by photosynthesis from the plants and in litter production and ends slowly through the
peat land’s oxic surface layer into the anoxic layers (Laine et al. 2000).
About 90% of bound carbon in photosynthesis decomposes aerobically in the surface layer of peat lands.
When the organic substance has reached the anoxic state, and when only more difficult decomposable
carbon compounds are left, the decomposition gets remarkably slower. This part of organic matter is
formed as peat. (Laine et al. 2000). The formation speed varies in Finnish peat lands between 0.2–4.0
mm a-1, average being about 0.5 mm a-1 (Korhola & Tolonen 1998). By mass this is about 40 g m-2 and
as carbon about 20 g m-2 in a year (Laine et al. 2000). According to Minkkinen (1999), peat lands in
Finland bind carbon with a total of 4.2 Tg annually. Finnish peat lands are hundreds or thousands years
old. Most of them have reached their present extent already ca. 3000 B.P. (Korhola and Tolonen 1998)
About one-third of the total pool of soil carbon in the world is stored in northern peat lands (Gorham
1991). The total amount of carbon of all boreal and subarctic mires is between 270 and 370 Pg (Turunen
et al. 2002). Peat lands are important terrestrial carbon stores and they show large temporal and spatial
variation in the atmospheric exchange of CO2 and CH4 (Alm et al. 1999). Anthropogenic activities have
enhanced the emissions of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide (CO2) and nitrous oxide (N2O) from
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organic soils (Maljanen et al. 2007). Drainage and cultivation of peat lands initiates decomposition of
the stored organic material because of new oxygen entering into the soil and therefore CO2 and N2O
emissions increase while CH4 emissions decrease (Kasimir-Klemedtsson 1997).
Pristine peat lands act as carbon sinks in the long run (Leijting 1999). Carbon cycling in pristine boreal
peat lands has been extensively studied and gas fluxes have been found to vary widely. Both ombrotro-
phic (nutrient poor) and minerotrophic (nutrient rich) mires can be either net sources or net sinks of
CO2 at the annual level. The great variation in the annual CO2 balance is a consequence of inter-annual
and spatial variation in the hydrology and thermal conditions (Saarnio et al. 2007).
The natural carbon cycle of mire ecosystems is not responsible for the current anthropogenic global
warming and therefore the annual CH4 and CO2 effluxes are not reported in the national greenhouse gas
inventories (Saarnio et al. 2007).
Figure 121. An Example of Carbon Fluxes from Different Peat Land Types Drained for Forestry.
Vatkg-Mtkg in South Finland (1 200 dd) and Mtkg in North Finland (>900 dd). (MMM
2007)
In the previous figure Vatkg is Dwarf-shrub type, Mtkg is Vaccinium myrtillus type, Ptkg is Vaccinium
vitis-idaea type. Negative values indicate the loss of carbon emission, positive the input of carbon emis-
sion.
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4.9. Bioenergy Potentials in Finland
In the following, there are some calculations about Finland’s bio energy potentials. Noteworthy is that
the calculations are made using differing criteria. For instance, maximum potential refers to the total
amount of certain bio energy available in Finland restrictions aside. Other calculations limit the poten-
tial due to technical, economical or ecological reasons. Economic potential refers to the bio energy po-
tential that is economically viable to produce. Technical potential refers to the potential that is techni-
cally possible to produce. Environmental reasons can also limit in certain areas the maximum potential
of a certain bio energy form.
4.9.1. Biomass potential of the Finnish forests
Forest biomass is renewable, but nevertheless a limited resource and its use must be built on a sustain-
able basis. Estimations of availability begin from the theoretical maximum potential. This consists of two
major sources. First, it includes all residual biomass left in the forest in conjunction with timber harvest-
ing. Secondly, it includes the small-tree biomass, which is removed, or should be removed for reasons to
do with silviculture in precommercial thinnings of young stands. The former is dependent on the mar-
kets of forest products, whereas the latter is free of market fluctuations. Only a part of the maximum
biomass potential can be recovered. Following technological, socio-economic and environmental factors
affect the availability: (Hakkila 2004, 26–28)
· Price development of alternative fuels, taxes and subsidies
· Development of procurement technology and logistics
· Motivation of forest machine and truck contractors to participate
· Development of the quality requirements of forest chips. For example, will the foliage be taken
or left?
· The acceptance of private forest owners, which is affected by the price paid for biomass
· The energy and climate policies at the national and EU levels. The trade of CO2 emissions will be
of utmost importance.
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Figure 122.  The Biomass Potential of the Finnish Forests. The First Part of the Series of the Num-
bers Refers to Stemwood and the Second Part to Crown Mass (mill. cubic me-
ters/annum) (Hakkila 2004).
In the previous Figure, the technological and environmental factors have been taken into account, but no
price assumptions have been applied. The technically harvestable potential is estimated separately for
five different types of logging operations (Hakkila 2004, 26–28):
· Energywood thinnings are tending operations in young stands in which the owner has earlier
neglected good forest management. Because of the small size of the trees, the primary product is
fuel. The age of the stands is typically 15–25 years and a majority is dominated by pine, but the
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removals may be composed of hardwoods. The cost of harvest is high, and subsidies are neces-
sary to make the recovery possible.
· First thinnings refer traditionally to the first commercial logging operation of a stand, normally
at the age of 25–40 years. Pulpwood is the primary product, but as 20–30 % of the stemwood
drain does not meet the minimum dimensions of pulpwood, first thinnings may also yield sub-
stantial quantities of fuel wood. Later thinnings leave only small amounts of stemwood at the
site. Residues contain mainly crown mass, the separate recovery of which would cause logging
damage to standing trees and unnecessary nutrient loss at a critical development phase of the
stand. Production of forest chips is not recommended at this stage.
· Logging residues from final harvest are composed largely of crown mass which is abundantly
available, especially in spruce stands. Logging residue chips are therefore produced mainly from
the crown mass of spruce. Conditions of recovery are favorable. No subsidies are available.
· Stump and root wood from final harvest can be salvaged from clear-cut areas of mature spruce
stands. Typically, logging residues have already been collected from the same site.
A summary of the amount and structure of the technically harvestable biomass reserve is demonstrated
in following figure 123. More than a half of the harvestable reserve is crown mass including foliage. If the
objectives set for forest chips are to be met, crown mass must be accepted as a source of fuel regardless
of its inferior quality and accelerated nutrient loss. The technology of harvesting needs to be developed
to keep needle removal at an acceptable level. (Hakkila 2004, 26–28.)
Figure 123.  Technically Harvestable Biomass Potential of the Finnish Forests (Hakkila 2004).
4.9.2. Field biomass potential in Finland
Finland's cultivated area is 2.3 million hectares (2006). Grain is cultivated in 1.17 million hectares and
forage grass plants in 0.64 million hectares. Abundant 0.1 million hectares of harvest has been taken
abroad unrefined. The area of oil plants is 100 000 hectares. During the time Finland has been the
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member of EU, the amount of fallow has been 10- 11 % of the cultivated area. In Finland, 1.7–1.8 million
hectares of field is needed for the production of food and forage. About 0.5–0.7 million hectares could be
used for energy without any danger to the food production in Finland. If in this area of 500 000 hec-
tares, for instance reed canary grass would be cultivated and assumption of the level of the harvest would
be 20 Mwh / hectare, this corresponds the potential of 10 Twh. (Asplund 2008, 25.)
4.9.3. Biogas Potential in Finland
Vehicle use potential of biogas from waste
Ari Lampinen (2003) has estimated the yearly production potential of biogas for vehicle use in Finland.
The yearly potential of biogas (methane) is in Finland 14 TWh. It would be enough fuel for 700.000 pas-
senger cars, if they drove city-orientated driving (consumption 10 1/100 km) on average 20.000
km/year or nearly 50.000 buses, if they drove on average 100.000 km/year. (Lampinen 2003)
With current technology, quickly decomposing organic material is easiest to utilize, while wood-based
waste and plastic waste processing is more difficult. For that reason, wood-based waste and plastic waste
as well as industrial solid waste (apart from food industry) have been left out of this examination of po-
tentials. In addition, these wastes have other recycling possibilities. Methane from the dumping places is
included, for it must be collected in any case. (Lampinen 2003)
132
Table 6. The Yearly Production of Biogas (Methane) from Waste in Finland (Lampinen 2003).
Source of
methane
Mass of the
composing
organic
waste (t)
Produce of
methane
(m3/t)
Energy
(TWh)
Fuel for cars
(pieces)
Fuel for bu-
ses (pieces)
Methane from
the dumping
places
1.5 75 000 5 000
Community
biowaste (kit-
chen waste)
360 000 (fresh
weight)
100 0.36 18 000 1 200
Community
wastewater
160 000 (sus-
pended matter)
200 0.32 16 000 1 100
Manure 21 500 000
(fresh weight)
20 4.3 220 000 15 000
Agricultural
plantwaste
4 000 000
(fresh weight)
170 6.8 340 000 23 000
Food industry’s
waste
960 000 (fresh
weight)
50 0.48 24 000 1 600
Industrial was-
tewater
22 300 (sus-
pended matter)
200 0.04 2 000 130
IN TOTAL 14 700 000 47 000
Biogas potential of energy crops and crop residues
Annimari Lehtomäki (2006) has studied the methane potentials of different energy crops and crop resi-
dues. In her study Jerusalem artichoke, reed canary crass and timothy-clover grass gave the highest
methane potential per hectare, corresponding to gross energy potential of 28–53 MWh ha-1. Thus, up to
3000–5000 m3 of methane can potentially be obtained from one hectare of energy crops cultivated for
biogas production, corresponding to approximately 40 000–60 000 km in passenger car transport per
hectare. Consequently, one to three passenger cars (average distance driven approximately 20 000–
30 000 km per year) could potentially be fuelled by one hectare of energy crops. For example, if the area
corresponding to the set aside agricultural land in Finland (195 929 ha in 2004, Statistics Finland 2005)
was used for production of energy crop as substrates for biogas production, the methane production
could potentially cover the yearly consumption of 8–25 % of the passenger cars in Finland (2 246 726
passenger cars in 2004, Statistics Finland 2005). These previous figures represent the theoretical poten-
tial of methane production from energy crops, and the energy consumed during the production of the
biomass and operation of the anaerobic digestion process has not been taken into account when calculat-
ing the gross energy potentials. (Lehtomäki 2006, 66–68.)
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4.10. Ocean Energy
Since the late 1990s a number of small companies have tried to develop a range of different wave energy
technologies as a non-polluting source of energy, which has resulted in a number of full-size devices be-
ing deployed in the sea. In some countries, these initiatives have been accompanied by government-
funded activities, as well as developments in international organisations such as the European Commis-
sion and the International Energy Agency. (IEA 2008)
Wave energy can be considered as a concentrated form of solar energy, where winds generated by the
differential heating of the earth pass over open bodies of water, transferring some of their energy to form
waves. The amount of energy transferred and hence the size of the resulting waves, depends on the wind
speed, the length of time for which the wind blows and the distance over which it blows (the 'fetch'). In
this way, the original solar power levels of typically ~ 100 W/m2 can be transformed into waves with
power levels of over 1,000 kW per metre of wave crest length. (IEA 2008)
Waves lying within or close to the areas where they are generated (storm waves) produce a complex, ir-
regular sea. These waves will continue to travel in the direction of their formation even after the wind
dies down. In deep water, waves lose energy only slowly, so they can travel out of the storm areas with
minimal loss of energy as regular, smooth waves or 'swell' and this can persist at great distances from the
point of origin. Therefore, coasts with exposure to the prevailing wind direction and long fetches tend to
have the most energetic wave climates, such as the western coasts of the Americas, Europe, Southern
Africa and Australia/New Zealand. (IEA 2008)
The global wave power resource in deep water (i.e. 100 m or more) is estimated to be in the range of 1-10
T. As the waves move to shallower waters they lose energy, but detailed variation of sea-bed topography
can lead to the focusing of wave energy in concentrated regions near the shoreline, called 'hot spots'. The
economically exploitable resource is about 140 - 750 TWh/yr for current designs of devices when fully
mature. (IEA 2008)
Many wave energy devices are at the R&D stage, with only a small range of devices having been tested at
large scale or deployed in the oceans. This slow rate of progress is due to the fact that wave energy de-
vices face a number of design challenges, among which the variability in wave power intensity and wave
direction. (IEA 2008)
4.10.1. Current Technologies
Four of the main types of device deployed at large scale over the past few years are the following:
Oscillating Water Column: it comprises a partially submerged structure forming an air chamber,
with an underwater aperture. This chamber encloses a volume of air, which is compressed as the inci-
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dent wave makes the free surface of the water rise inside the chamber. The compressed air can escape
through an aperture above the water column which leads to a turbine and generator. As the water inside
falls, the air pressure is reduced and air is drawn back through the turbine. Both conventional (i.e. unidi-
rectional) and self-rectifying air turbines have been proposed. Even with this commonality of operating
principles, the examples of oscillating water column actually deployed vary considerably from the bot-
tom-standing, shoreline-based concrete device developed by Wavegen (2007) in Scotland, to the teth-
ered, near shore steel device deployed by Energetech (2007) in Australia (WEC 2007).
Figure 124. Shoreline-based Concrete Device in Scotland (WEC 2007).
Figure 125.  Near Shore Device in Australia (WEC 2007).
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The Pelamis: this is a floating device comprised of a series of cylindrical hollow steel segments that are
connected to each other by hinged joints. The device is approximately 120 m long, 3.5 m in diameter and
is loosely moored in water depths of ~ 50 m so that it points into the waves. As waves run down the
length of the device, the segments move with respect to each other and actuate hydraulic cylinders in-
corporated in the joints to pump oil to drive a hydraulic motor/generator via an energy-smoothing sys-
tem. The device has been deployed in Scotland and a small scheme of three devices is currently being
deployed in Portugal (WEC 2007).
Figure 126.  The Pelamis (WEC 2007.)
The Wave Dragon. This device uses a pair of large curved reflectors to gather waves into the central
receiving part, where they flow up a ramp and over the top into a raised reservoir, from which the water
is allowed to return to the sea via a number of low-head turbines. A quarter-scale prototype (58 m wide x
33 m long) rated at 20 kW has been deployed in a Danish inlet and a full-size device (estimated to have a
generation capacity of ~ 4 MW) is being constructed for a site in Wales (WEC 2007).
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Figure 127.  The Wave Dragon (WEC 2007).
The Archimedes Wave Swing: This consists of a buoyant cylindrical, air-filled chamber (the
'Floater') that can move vertically with respect to the cylindrical 'Basement', which is fixed to the sea bed.
As a wave passes over the top of the device, it alternatively pressurises and depressurises the air within
the Floater, changing its buoyancy, which causes the Floater to move up and down with respect to the
Basement. This relative motion is used to produce energy, using a linear electrical generator. A 2 MW
Pilot scheme has been deployed and tested in Portugal (WEC 2007).
Figure 128.  Archimede Wave Swing (WEC 2007).
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Despite the fact that wave energy is a relatively immature technology, and that the technologies are be-
ing developed by small companies, with a total investment of US$ 5–10 million in each company, wave
energy presents two important advantages over other renewables (WEC 2007):
o outside the tropics, storms are usually more intense and frequent during winter, which results in
wave power levels being higher in that season. Therefore wave energy provides good seasonal
load-following for those regions where peak electricity demand is produced by winter heating
and lighting requirements (e.g., northern Europe, western Canada and north-west USA).
o wave energy is predictable for one to two days ahead, because satellites can measure waves out
in the ocean that will later impact on devices around the coast. This predictability will allow for
less spinning reserve than is often required to support more intermittent renewable energy
sources.
However, wave energy has to face various difficulties as in many countries there is a high cost associated
with obtaining permits and carrying out environmental impact assessments. Moreover, once deployed in
free energy markets, wave energy has to compete with established renewable energy technologies that
have benefited from billions of dollars of cumulative investment. (WEC 2007)
As stated by the IEA, one of the major problems that wave energy has to face is that the pilot projects
need to be relatively large-scale in order to stand offshore conditions, thus implying high costs and risks.
These factors have inhibited the early development of wave energy technologies, as only in recent years
adequate government funding has been made available to support sizeable pilot projects. (IEA 2008)
The sampling of projects being developed worldwide which is reported in the list below, is instructive for
the kinds of technologies that are being developed and used and any problems they may be encountering
(EIA 2008).
· A 27 MW wave energy project in Portland, Victoria, Australia.
· Wave Hub Project in North Cornwall, United Kingdom.
· A 22.5 MW wave park in Agucadoura, Portugal, Power Technology.Com,
· “Pelamis, World’s First Commercial Wave Energy Project, Agucadoura, Portugal.”
· Limpet wave project on the Island of Islay, Scotland
A possible roadmap of the development of different aspects of wave energy is shown below.
138
Figure 129. Roadmap for Wave Energy (WEC 2007).
4.10.2. Situation in European Countries and Future Development
According to IEA, currently R&D is focusing on moorings, structure and hull design methods, power
take-off systems, as well as wave behavior and hydrodynamics of wave adsorption. Research efforts on
turbines and rotors will need to focus on cost-efficiency, reliability and ease of maintenance, particularly
in developing components that can resist hostile marine environments. Control systems for turbine
speed and rotor pitch will also play a major role in maximizing power output. (IEA 2008)
United Kingdom is the leading country in wave and marine currents energy, and it has developed some
specific policy instruments, such as capital grants, feed-in tariffs and tradable certificates. (IEA 2007)
In Ireland, the Government launched, in March 2007, the White Book “Delivering a Sustainable Energy
Future for Ireland”, which set a target deployment of 500 M W of ocean energy power by 2020. This
document followed the strategy document for ocean energy launched in 2006 by the Irish Government.
(IEA 2007)
In Portugal, the government launched an attractive feed-in tariff of up to 26 c€/kWh for the demonstra-
tion phase (which decreases for the pre-commercial and commercial phases), and a pilot zone with sim-
plified licensing procedures designed to support both the initial phase of the demonstration and the pre-
commercial and commercial phases of wave energy utilization. (IEA 2007)
In Spain, there is no national strategy for ocean energy, however one Spanish region – the Basque Coun-
try – has a target 5 MW of installed wave power by 2010 and for that purpose, an investment of 15 M €
has been allocated (IEA 2007).
In France, a first governmental initiative took place in ocean energy: a new law setting a feed-in price of
15 c€/kWh for electricity produced using wave energy was launched in March 2007 (IEA 2007).
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In Denmark, since the end of the Danish Wave Energy development program in the year 2002, there has
been no dedicated development policy on ocean energy. However, interest in developing wave energy
technology among developers is growing in Denmark, with much work carried out on a private basis.
(IEA 2007)
In Sweden, activities in wave energy have achieved considerable developments in 2007 with funding
from the Swedish Energy Agency, a governmental entity (IEA 2007).
In Norway the world’s first prototype on osmotic power is under construction and further research ac-
tivities and developments on wave energy and tidal energy are taking place with support from the Nor-
wegian government and through EC funding (IEA 2007).
4.11. Hydrogen and Fuel Cells
4.11.1. Technology
Fuel cells are devices that employ a reaction between hydrogen and oxygen to produce electricity and
heat, the reverse of water electrolysis. Fuel cells are categorized by the type of electrolyte they employ,
such as polymer electrolyte (PEFC), phosphoric acid (PAFC), molten carbonate (MCFC) and solid oxide
(SOFC) fuel cells. (JETRO 2006)
Practical uses for PEFCs are anticipated in many sectors, including commercial/industrial and house-
hold distributed power, as well as mobile energy for cars (most Japanese carmakers are developing fuel-
cell vehicles) and portable devices. PEFCs are small yet deliver high output, and start/stop easily due to
low operating temperatures. (JETRO 2006)
Installations are proceeding with PAFC systems developed for commercial and industrial cogeneration,
and fueled with natural gas, LNG, LPG, naphtha and methanol. Advantages of these PAFC systems in-
clude very low environmental impact and low noise, but significant demerits include high purchase and
operation cost. (JETRO 2006)
MCFCs are electrolyte fuel cells that use carbonate ions to produce a simple electric charge. Operating at
comparatively high temperatures of 600º–700ºC, MCFCs produce high-grade exhaust heat, and can be
used for air conditioning, hot water, heating, and large-scale power generation. They can be used to-
gether with micro gas turbines for highly efficient combined power generation, and can run on various
types of fuel. (JETRO 2006)
Although MCFCs are not noteworthy for overall efficiency, they can offer outstanding power-generation
efficiency, which is highly valued by customers placing priority on electricity over heat. MCFCs are also
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superior in terms of running costs. Accordingly, demand is expected to rise among food-related and
sewage-treatment plants that generate digester gas. (JETRO 2006)
A diverse range of applications is expected for SOFCs, from micro systems to medium- and largescale
systems. In particular, high expectations are placed on distributed power sources, stationary power
sources, and cogeneration systems (simultaneous supply of power and heat or hot water), especially in
Europe and North America. High temperature SOFCs are now in the confirmation test stage, but prob-
lems related to long-term generating performance, cost reduction, and reliability must be solved in order
to achieve practical application. (Kawamoto 2008)
4.11.2. Applications and Market Trends in Fuel Cells
These years are of uppermost importance for the fuel cell industry commercial breakthrough. Small
portable applications, for example, will see their commercial launch in 2009, with mobile phones and
toys/gadgets, followed by notebooks, mp3 players, military communication equipment and chargers.
Large portable products powered by fuel cells will see the fastest short-term growth in the military sec-
tor, with items such as battery chargers and portable generators for different uses. (Makover et al. 2006)
The niche transport sector has experienced the fastest growth in the fuel cell industry since 2005 and is
forecasted to continue to grow strong for a number of years, with tens of thousands of military, light and
heavy duty vehicles being sold in 2012. New fuel cell powered scooters, forklifts, golf-wagons, wheel-
chairs and motorbikes will also be introduced in the market. Moreover, due to environmental concerns,
trains and aircrafts are new potential application areas. (Makover et al. 2006)
The automotive sector will also experience a commercial breakthrough: All major car manufacturers de-
velop FCVs and FCV hybrid concepts, as they look at FCVs as a new business opportunity. The mass
market penetration estimated at 2020–2025, depending on investments in infrastructure development,
but at least Daimler, Honda, GM and Hyundai plan to bring cars for customer promotion before 2010.
Early sales price estimated at $US 50,000 / car. (Makover et al. 2006)
The small stationary sector is expected to see a steady growth for several years, with the fastest growth in
Europe and moderate growth in the US, meanwhile Japan will continue to dominate the market. Of all
the units installed it needs to be noted that PEMFC systems account for > 90 %, but SOFC systems
(presently < 10 %) are likely to increase their market share since 2008–2009. The main marketable
products will be small emergency units, but a significant growth in CHP residential units expected in
Europe. Moreover, off-grid and remote applications will also be possible thanks to wind and solar power.
(JETRO 2006) This is the case of Denmark, where wind power is already reaching such a high penetra-
tion in the Danish electricity system, that a solution to spill-over problems must be found. Surplus wind
power can therefore be used to produce hydrogen, either directly for vehicle storage tanks in the garages
of each building, or to a store associated with the building. A storage size of 1/2 m3 metal-hydride store
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per average one-family dwelling is sufficient to store any arising surplus and take care of every deficit.
(Makover et al. 2006)
Due to incentives, especially in Europe, the main marketable products in the large stationary sector will
be biogas (biomass, waste) based systems. Coal gas based systems give significant long-term opportuni-
ties (thanks to US energy politics). In both cases the customers will be most likely either hotels/holiday
centers (for image creation reasons), or data centers, hospitals and other premium power (for energy
security issues). (Jumppanen 2008)
The established technologies for hydrogen production are natural gas reforming, coal gasification and
water electrolysis, but these processes would need to be significantly more efficient and cost-effective in
order to produce high volumes of hydrogen for energy use. For this reason, most of the current R&D is
looking at making natural gas reforming, coal gasification in IGCC plants and electrolysis highly effi-
cient. (IEA 2008)
In most cases the available technologies are applied to small-scale decentralized production units, since
these do not require any expensive infrastructure for hydrogen transportation and distribution. How-
ever, decentralized technologies are relatively inefficient and expensive: at the moment this option costs
more than USD 50/GJ, meanwhile centralized production options promise, in the long run, hydrogen at
USD 10/GJ to USD 15/GJ. Long-term costs for high-temperature water splitting could range from USD
10/GJ (using nuclear) to USD 20/GJ (using solar heat), while higher costs are projected for other tech-
nologies. (IEA 2008)
Apart from the cost issues, according to IEA projections the main problem will be the shift to an entirely
new system of vehicles and fuels, which are unlikely to happen unless strong policy interventions are
applied. (IEA 2008)
4.12. Energy Storage
4.12.1. Why Energy Storage?
Energy storages have been internationally seen as a key component for the further implementation of
distributed energy. Most of the problems in power quality, distribution reliability and peak power man-
agement can be solved with energy storages. Energy storages give new possibilities for demand side
management and for customer level energy cost control. Cost effective, smart energy storages give new
potential for building energy management especially when they are used in combined heat and power
(CHP) production systems such as fuel cells and microturbines. Energy storages give possibilities to
manage uncontrollable power production in renewable energy production systems such as photovoltage
and wind power systems. Uninterruptible power delivery can be essential in single family houses for ex-
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ample when they are used as a home office with computer systems or they have critical medical equip-
ment that could be more common in near future. (EC 2008)
· Energy storage is needed to store electricity, heat and cold, which is produced at times of low
demand and low generation cost and from intermittent energy sources such as wind and solar
power. It is released at times of high demand and high generation cost or when there is no more
generation capacity available. (EC 2008)
· Reliable and affordable energy storage is a prerequisite for using renewable energy in remote lo-
cations, for integration into the energy system and the development in a future decentralised en-
ergy supply system. Energy storage therefore has a pivotal role to play in the effort to combine a
future, sustainable energy supply with the standard of technical services and products that we
are accustomed to and need. (EC 2008)
· Energy storage is the most promising technology currently available to reduce fuel consumption
in the transport sector. (EC 2008)
Figure 130. Diagram of Energy Sources, Use of Energy and Energy Storage (EC 2008).
4.12.2. Current Uses of Energy Storage Technologies
· The decision to use an energy storage system depends both on the requirements of the applica-
tion and the cost of competing solutions. In renewable energy systems, for instance, the use of
fossil fuel based back-up generation and grid connection are competing solutions. (EC 2008)
· Power stations, compressors, heating systems, etc. all have different performance characteristics
as regards their response time to changing demand, their lead times for starting up or shutting
down, and their most efficient points of operation. (EC 2008)
· Energy storage systems can usually be replaced by conventional energy generation. However,
this can lead to an inefficient use of fossil fuels and a demand for investment in additional en-
ergy generators with high power output and fast response time. (EC 2008)
· The time required for energy generation from renewable sources, be they electricity or heat,
cannot always be matched to the time of demand.
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· Energy storage systems are therefore an integral part of any renewable energy sources (RES)
system. (EC 2008)
· Even when fuel-powered generation is used to cover periods of low RES generation, energy stor-
age is required for economic reasons, as it is cheaper than the frequent use of a motor-driven
generator. (EC 2008)
· Also, the stability of the electricity system and quality of the voltage supplied will be considera-
bly higher when an energy storage system is used. The technical and economic optimum con-
cerning the size of an electricity storage system needs to be defined in each case individually.
(EC 2008)
· Conventional, commercially available lead-acid batteries have a very high-energy efficiency and
all other technologies have to compete with this.
· Batteries are the most expensive item in RES systems when the system's total lifetime costs are
considered; and there are big variations in battery lifetime in different installations. (EC 2008)
· Excess electricity can always be stored cheaply in the form of heat and for a long time. However,
the value of heat energy is much lower than the value of electricity. (EC 2008)
· In solar thermal systems for heating and cooling it is also necessary to store energy because heat
generation depends on solar radiation for energy production. Overview of the technology. (EC
2008)
4.12.3. Energy Storage Technologies
o Batteries
o Flywheels
o Reversible fuel cells
o Electromagnetic
o Compressed air
o Super-capacitor
o Pumped hydro storage
Different energy storage technologies coexist because their characteristics make them attractive to dif-
ferent applications. From a user point of view there are both technical and commercial criteria for select-
ing the most suitable technology. (EC 2008)
Batteries and Advanced Batteries
Rechargeable batteries or accumulators are the oldest form of electricity storage and widely used. Batter-
ies store electric energy in a chemical form. Their performance is linked in a complex manner to the ma-
terials used, the manufacturing processes and the operating conditions. Consequently, progress in bat-
tery technology is slow and the transfer of laboratory results into commercial applications is sometimes
risky. Lithium ion and nickel-metal-hydride (NiMH) batteries are the only new battery technologies
which have achieved significant market penetration in the last decade. Batteries can respond to changes
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in power demand within microseconds. Only super-capacitors equal such a response time. Batteries
usually have very low standby losses and can have high energy efficiency, depending on the application
and the details of the operation. Most batteries contain toxic materials, hence the ecological impact from
uncontrolled disposal of batteries must always be considered. (EC 2008)
Super-Capacitors
Super-capacitors store electrical energy in the electric field between two electrodes. Ultra-capacitor, su-
per-capacitor and electric double layer capacitor (EDLC) are also called electro-chemical capacitors
working with chemical reactions or not like true capacitors. The fundamental design and electrical prop-
erties are those of conventional capacitors used throughout the electrical and electronics industry. EDLC
uses electric double layer capacitance on both positive and negative electrodes. (EC 2008)
Reversible Fuel Cell Systems and Redox Flow Batteries
Fuel cells convert hydrogen from a storage tank and oxygen from the air to water and generate a current
from the electrochemical process. The electrochemical reaction itself is reversible. The fuel cells' energy
capacity is determined by the size of the storage tanks for the active materials, and the power by the area
of the electrodes and design of the reactor. Standby losses are low because the active materials are kept
physically separate. Redox flow batteries are systems using materials other than hydrogen and oxygen.
Their energy efficiency is higher than those of reversible fuel cells, but still below the energy efficiency of
most batteries. (EC 2008)
SMES (Super-Conducting Magnetic Energy Storage Systems)
SMES store energy in the magnetic field of a coil made from special alloys. By cooling the conducting
wires to - 269°C the resistance of the material to electrical current disappears, allowing it to conduct very
high currents without electrical losses. When looking at the complete system, however, it is clear that
there is considerable energy requirement for refrigeration. Also, the current has to flow through non-
super-conducting components and solid-state switches, which cause resistive losses. Despite this, the
overall efficiency in commercial applications is very high. (EC 2008)
Flywheels
The energy is stored as kinetic energy in a rotating mass. The amount of energy stored increases with the
square of the rotational speed, which is limited by the tensile strength of the material used. (EC 2008.)
Thermal Storage (Heat and Cold)
Conventional heat and cold storage systems simply store excess energy in a large tank using the working
medium at the temperature required for later use. Virtually every cooling and heating system has such
storage tanks. (EC 2008)
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Compressed Gas Storage
Compressed air tanks are widely used in industry to provide a constant source of compressed air with
uniform pressure in the range of 8-10 bar. There is renewed interest in compressed air storage for cover-
ing the demand of peak electricity or for small wind/hybrid applications, where the energy-to-power ra-
tio of batteries is unsuitable, either because the energy content is very high but the power requirement
low, or the energy through-put is very high compared to the energy content. (EC 2008)
Pumped Hydro Storage
Pumped hydro storage is a conventional energy storage technology utilised by the electrical industry.
Water in a basin at the top of a mountain is used to drive a generator in a reservoir at a lower level.
When surplus energy is available, the water is pumped back up again. The power output and the cost
efficiency of pumped hydro storage depends on the difference in height. (EC 2008)
4.12.4. The Future Potential and Challenges of Energy Storage Technology
The main applications of Energy Storage systems are stand-alone systems with the highest potential in
third world countries as well as isolated and interconnected grids for stability and management purposes
in industrial countries. (EC 2008)
The perception of renewable energy systems and decentralised energy resources depends on the demon-
stration of their ability to supply with high-quality and with economic profitability. Energy storage sys-
tems have to compete against the present over-capacity of power stations and power generators with
short start-up times, such as gas turbines and gas or diesel motors with the appropriate emission con-
trols. (EC 2008)
Energy storage systems enable energy services belonging load management, to peak shaving, power
quality and uninterruptible power supply (EC 2008).
Reliable and affordable electricity storage is a prerequisite for optimising the integration of renewable
energy systems. Energy storage therefore has a pivotal role to play in the effort to combine a future, sus-
tainable energy supply with the standard of technical services and products. (EC 2008)
For both stationary and transport applications, energy storage is of growing importance as it enables the
smoothing of transient and/or intermittent loads, and down-sizing of base-load capacity with substantial
potential for energy and cost savings (EC 2008).
Energy storage is a key element in achieving the EU policy goals for sustainability, air quality and cost-
effective, competitive goods and services (EC 2008).
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4.12.5. Carbon Nanotubes
The range of applications employing carbon nanotubes for energy storage and conversion include fuel
cells, batteries, supercapacitors, solar cells, and thermionic power devices. In fuel cells, carbon nano-
tubes are likely to be utilized for hydrogen storage and in developing new composite materials for proton
exchange membranes. They also represent a promising material for lithium storage in lithium-ion bat-
teries and may even find a use in novel carbon-carbon battery types. Other potential applications are
supercapacitors, where nanotubes could be used as electrodes in electrochemical double layer capaci-
tors. Nanotube-based composite materials are expected to have a high impact in solar cells industry,
while an exotic class of devices is about to exploit thermionic emission of carbon nanotubes for produc-
ing electric energy from residual heat.
Figure 131.
Therefore, the use of nanotubes in energy storage and conversion applications has the potential to affect
several major industries. In the automotive industry, nanotube research could permit hydrogen energy
to substitute conventional solutions sooner than expected, replacing internal combustion engines with
fuel cells. Since hydrogen can be converted into electricity with only water as emission and with very
high operating efficiency, another probable use could be in stationary low scale power plants or energy
storage facilities, probably as a complement to solar or wind-based power plants. Solar cells could also
benefit from the development of nanotube composites, which allow building of increasingly cheaper,
lighter and more efficient photovoltaic cells. In the consumer electronics market, methanol-based micro
fuel cells, which are currently developed as energy sources for portable devices, could complement lith-
ium-ion, lithium sulfur, and carbon-carbon batteries employing nanotubes. Carbon nanotubes could also
penetrate the aerospace industry, thanks to thermionic power devices, which are able to extract the en-
ergy from the residual heat in jet exhaust flow.
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Nanotubes are most likely to have an impact in the energy storage and conversion field of applications.
Whether their potential for hydrogen storage will be confirmed or not, nanotube-reinforced composites
and nanotube-based catalyst supports will likely improve electrodes and proton exchange membranes in
fuel cells. Electrodes for lithium batteries are also a sure target and a huge market in the same time. The
third major field of research is represented by the solar cell industry, where nanotubes are expected to
boost the performances and to significantly lower the costs. Unlike more exotic applications (such as
carbon-carbon batteries or thermionic power devices), nanotube-based fuel cells, photovoltaic cells and
batteries are expected to hit the market within a decade, as prices will surely drop.
The range of applications employing carbon nanotubes for energy storage and conversion include fuel
cells, batteries, supercapacitors, solar cells, and thermionic power devices. In fuel cells, carbon nano-
tubes are likely to be utilized for hydrogen storage and in developing new composite materials for proton
exchange membranes. They also represent a promising material for lithium storage in lithium-ion bat-
teries and may even find a use in novel carbon-carbon battery types. Other potential applications are
supercapacitors, where nanotubes could be used as electrodes in electrochemical double layer capaci-
tors. Nanotube-based composite materials are expected to have a high impact in solar cells industry,
while an exotic class of devices is about to exploit thermionic emission of carbon nanotubes for produc-
ing electric energy from residual heat.
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Nanotubes Power Paper-Thin Battery
By Katherine Noyes
TechNewsWorld
08/14/07 2:48 PM PT
Developed by a team of researchers at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI), the nanoengineered
battery is 90 percent cellulose, made up of the same plant cells used in nearly every type of paper.
Infused in that paper, though, are aligned carbon nanotubes, which act as electrodes and allow the
battery to conduct electricity.
The result is a lightweight, ultra thin, completely flexible storage device that can be rolled, twisted,
folded or cut into any number of shapes with no loss of mechanical integrity or efficiency. The paper
batteries can also be stacked, like a ream of printer paper, to boost the total power output.
Details are outlined in the paper, "Flexible Energy Storage Devices Based on Nanocomposite Paper,"
published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. The project was supported by the
New York State Office of Science, Technology, and Academic Research (NYSTAR), as well as the
National Science Foundation (NSF) through the Nanoscale Science and Engineering Center at RPI.
Taken together, the devices can provide the long, steady power output of a conventional battery as
well as a supercapacitor's quick burst of high energy needed for starting things like engines.
The researchers used ionic liquid, essentially a liquid salt, as the battery's electrolyte, but they also
printed paper batteries without adding any electrolytes and demonstrated that naturally occurring
electrolytes in human sweat, blood and urine can be used to activate them.
The devices are completely integrated, and can be printed like paper.
Potential applications span the spectrum, including not just lightweight handheld devices but also
automobiles, aircraft and boats. Because the paper could be molded into different shapes, such as a
car door, it could spur a new generation of automotive innovations, for example.
Thanks to paper's essential biocompatibility, the devices also have potential as power supplies for
devices implanted in the body.
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4.12.6. Comparison of Different Energy Storage Technologies
Figure 132.  Energy Storage Technologies (ESA 2003).
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Ratings
Large -scale stationary applications of electric energy storage can be divided in three major functional
categories (ESA 2003):
o Power Quality. Stored energy, in these applications, is only applied for seconds or less, as
needed, to assure continuity of quality power.
o Bridging Power. Stored energy, in these applications, is used for seconds to minutes to assure
continuity of service when switching from one source of energy generation to another.
o Energy Management. Storage media, in these applications, is used to decouple the timing of
generation and consumption of electric energy. A typical application is load leveling, which in-
volves the charging of storage when energy cost is low and utilization as needed. This would also
enable consumers to be grid-independent for many hours.
Although some storage technologies can function in all application ranges, most options would not be
economical to be applied in all three functional categories.
Figure 133.  Electricity Storage (ESA 2003).
Efficiency
Efficiency and cycle life are two important parameters to consider along with other parameters before
selecting a storage technology. Both of these parameters affect the overall storage cost. Low efficiency
increases the effective energy cost as only a fraction of the stored energy could be utilized. Low cycle life
also increases the total cost as the storage device needs to be replaced more often. The present values of
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these expenses need to be considered along with the capital cost and operating expenses to obtain a bet-
ter picture of the total ownership cost for a storage technology. (ESA 2003)
Figure 134.  Technology Comparisons: Life Efficiency (ESA 2003.)
Size and Weight
Size and weight of storage devices are important factors for certain applications. Metal-air batteries have
the highest energy density in this chart. However, the electrically rechargeable types, such as zinc-air
batteries, have a relatively small cycle life and are still in the development stage. (ESA 2003)
The energy density ranges reflect the differences among manufacturers, product models and the impact
of packaging (ESA 2003).
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Figure 135.  Technology Comparisons: Size and Weight (ESA 2003).
Per Cycle Cost
Per-cycle cost can be the best way to evaluate the cost of storing energy in a frequent charge/discharge
application, such as load levelling (ESA 2003).
This chart shows the capital component of this cost, taking into account the impact of cycle life and effi-
ciency. For a more complete per-cycle cost, one needs to also consider O&M, disposal, replacement and
other ownership expenses, which may not be known for the emerging technologies. (ESA 2003)
It should be noted that per-cycle cost is not an appropriate criterion for peak shaving or energy arbitrage
where the application is less frequent or the energy cost differential is large and volatile. (ESA 2003)
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Figure 136. Technology Comparisons: Per Cycle Cost (ESA 2003).
Capital Costs
While capital cost is an important economic parameter, it should be realized that the total ownership
cost (including the impact of equipment life and O&M costs) is a much more meaningful index for a
complete economic analysis. For example, while the capital cost of lead-acid batteries is relatively low,
they may not necessarily be the least expensive option for energy management (load leveling) due to
their relatively short life for this type of application. (ESA 2003)
The battery costs in this chart have been adjusted to exclude the cost of power conversion electronics.
The cost per unit energy has also been divided by the storage efficiency to obtain the cost per output
(useful) energy. (ESA 2003)
Installation cost also varies with the type and size of the storage. The information in the chart and table
here should only be used as a guide not as detailed data. (ESA 2003)
Notes:
1. The costs of storage technologies are changing as they evolve. The cost ranges in this chart in-
clude approximate values in 2002 and the expected mature values in a few years.
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2. The Metal-Air batteries may appear to be the best choice based on their high energy density
and low cost, but the rechargeable types have a very limited life cycle and are still under de-
velopment.
Figure 137.  Technology Comparisons: Capital Cost (ESA 2003).
4.13. Carbon (CO2) Capture and Storage (CCS)
4.13.1. Technologies
CO2 capture and storage (CCS) is separation of CO2 from anthropogenic sources, transport to a storage
location, and isolation from the atmosphere. CCS would be an option in the portfolio of actions for stabi-
lization of greenhouse gas concentrations while allowing for the continued use of fossil fuels. (Rubin et
al. 2005)
Capture of CO2 can be applied to large point sources, and storage could take place in geological forma-
tions or the ocean, in mineral carbonates, or by using the CO2 in industrial processes (Rubin et al. 2005).
155
Figure 138. Schematic Diagram of Possible CCS Systems. It Shows the Sources for which CCS
Might Be Relevant, Transport of Carbon Dioxide and Storage Options (Rubin et al.
2005).
Figure 1249. CCS Systems (IEA 2004.)
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4.13.2. Current Status of CCS Technology
Components of CCS are in various stages of development. Complete CCS systems can be put together
from existing technologies that are mature or economically feasible under specific conditions. (CO2CRC
2008)
Pipelines are preferred for transporting large amounts of CO2 for distances up to around 1,000 km. For
smaller amounts or larger distances overseas, use of ships to transport CO2 is economically more attrac-
tive. (CO2CRC 2008)
Storage of CO2 in deep geological formations (oil and gas fields, saline formations, unminable coal beds)
uses many of the same technologies that have been developed by the oil and gas industry and has been
proven to be economically feasible under specific conditions for oil and gas fields and saline formations.
(CO2CRC 2008)
Figure 140.  Overview of Geological Storage Options (CO2CRC 2008).
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Figure 141. Overview of Ocean Storage Options (Global Warming 2008).
Ocean storage could be done in two ways: by injecting CO2 into the water column (typically below 1,000
meters) via a fixed pipeline or a moving ship, or by depositing it via a fixed pipeline or an offshore plat-
form on the sea floor at depths below 3,000 m, where CO2 is denser than water and is expected to form a
“lake” that would delay dissolution of CO2 into the surrounding environment (see Figure 141). Ocean
storage is still in the research phase and especially Japan has been active while the USA has practically
withdrawn form the area. (Global Warming 2008)
The estimated geological reservoir capacities are 900 Gt CO2 in disused oil and gas fields, 40 Gt CO2 in
unmineable coal beds and 400–10,000 Gt CO2 in deep saline reservoirs. To put these capacities in per-
spective, in 2002 global CO2 emissions from fuel combustion amounted to about 24 Gt CO2 and are pro-
jected to reach 38 Gt – CO2 per year in 2030. (Global Warming 2008)
4.13.3. Environmental and Economic Benefits
Carbon dioxide emissions are the main source of climate change and the reduction of the emissions is
crucial for environmental sustainability. CO2 capture and storage offers one way of reducing the emis-
sions. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that the CCS is an end-of-pipe solution, and should there-
fore be considered only once a maximum efficiency improvement has been achieved on the power pro-
duction process. (Stone et al 2009)
The net reduction of emissions to the atmosphere through CCS is influenced by the fraction of CO2 cap-
tured, the loss in overall efficiency of power plants or industrial processes due to the additional energy
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required for capture, transport and storage, and the fraction of CO2 retained in storage over the long
term. (Stone et al 2009)
CCS has value to mitigation as it may reduce overall mitigation costs and increase flexibility in achieving
greenhouse gas emission reductions. The application of CCS would depend on technical maturity, costs,
overall potential, regulatory aspects, environmental issues and public perception. (Stone et al 2009)
With respect to storage in depleted oil reservoirs, one option consists in injecting CO2 into almost de-
pleted oil fields so as to enhance oil production. This process, called the Enhanced Oil Recovery process
(EOR), currently uses about 45 Mt CO2/year and is most commonly used in the USA. Transposing this
process for Enhanced Gas Recovery (EGR) is not currently used, although such projects have been pro-
posed in Canada and the Netherlands. CO2 can also be injected into suitable coal seams, producing
methane that is pushed out by the incoming CO2. There have been few Enhanced Coal Bed Methane
(ECBM) trials in the world to date. The benefits from the enhanced fossil fuel production is calculated to
amount €0–29/t CO2; compared to capture costs of €16–42/t CO2. This offers the opportunity to offset
part or even all of the capture costs. (Stone et al 2009)
CCS technology does not offer considerable employment effects since the planned projects are mainly
large scale offering only limited employment possibilities in the process operation and some in the
equipment manufacturing (Stone et al 2009).
CCS technology can form an important process option in the shift towards hydrogen economy. If hydro-
gen is produced from natural gas or coal the CCS technology can form part of the process chain. (Stone
et al 2009)
4.13.4. Market Trends for CO2 Capture Technologies
From a market perspective, chemical absorption-based processes, which are readily available, will be the
first to fulfil the needs of the CO2 capture technology market. Once membrane technology is fully devel-
oped, it will progressively replace absorption technology. (EC 2005)
Although capturing is technically feasible today, the cost of this process is a major issue. Capture costs
are currently estimated at €50–60/t, whilst the target costs are €30-40/t for Japan, €20-30/t for
Europe and $10/t for the USA. (EC 2005)
The CO2-EOR potential in the North Sea is significant. On the Norwegian Continental Shelf alone, the
potential incremental oil from CO2-EOR projects has been estimated to be in the region of 1.5–2.0 mil-
liard barrels, thereby inferring a requirement for 500–650 Mt CO2 in the Norwegian sector until 2025.
Similar figures are anticipated for the UK offshore oil sector. (EC 2005)
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4.13.5. Barriers to Use and Local Health, Safety and Environmental Risks
Continuous leakage of small quantities of CO2 over a long time frame could offset the benefits of CCS for
mitigating climate change and, depending on the storage option and the selection process, leaks could
become a disperse emission source, which would be difficult to control. (IPCC 2005)
The local risks associated with CO2 transport could be similar to or lower than those posed by compara-
ble operations. For existing CO2 pipelines, mostly in areas of low population density, accident numbers
reported per kilometre pipeline are very low and are comparable to those for hydrocarbon pipelines, and
the impacts would probably not be more severe than those with natural gas accidents. If a sudden and
brief large release of CO2 occurred, the local impacts on health could be significant; a concentration of
CO2 greater than 7–10% in air would cause immediate dangers to human life and health. (IPCC 2005)
Risks posed by geological storage would depend on the criteria and available subsurface information
used for site selection, the design of the monitoring program to detect problems, the regulatory system,
and the appropriate use of remediation methods to stop or control CO2 releases if they arise. (IPCC
2005)
There are two different types of leakage scenarios: 1) Abrupt leakage, through injection well failure or
leakage up an abandoned well, and 2) more gradual leakage, through undetected faults, fractures, or
wells. Impacts of elevated CO2 concentrations in the shallow subsurface could include lethal effects on
plants and subsoil animals, and contamination of groundwater. High fluxes in conjunction with stable
atmospheric conditions could lead to local high CO2 concentrations in the air that could harm animals or
people. (IPCC 2005)
The chronic effects of direct CO2 injection into the ocean on ecosystems over large ocean areas and long
time scales are unclear. In contrast, adding CO2 to the ocean or forming pools of liquid CO2 on the ocean
floor at industrial scales will alter the local chemical environment to an extent that has been shown in
laboratory studies to cause mortality of ocean organisms. (IPCC 2005)
At normal conditions, the atmospheric concentration of CO2 is 0.037 %, a non-toxic amount. Most peo-
ple with normal cardiovascular, pulmonary-respiratory, and neurological functions can tolerate expo-
sure of up to 0.5 to 1.5 % CO2 for one to several hours without harm. (IPCC 2005)
Higher concentrations or exposures of longer duration are hazardous – either by reducing the concen-
tration of oxygen in the air to below the 16 % level required to sustain human life, or by entering the
body, especially the bloodstream, and/or altering the amount of air taken in during breathing. Protective
standards have been developed for workers who may be exposed to CO2. These standards could form a
basis for protection of the population at large against exposure to CO2. (IPCC 2005)
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4.13.6. CCS Use in Different Countries
Large point sources of CO2 are concentrated in major industrial areas, mostly in industrialized countries,
but also in developing countries. CO2 sources are often close (< 300 km) to areas that potentially hold
reservoirs for geological storage. Only a small proportion of large emission sources might be close to
ocean storage locations. (IPCC 2005)
The timing of the entry of CCS technologies into a particular region is influenced by local conditions such
as the relative price of coal and natural gas in a region. The policy regime, and in particular the extent of
emissions trading can influence where CCS technologies are deployed. (IPCC 2005)
Currently, three large-scale CCS systems are in place: in Norway, Canada, and Algeria. There are alto-
gether four commercial capture projects in Asia, five in North America, one in Europe and one in Latin
America. R&D capture projects are mainly in North America (23) and Europe (14). Geological and ocean
storage demo and R&D projects are also mainly in North America (40) and Europe (22) and some in de-
veloping countries (9). (IPCC 2005)
Due to its large and increasing fossil-fuel-based power production systems, China represents a great po-
tential market for CCS technologies (IPCC 2005).
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5.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENERGY MARKETS
The energy policies of European Union are among the strongest factors determining the future of energy
markets in Finland. The most central objectives of European energy policy are sustainable development,
competitiveness and energy security. On the other hand, the Finnish energy sector is in good position to in-
fluence these policies as the Nordic power market and cross-border trade continue to be progressive in com-
parison to most other regions of the Union (see e.g. Nordel 2007).
The primary objective of common European energy markets is increasing competitiveness. The integrated
European energy markets and their regulation play a critical role in European competitive strategy. Competi-
tive and efficient European electricity and gas markets are aimed at affecting the energy prices for the benefit
of European societies, industry and citizens. Energy pricing is seen as a key factor for the wellbeing of Euro-
pean citizens, while electricity and gas markets are critical inputs for the industry. Increasing competition in
the energy sector is considered to increase efficiency and service supply in the energy sector, to support tech-
nology development and price competition. (COM 2007-528; COM 2007-529)
Competitive and efficient electricity and gas markets can also play a role in combating climate change. Only in
a functioning market, it is possible to create a functioning emission trade system and industry based on re-
newable energy sources. These are needed to comply with the target of European Council, requiring that 20 %
of primary energy consumption must be covered with renewable energy by year 2020. Also well functioning
retail markets plays a significant role in climate change mitigation by increasing consumers awareness of
household energy consumption and energy costs, as all measures aiming at CO2 emission reductions and in-
creasing energy efficiency presume measures taken by private households. (COM 2007-528; COM 2007-529)
In addition, competitive EU wide electricity and gas markets are seen indispensable for securing European
energy supply, because only Europe-wide and competitive markets create accurate investment signals and
provide equal network access for all potential investors. Cross-border interconnections were originally devel-
oped for mutual support between countries and regions in emergency situations, but they are increasingly
being used for trading between states. In addition, competitive markets are seen to create real and effective
incentives for both network operators and producers to realize the extensive investments required in EU dur-
ing the following decades. Modern societies are in a critical manner dependent on security of energy supply.
Countries that do not possess sufficient supply of fossil fuels are facing increasing insecurity in availability of
primary energy. In addition, the aging of European power transmission and distribution networks in threat-
ening security, reliability and quality of supply. (COM 2007-528; COM 2007-529)
The transmission and distribution systems are commonly run by natural monopolies, either national or re-
gional bodies, under energy authorities’ supervision, while the generation sector is increasingly competitive.
The basic elements of market restructuring involve unbundling of the potentially competitive services from
the core of natural monopolies, (introducing competition in the services provided over the networks, and in-
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troducing the regulation of natural monopolies in order to ensure reasonable tariffs and non-discriminatory
network access. (see e.g. Energiamarkkinavirasto 2008)
The requirements of developing European electricity markets include separation of supply and production
activities from network operations, harmonization of powers of national regulatory authorities and strength-
ening their independence. Further requirements include creating a system for coordinating national regula-
tors’ cooperation, establishing a mechanism for transmission system operators for coordinating network op-
eration and increasing efficiency in cross-border power trade and transparency of energy markets. (COM
2007-530; COM 2007-531)
The process of liberalizing the electricity and gas market started about 10 years ago. During this time, many of
Europe's citizens have benefited from more choice and more competition, with improved service and security.
The Nordic countries have been European forerunners in power sector liberalization and development of a
genuinely competitive international market area for electricity. However, the process of developing real com-
petitive markets is far from complete, because the ultimate objective in development of internal electricity
and gas markets is the creation of real European end user markets. All retails markets within the Union have
been opened to competition since July 1 2007, however in practice many consumers are tied to their tradi-
tional supplier, as the required legislative framework has not been developed. In practice, a large proportion
of the EU’s citizens and businesses lack a genuine choice of supplier. Market fragmentation along national
borders, a high degree of vertical integration and high market concentration are at the root of the lack of a
truly internal market so far. (ERGEG 2007)
5.1. Role of third countries in EU internal energy markets
The new directives require factual unbundling of transmission network operators and distribution and genera-
tion activities on both national level and union wide. In particular, this requirement dictates that a distribution
or generation company operating in any Member State may not own nor operate transmission network in any
Member State. This requirement applies similarly to enterprises both from and outside the Union. In addition,
legislative measures guarantee that in case enterprises from third countries seek to acquire or control a signifi-
cant share of a network within EU, they are required to present unambiguous verification that they are following
the same unbundling principles as enterprises in the Union. Similarly, transmission network or TSO should not
be under control of third counties nor individual coming from third counties, with the exception of a specific
agreement between EU and respective third country. (COM 2007-530; COM 2007-531)
5.2. Development of Market Regulation
Considering the significance of availability of electricity to the functioning of the whole society, gives the
requirement of public service to the reliability of power system. It is controversial, whether completely
liberalized market system could satisfy this requirement tolerably (See Brennan 2005). Substituting
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competition for regulation has been more successful in economic sectors such as aviation and banking,
yet after the dramatic turns of financial crisis in autumn 2008, more regulation is called for at least in
the latter. In some other industries, such as telecommunication and electricity, competition and markets
liberalization has been more difficult from the start, because these industries have segments with charac-
teristics of natural monopolies.
Power generation and trade have been liberalized in many countries, while long distance transmission
and local electricity distribution continue to be regulated monopolistic operations. It seems therefore
appropriate to target regulation where it supports market development in those parts of the systems
where requirements for competition are innate. It may be also worth asking whether the competition is
actually worthwhile, if the restructuring and regulatory structures necessary to ensure competition
themselves are costly. (Brennan 2005.) In addition, the relation between competition and regulation
should strive for the goal of serving European citizens and national economies as efficiently and equita-
bly as possible. Developing the European energy markets aims at strengthening of the regulatory frame-
work to support market functioning. Measures related to this are involved in strengthening the powers
of national regulatory authorities and creating an independent organization for natural regulators coop-
eration.
5.3. Cooperation of Regulatory Authorities in the Energy Sector
Even though the internal market for energy has developed significantly, there are regulatory issues to be
solved, particularly on cross-border issues. Commission-initiated self-regulatory forums like the Flor-
ence (electricity) forum and the Madrid (gas) forum have been working to bring the respective stake-
holders together in order to strengthen cooperation. In addition, an independent advisory group, called
the "European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas" (ERGEG) was established by the Commission
in 2003 from representatives of the national regulatory authorities. (ERGEG 2007)
ERGEG activities have advanced the completion of the internal market in gas and electricity by issuing
non-binding guidelines and addressing recommendations and opinions to the Commission. Nonethe-
less, the initiation of self-regulatory forums and setting up of ERGEG has not resulted in the real pro-
gress towards the development of common standards and approaches that are needed to create function-
ing cross-border and regional markets, and ultimately, a European energy market. The present decision
making process within ERGEG usually requires the agreement of 27 regulators and more than 30 trans-
mission system operators to reach agreement, which has not lead to real decisions on the difficult issues.
(ERGEG 2007)
At moment, the grid codes under which electricity companies must operate, differ greatly between
Member States and often even within a single Member State. The grid codes need to undergo a process
of convergence and then harmonization if the objective is to truly create integrated energy markets in the
EU. In order to realize an independent organizational body with appropriate powers to support coopera-
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tion and development of energy markets, the creation of a more powerful network of national energy
regulators is therefore under consideration. (ERGEG 2007)
5.4. Functions of the proposed Agency for the Cooperation of Energy
The proposed regulatory authorities’ cooperation agency would have the following functions at European
level: In order to improve the handling of cross-border situations, the agency would provide a frame-
work for national regulators to cooperate. The agency would establish procedures for cooperation be-
tween national regulators, in particular concerning the exchange of information and the sharing of com-
petence where more than one Member State is involved. (COM 2007-530; COM 2007-531)
The second duty would be regulatory oversight of the cooperation between transmission system opera-
tors. The agency would assume responsibility for monitoring and reviewing the activities of the Euro-
pean Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity and of the European Network of Trans-
mission System Operators for Gas, including in particular their investment plans, and in the preparation
of technical and market codes. (COM 2007-530; COM 2007-531)
With regard to the technical and market codes, the agency would be authorized to ask transmission sys-
tem operators to revise their drafts or to deal with specific issues in more detail. In addition, the agency
would be able to recommend that the Commission make these codes legally binding, in case voluntary
implementation should prove to be insufficient or not suited to certain issues. In addition, the agency
would be able to take specific decisions on individual technical issues and have a general advisory role
concerning market regulation issues with regard to the Commission.  Moreover, the agency could issue
non-binding guidelines to disseminate good practices among the national regulators. (COM 2007-530;
COM 2007-531)
5.5. Long-term supply contracts
Bilateral contracts help energy intensive industries obtain more predictable energy prices. However,
such contracts contain the threat to open competition by closing the downstream market of the supply
chain and thus hindering customers from changing their supplier. In order to reduce insecurity on the
market, the Commission intends to provide guidelines on whether such bilateral long-term contracts are
in compliance with EC competition law. (COM 2007-528; COM 2007-529)
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6.  ENERGY TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION
The functioning of electricity transmission and distribution are inseparable from the functioning of elec-
tricity markets. Modern societies are increasingly dependent on undisrupted electricity supply. The most
significant societal factor influencing the development of power transmission and distribution is the
change of community structures and consumption structure. Transmission and distribution infrastruc-
ture is also challenged by the changing power generation structure, which is driven by, among other
matters, the rise of distributed generation technologies and renewable energy sources. (Vajjhala et al.
2008)
Future uncertainties in electrical networks are numerous: availability and production of primary energy;
liberalized trade, inducing changes in power transmission flows, intermittent power supply from distrib-
uted generation units, regulatory frameworks and investment incentives for new innovations. Redesign-
ing electrical networks in a way that responds to these challenges calls in for substantial investment.
(Kumpulainen et al. 2006)
The importance of new network solutions is emphasized in improving security of supply. As the society
develops, location of new electrical power utilities/generation plants/(appliances) becomes more chal-
lenging than earlier. This calls for introduction of new innovative solutions and measures. In addition,
environmental and landscape impacts of network operations receives closer attention for the whole life-
cycle of the equipment. (Kumpulainen et al. 2006)
At the same time, consumption preferences of electricity users are changing. Regardless of energy effi-
ciency measures, electricity consumption in homes and service sector is likely to increase. Electricity will
be used to substitute for other energy uses, in particular those harmful to the climate. Heat pumps and
electric cars will affect how distribution network is used. Importance of energy efficiency will rise to a
significant level and the role of renewable energy sources will be given emphasis to. Interest towards
small-scale power production will increase, as will the number of heat pumps on heating homes.  Due to
the new ways of consuming, storing and producing electricity, estimating energy demand will become
more complicated, which in turn increases uncertainty in network business. Subsidies directed e.g. to
renewable energy, such as feed-in tariff, may cause pressure to raise the network tariffs. (Kumpulainen
et al. 2006)
The architecture of European power networks has over the decades developed to serve an infrastructure,
where large generation facilities are located far from points of electricity consumption. Because electric-
ity generation currently is for the most part based on fossil fuel facilities, the infrastructure for trans-
porting both fuel and power has been developed accordingly. However, as European energy supply is
now anticipated to shift towards low carbon sources, the infrastructure will also evolve. Renewable en-
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ergy has only recently emerged as a policy and technology priority, and electrical networks are central to
meeting goals for new development. (Kumpulainen et al. 2006)
Transmission and distribution networks are indispensable part of renewable energy infrastructure. The
significance of access to network for renewable energy is widely understood. However, it is helpful to
bear in mind that dedicated renewable energy quotas and other steering measures are policy instru-
ments, and the planning of such instruments is typically not based on assessment of availability of
transmission and distribution capacity or assessment of technological or economic renewable energy
potential.  Therefore, renewable energy generation and power delivery are not usually connected in pol-
icy planning as they implicitly are in project planning. (Kumpulainen et al. 2006)
For renewable energy facilities, such as wind farms, where operating costs are typically low and capital
costs, including transmission, are often a significant component of total project costs. In addition, as
renewable energy resources are often located in remote locations, greater reliance on renewable electric-
ity generation is bound to result in a geographic shift in the location of generation capacity. On the other
hand, adequate existing transmission access may act as a driver of early large-scale, grid-connected re-
newable energy development. As the electric power sector shifts toward greater use of renewable re-
sources, transmission policies and renewable policies should be evaluated together. (Kumpulainen et al.
2006)
6.1. Restructuring and Unbundling of Transmission from Trade and Gen-
eration
Existing legislation requires both legal and functional unbundling of transmission and distribution from
trading and generation operations. On European Union level, legal and functional unbundling only con-
cerns transmission system operators and large distribution system operators serving more than 100 000
customers. EU member states have followed this requirement by applying various organization struc-
tures.  Many of member states have established completely separate enterprise for network operations,
while some others have established a legal person that is part of the integrated enterprise.
Three kinds of problems may arise, if network operator is a legal entity within an integrated company.
Firstly, the transmission system operator may treat its affiliated companies better than it would treat
competing third parties. Integrated companies may use network assets to make entry more difficult for
competitors. Legal unbundling does not solve the conflict of interest within integrated companies,
whereby the supply and production interests aim to maximize their sales and market share while the
network operator is obliged to offer non-discriminatory access to competitors. Secondly, non-
discriminatory access to information cannot be guaranteed under the current unbundling rules, as there
is no effective means of preventing transmission system operators releasing market sensitive informa-
tion to the generation or supply branch of the integrated company. (COM 2007-528)
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Third problem is that integrated companies have distorted investment incentives. Vertically integrated
network operators have no incentive for developing the network in the overall interests of the market.
Quite the opposite, they have an inherent interest to under-invest in new networks when this could
benefit their competitors and bring in new competition. Instead, the investment decisions made by verti-
cally integrated companies tend to be biased to the needs of own sales companies. This undermines the
EU's competitiveness and its security of supply and prejudices the achievement of its climate change and
environmental objectives. (COM 2007-528)
6.2. Cooperation of transmission network operators in Europe and Nordic
Countries
Market harmonization presumes effective cooperation between transmission system operators, in addi-
tion to an unambiguous and secure regulatory framework, including coordination of regulatory actions.
This presumes that rules and procedures governing access to network to be unified, and information and
data exchange between TSOs to function effectively and investment in cross border transmission capac-
ity to be closely coordinated. Gas and electrical transmission system operators are already engaged in
voluntary cooperation within currently existing structures such as ETSO (European Transmission Sys-
tem Operators), GTE (Gas Transmission Europe), UCTE (Union for the Coordination of Transmission of
Electricity) and EASEE-Gas (European Association for the Streamlining of Energy Exchange). (COM
2007-528)
Voluntary cooperation is limited by lack of legal validity, enabling countries according to their delibera-
tion to withdraw from common technical standards and developing power and gas network connections
and coordinating network operations. Three kinds of gaps exist regarding development of market and
technical rules: the present rules do not cover all sectors that need to be harmonized; national rules are
not compatible, and rules are either not legally binding or their execution cannot be monitored. Difficul-
ties in coordinating development of electric and gas network connection and operation are displayed in
trading limitations and delivery interruptions. It has been therefore proposed that transmission opera-
tors intensify their cooperation in several central areas. (COM 2007-528)
The Nordic infrastructure of electricity transmission and distribution is relatively progressive, providing
a solid ground for further development. The main areas are network operation control, condition moni-
toring, demand side management, measurement technologies and related data exchange.  Nordel is the
cooperation organization of Nordic transmission system operators, aimed at advancing seamless coop-
eration in the Nordic electricity market area as a part of North-East European electricity markets, as well
as maintaining high level of security and reliability in the Nordic power system. (Nordel 2007)
In the Nordic countries, electricity production systems differ greatly from one country to another, partly
due to historical reasons and partly owning to the fact that the national systems are subject to different
legislation and to supervision by different official bodies. The purpose of the Nordic Grid Code is to ac-
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complish coherent and coordinated Nordic operation and planning practices between the national
transmission system operators, to establish the favourable conditions for development of a functioning
and effectively integrated Nordic power market. The Nordic Grid Code governs technical cooperation
between the transmission system operators in the interconnected Nordel countries: Norway, Sweden,
Finland and Denmark. The Code concerns the transmission system operators (TSO’s) functioning in the
operation and planning of the electric power system, in addition the market participants’ access to the
grid. The Nordic Grid Code lays the foundation for technical rules governing the cooperation of the Nor-
dic transmission systems operators and is a step towards the harmonization of present national rules. A
central objective is to develop a common understanding of satisfactory operational reliability and quality
of delivery in the Nordic power system. A new element in the Code since 2007 is set of regulations on
connecting wind turbines in the transmission system. (Nordel 2007)
6.3. Challenges in developing power transmission and distribution
Electricity distribution business has undergone significant changes over the past decades, and the re-
structuring of the industry is still in progress. While EU legislation requires unbundling of distribution
system operators serving more than 100 000 customers, in Finland, where unbundling has advanced
further, legal unbundling of network operations are required when energy transmitted in a distribution
network exceeds 200 kWh/a. According to Finnish legislation, all electrical networks below 100 kV volt-
age level are defined as distribution networks. The prevalent distribution voltage levels are 0.4 kV and
20 kV. (Energiamarkkinavirasto 2008)
Information societies of today are highly dependent on reliable electric power systems, and the function-
ing of the distribution networks largely determines the availability of electricity within a society. In addi-
tion, the voltage quality at customer supply terminals is determined by the characteristics of distribution
networks. (Kumpulainen et al. 2006)
Strong driving forces in distribution business appear to be regulation, the changes in owners’ profit ob-
jectives, organizational developments, and technological innovations. Regulation has significant impact
on the overall development of the industry because companies tend to adapt to their operating environ-
ment, aiming to optimize their performance under a given regulatory regime. (Hänninen et al. 2006)
As energy industry has become increasingly competitive, both private and municipal owners of distribu-
tion companies are now considering the commercial interests in electricity distribution alongside their
public service obligations. Therefore, ensuring that electricity distribution business remains an attractive
investment object is essential for maintaining reliable electric power systems. (Hänninen et al. 2006)
While electricity distribution companies nowadays experience competition, being a regulated industry
makes electricity distribution business differ from most conventional commercial businesses. The major
difference is that in the regulated industry a single driving force, regulation, plays an essential in deter-
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mining the operational framework of the regulated sector. Electricity distribution is an industry with
long asset lifetimes, typically of 30–50 years. As today’s decisions have such far-reaching impacts, regu-
lation has an exceptionally influential position regarding the future of electricity distribution. (Hänninen
et al. 2006)
Regulation models, on the other hand, are typically in place approximately 3–5 years on average. Fur-
ther, regulation even has power to shape other driving forces of the sector, e.g. by either promoting or
prohibiting organizational and technological developments. Therefore, understanding the long-term
consequences of any regulatory actions is crucially important. As regulation strongly directs the devel-
opment of the distribution sector, clear definition of the long-term strategic goals of regulation and
sound understanding of their practical implications are called for. (Hänninen et al. 2006)
Finally, the aging distribution networks all over the western world will soon require extensive refur-
bishment programs. In the near future, the question how to rebuild the networks will be of high rele-
vance. Underlying factors of the need to renovate distribution networks in the sparsely habited areas of
Finland involve aging of the network and increased expectations for supply reliability, in addition to po-
litical steering aimed at expanding distributed and renewable electricity generation. At the moment, me-
dium voltage networks are the most vulnerable part of distribution system, their faults causing most of
the duration of interruption experienced by customers. Over 90 % of the interruptions experienced by
the customers are caused by faults in distribution networks. Moreover, about 90% of the 140 000 km
medium voltage distribution network in Finland consists of open wire lines, that are subject to distur-
bances caused by weather, such as storms and thundering. Climate change is believed to increase occur-
rence of storms and failure frequency of overhead lines. (Hänninen et al. 2006)
Therefore, a key question is how to promote innovations in the electricity distribution sector in the long-
term. The need for refurbishing the existing electricity distribution networks provides a chance to adopt
new technologies in the sector. At present, as EU policies strongly promote new and renewable tech-
nologies, and the new Finnish national climate and energy strategy foresees reducing energy consump-
tion and strong increase in the use of renewable energy, this is particularly important. (Hänninen et al.
2006)
6.3.1. Future grids
The future vision adopted by the European Commission is that distribution grids will become active and
will have to accommodate bi-directional power flows. The European electricity systems have moved to
operate under the framework of a market model, in which generators are dispatched according to market
forces and the transmission grid control centers undertake an overall supervisory role, including respon-
sibilities on active power balancing and ancillary services such as voltage stability. The primary role of
distribution networks in delivering energy to end-users, on the other hand, has changed little. Distribu-
tion networks tend to be radial with mostly unidirectional power flows. (Kumpulainen et al. 2006)
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Future models for the electricity grids have to meet the changes in technology, in the values in society, in
the environment and in commerce. Thus, security, safety, environment, power quality and cost of supply
are all being examined in new ways and energy efficiency in the system is taken ever more seriously for a
variety of reasons. (Kumpulainen et al. 2006)
European and national measures set binding obligations for low carbon power production, new and old
renewable energy technologies and efficient utilization of heat.  Energy policies of the European Union
strongly encourage the development of distributed electricity generation and strive to realize and pro-
gressive network infrastructure. The starting point for these aims is that application of new network
technologies are considered critical for transforming the European electrical transmission and distribu-
tion networks and successfully managing the forthcoming power sector challenges. Among other meas-
ures, this includes network technologies that increase power transmission and reduce losses, hence im-
proving efficiency of generation and supply, and utilization of power electronics that improve supply
quality. (Energiamarkkinavirasto 2008)
6.3.2. Distributed generation
Distributed generation is generally understood as electricity production that is located in proximity of
point of demand and connected to distribution network. Distributed generation effectively changes the
operation of distribution network, even if microgrids are not in question. Instead of the present, unidi-
rectional power flow, the flow in the network would be bidirectional and depend on momentary output
of local generation units. Distributed generation units can be classified by size into micro generation (2-
200 kVA), generation connected to distribution network (0.2–2.0 MVA) and generation connected to
regional transmission network (2–20 MVA). Although technologies or fuels are not defined, distribution
generation technologies are often identified with utilization of renewable energy sources. (Willis & Scott
2000)
In Finland, relatively small amount of distributed generation capacity has been connected to distribution
networks until now. Development of micro and small-scale power generation strongly depends on politi-
cal decision-making, in addition to development of technologies and energy prices. At present, EU poli-
cies strongly encourage distributed generation. Political decisions on European Union level stipulate in-
creasing renewable energy use, which supports distributed energy. In addition, emission trade improves
the competitiveness of renewable energy. Challenges from investor perspective lie in maturity of tech-
nologies and economic profitability. In electrical power system, increasing distributed generation
changes increases complexity of the system. This will set new requirements e.g. for voltage control and
protection solutions. (Kumpulainen et al. 2006)
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Requirements for distributed electricity generation
The change of the electricity supply structure towards progressively more DG, RES and active grids re-
quires that a number of wider factors be addressed:
o Improvements of security standards in the context of critical infrastructures;
o Integration of both central and distributed generation;
o Integration of innovative technologies into existing grids;
o Harmonization of equipment standards to allow “plug-and-play”;
o Increased funding for large research incentives, including public and private sharing;
o The impact of neighboring electricity systems on the European network;
For electric utilities, distributed generation may appear to reduce energy transmitted through the net-
work and thus income. Therefore, tariff structures need to be revised (more power-based) in order to
ensure sufficient resources can be allocated to network maintenance and development. In the long term,
however, distributed energy resources can be help improve system reliability and power quality. If the
aim is to draw benefits from improved quality and reliability in low voltage networks through increased
amount of distributed generation and energy storage, development of microgrids is needed. (Kumpu-
lainen et al. 2006)
Microgrids are low voltage networks that incorporate DG sources with local energy storage devices and
controllable loads, such as water heaters and air conditioning. Within the main grid, a microgrid can be
regarded as a controlled entity, which can be operated as a single aggregated load or generator, and,
given attractive remuneration, as a small source of power or as ancillary service unit supporting the net-
work. (Kumpulainen et al. 2006)
Typical total installed capacity of a microgrid ranges from a few hundred kilowatts up to a couple of
megawatts. Larger units are typically connected to transmission grid. Although microgrids mostly oper-
ate connected to the distribution network, they are capable of islanding. In case of a fault in the up-
stream network, a microgrid can automatically be transferred to islanded mode, and be resynchronized
after restoration of the upstream network voltage. This feature can help increase reliability of supply in
case of large faults. (Kumpulainen et al. 2006)
Technologies enabling Smartgrids
o Active distribution networks, revealing characteristics of today’s transmission grids
o New network technologies that facilitate increased power transfers and losses reduction (e.g.
GIL, superconductivity, high operating temperatures, FACTS technologies, etc.)
o Wide deployment of communications to enable grid automation, on-line services, active opera-
tion, demand response and DSM
o Power electronic technologies for quality of supply
o Stationary energy storage devices.
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Superconducting hydrogen-electricity grid - The grid of the future?
On August 14, 2003, electricity failed in New York City, plunging 48 million people throughout the
northeastern U.S. and Ontario into a night of darkness. Even more extensive blackout affected 56 million
people in Italy and Switzerland a month later, calling attention to pervasive problems with modern in-
terconnected electrical networks. The increasing pressure on existing high-voltage transmission grids
and recent large power outages in the U.S. and Europe has brought idea of a superconducting grid into
the spotlight again.
Super Cable is a superconducting conduit cooled by hydrogen that can simultaneously deliver electrical
power and hydrogen fuel. The cable contains a pair of DC superconducting wires at +/- 50 kV carrying
50 kA, a current far higher than in a conventional wire. Such a cable could carry approximately 5 GW
over several hundred kilometers at nearly zero resistance. Since the cable carries hydrogen as its cryo-
genic coolant, it has the double advantage of transporting energy in chemical as well as in electrical
form.
Boosting renewables and hybrid vehicles
Such a hydrogen-filled “SuperGrid” would serve also as a vast energy storage. It would enable the trans-
port of large amounts of electrical power from remote renewable or nuclear energy power stations.
Power stations could also operate an electrolysis plant to produce hydrogen. The intermittent output of
renewable energy power stations could be compensated by a shift in the electricity/hydrogen blend pro-
duced. Super Grid could also dramatically reduce fuel costs for a future transport sector based on elec-
tric- and hydrogen-powered hybrid vehicles.
Safety, reliability and investment cost are barriers
A prototype of Super Cable still has to be built. Existing nuclear, hydrogen and superconducting tech-
nologies, supplemented by selected renewable energy, provide all the technical ingredients required to
create a SuperGrid. A major technological challenge is ensuring the environmental safety and the reli-
ability of the grid when a Super Grid cable fails. Moreover, the explosive potential of hydrogen requires
an absolute hermetic seal of the line. Another barrier to overcome is that the investment costs will
probably exceed the amount and timescale that is attractive to private investment. Mustering the social
and national resolve to create it may be a challenge. However the benefits would be considerable.
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7.  SUMMARY
Overall, it can be stated that the future of energy consumption and production can develop towards vari-
ous directions. Different energy scenarios offer certain aspects of future development, but are always
tied to their own presumptions, predefined research targets and the material available and thus are not
always entirely comparable. They do however give ideas of the future of energy consumption and pro-
duction likely to be, if no measures are taken to alter it, and then, alternative futures.
In this report, global energy scenarios have been covered, with the overview of the most well known and
recently published scenarios. Major economies in the world, whose development will most likely have a
huge impact on other countries and especially Finland, have been introduced and include China, India,
Russia, the United States of America and also an intergovernmental organization, the European Union.
Finnish development in regards to energy policy goals and strategies presents the path, toward which the
current policy makers are leading the Finnish energy consumption and production. Also changes in Fin-
nish regional structure, transport and the way of living are considered as factors, which in their part in-
fluence the state of the future, as far as energy matters are concerned.
Estimations of the energy resources and their potentials are an indication of the options available to the
energy production sector. Different energy technologies with the focus on their impact on climate and
the directions that the technology developments are expected to take in the future, offer seeds for think-
ing about the future of the energy production. Fossil fuels: oil, coal and natural gas, nuclear power and
renewable energies, such as solar energy, wind energy, ocean energy and bio energy have been intro-
duced as technologies available as well as carbon capture and storage technologies, energy storage in
general and hydrogen and fuel cells technologies with the known applications for the technologies.
In addition, the development of energy markets has been viewed, with the possibility of liberalizing fur-
ther the electricity and gas markets in Europe. The development of market regulation and the coopera-
tion amongst the regulatory authorities in the energy sector and then the functions, which such regula-
tory authorities would have on European level, if energy markets were to consist of the whole EU, have
been presented in this report.
Related to the functioning of energy markets are also the energy transmission and distribution. Chal-
lenges and uncertainties in electrical power generation are numerous and therefore it is beneficial to
ponder the possible future energy production patterns to improve the network infrastructure accord-
ingly. Legal and functional unbundling in transmission from trade and generation as well as cooperation
of transmission network operators in Europe and especially Nordic countries have been viewed in this
report as well as the challenges that lie ahead in regards to energy transmission and distribution as well
as future models for the electricity grids.
174
All and all, in this report, different perspectives on possible future developments have been introduced,
with the purpose of giving ideas of the ways that the future might look like. The information given in this
report can be helpful in the scenario making process, similar to the one in progress instigated by Finnish
Energy Industries (Energiateollisuus ry) and implemented by Turku School of Economics, Finland Fu-
tures Research Centre. Report will then offer certain options and possibilities for the future and it can be
used at the different stages of the future process by the participants involved in it.
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